Many Voices, Few Listeners: an analysis of the dialogue between Islam and contemporary Europe by Boyce, Valerie
Many Voices, Few Listeners:  
an analysis of the dialogue between  
Islam and contemporary Europe. 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Masters of Arts in European Studies 
at the  
University of Canterbury 
 
 
 
 
Valerie Boyce 
 
 
 
University of Canterbury  
2009 
 
 2 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. 
 
The great International Relations theorist Hedley Bull once said, “thinking is 
research”. Considering this thesis has been relentlessly circulating within the inner 
recesses of my brain for the past fourteen months, whether sitting at my desk, running 
in the park or playing with my granddaughter, I hope he is right. I consider it a 
privilege to have been able to embark on this journey of self-discovery added and 
abetted by passionate academics whose generosity of time and encouragement has 
been appreciated, and by loyal friends and family who put up with my neglect of 
them. 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the University of Canterbury and the 
NCRE for making this thesis possible by providing me with funding, resources, and a 
stimulating working environment. Special thanks to my supervisory team – Professor 
Martin Holland and Dr. Barrie Wharton. Thanks to you, Martin, for your guidance 
and input into this thesis. Thank you also for your untiring dedication to the creation 
and continuing success of the NCRE, which provides exciting opportunities for so 
many students. Thanks to you, Barrie, for your energy and encouragement, and 
critical editing from the other side of the world and I believe we will make a Kiwi of 
you yet!  
 
Thanks to Rebecca not only for your superb organisational skills but also for your 
constant enthusiasm and your infectious laugh. Thanks also to Sarah and the other 
Masters and PhD students at the NCRE – our home away from home. Best wishes in 
your academic futures –you deserve success. 
 
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the Boyce girls - Lisa, Wendy and Alexis 
- who fill my life with laughter, and to Lynda and Gareth – you are all extraordinary!  
 
 
 
 3 
ABSTRACT. 
 
Enlargement of the European Union (EU) coupled with immigration and rising 
transnational flows of people has led to increased contact between different cultures, 
religions, ethnic groups and diverse languages. Historically, the reproduction of 
ethnic and racial bigotry from generation to generation has marred the European 
landscape. Cognisant of this, the EU is committed to the development of intercultural 
competences and the promotion of intercultural dialogue, involving not only public 
authorities but also civil society. As part of a strategy to build a cohesive integrated 
„social Europe‟, the EU launched the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 
(EYID) at Ljubijana in Slovenia on January 8. Beneath the carapace of „Unity in 
Diversity‟, the aim of EYID is to promote a better understanding of Europe‟s 
complex cultural environment in an effort to move beyond „mere tolerance‟. In recent 
years, however, increasing tensions involving Europe‟s Muslim population have been 
exacerbated by their visible difference, youth riots, terrorism and the current global 
discourse of “clash”. Considering that Europe‟s largest ethnic minority is Muslim, 
any attempt to foster tolerance through intercultural dialogue could be severely 
limited by Europe‟s ability to sustain a meaningful dialogue with Islam.  
 
Thus, this thesis focuses specifically on dialogue with Islam in contemporary Europe. 
Its aim is to contribute to the present discussion concerning the perceived need for 
policy makers and citizens to redefine the space/identity allocated to Europe‟s 
Muslim population. Beginning with a brief history of Muslim immigration to Europe 
this dissertation then analyses the marginalisation of these immigrants by the 
development of institutionalised inequalities. Pursuant to this is an examination of the 
scholarly debate surrounding the phenomenon of a nascent „European identity‟ and its 
compatibility, to an equally embryonic „Euro-Muslim identity‟. Using EYID as a tool, 
this treatise then examines the themes reflected in academic discourse, which 
emerged from the EU level debates in relation to the acceptance of Europe‟s 
minorities. As Europe attempts to rethink a broader identity by accepting that 
immigrants are no longer sojourners but a necessary part of Europe‟s future, this 
thesis asks, how meaningful was the EYID to the discourse between Europe‟s 
Muslims and European leaders, policy makers, and civil society?  
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The battle for the hearts and soul of Islam today is taking place 
between moderates and fanatics, between democrats and dictators, 
between those who live in the past and those who adapt to the 
present and plan for a better future. In the resolution of this conflict 
may in fact lie the direction of international peace in the twenty-
first century.      (Benazir Bhutto, 2008:19-20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 9 
CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 
On the cusp of the 21
st
 century, worldwide concern over a „clash‟ between 
civilisations colours perceptions, relationships and policies at an international, 
national, and civic level in European Union (EU) nations.
1
 Fears of a clash with Islam 
in Europe are increasing, fuelled by terrorist attacks, racism and Islamophobic 
tendencies across member states. In response to this escalation of disquiet is a call for 
tolerance, for mutual understanding, and for the need to deepen communication 
through intercultural dialogue. Beset by a troubled history concerning its Muslim 
minorities, the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (EYID) offered the EU 
an opportunity to play a pivotal role in promoting peace through a dialogue with 
Islam. Intercultural dialogue has the potential to be an important mechanism in the 
toolbox of integration for Europe‟s Muslim population, and if supported by political 
and civic will, it may also be instrumental in helping a new generation of Euro-
Muslims shape a pluralistic Islam – an Islam, compatible with western democracy. 
 
The European Union is an unparalleled experiment, a unique polity, which in a mere 
fifty years has united 27 nations, both politically and economically, bringing peace to 
an area long divided by internecine wars. It has also emerged as a developing actor 
(civilian, political and military) on the international stage, promoting normative power 
and human rights.
2
 The EU now seeks to reinforce its sui generis nature in the socio-
cultural sphere, adopting the motto „Unity in Diversity‟ to promote its multi-cultural 
essence. Not only is the EU the first polity to weld previous adversarial nation-states 
together in a successful political and economic union, but by promoting a „European 
identity‟ it is also the first to attempt a union between multiple ethnicities and multiple 
post-modern identities, constantly fragmented by the forces of globalisation. 
 
                                                 
1
See Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2004). 
2
 See Mario Telò, Europe, a civilian power?: European Union, global governance, world order (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Charlotte Bretherton, & John Volger, The European Union as a 
Global Actor (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).  
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Unity in Diversity, however, may be an exigent paradox for the EU especially in 
relation to Europe‟s Muslim population. Ethnically, culturally, and religiously 
different, Muslims can be seen to expose Europe‟s longstanding inability to accept 
minority groups. Moreover, historically Western European identities based on Judeo-
Christian theologies have been constructed in opposition to Christianity‟s archetypal 
„other‟ - Islam. With 15 million Muslims resident in the EU, and the increasing 
visibility of Muslims within Europe due to ongoing conflicts, the biggest challenge to 
establish „unity‟ will be in the socio-cultural accommodation of Islam.3 Despite the 
EU‟s strong political vision, its social vision remains obfuscated and inconsistent and 
throughout Europe, Muslim populations are now forcing a re-conceptualisation of 
European identity by challenging age-old religious, political and secular paradigms. 
Not only are Muslims challenging the visible socio-cultural landscape, but they are 
also challenging core European norms and values by demanding recognition. Charles 
Taylor writes that modernity has brought with it not so much a “need for recognition 
but the conditions in which the attempt to be recognised can fail”.4 Considering that 
failure leads to conflict, „recognition‟ is crucial to the future stability of Europe‟s 
social fabric, and the accommodation of Muslims in Europe rests not only on the 
recognition of Islam as a European religion but also on the fact that Muslims are both 
a separate ethno-cultural group and that they are Europeans too.  
 
Aware of the increasing need to build a cohesive „social Europe‟, the EU launched 
the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue at Ljubijana in Slovenia on January 
8. Beneath the umbrella of the European Commission‟s Agenda for Culture in a 
Globalised World (2007), the aim of EYID was to promote a better understanding of 
Europe‟s complex cultural environment5. Through a series of events at the EU, 
national, and municipal levels, involving art, debates, theatre, exhibitions and inter-
religious dialogue, the EU institutions hoped to forge closer links between all 
                                                 
3
Due to a lack of accurate statistics, this figure represents a rough estimate and it refers to all Muslim 
cultures rather than practising Muslims in the religious sense. Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and 
Michael Emerson, eds. European Islam: Challenges for Society and Public Policy (Brussels, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, 2007), 1 (footnote). 
4
 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of 
Recognition, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 35. 
5
 In May 2007, the Commission proposed an agenda for Culture (com/2007/0242) founded on three 
sets of objectives: cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue; culture as a catalyst for creativity; and 
culture as a key in international relations. http://ec.europa.eu/culture/our-policy-
development/doc399_en.htm  
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European peoples and their respective cultures, including Islam. Considering that, as 
scholars argue, it is the marginalisation and exclusion of Europe‟s Muslims that leads 
to conflict rather than inherent cultural differences, inter-religious and intercultural 
discourse could well be vital to a better understanding of the Euro/Islam debate, and 
to determining a socio-cultural vision for Europe‟s future.6 Not only are Muslim 
immigrants crucial to Europe‟s continuing economic growth, as Europe‟s population 
is depleted by both falling birth rates and aging population, but recent terrorist attacks 
worldwide, mean that the importance of creating open channels of communication 
between diverse cultural identities to the 21
st
 century cannot be underestimated. The 
EU, thus, has a central role to play in accommodating Islam in Europe, and the way in 
which European leaders and society handle the problems resulting from a rapidly 
rising Muslim population could well shape not only Europe‟s future but also “the 
geopolitics of the Middle East and Islam‟s response to the challenge of modernity”7.  
 
The West and zealous Islamic leaders routinely portray Islam as a single monolithic 
entity, an immutable religion that promotes absolute adherence to a rigid dogma, 
leading to the perception that Islam is not compatible with a pluralistic society.
8
 
However, although the teachings of Islam provide precise laws regarding religious 
ritual, from which no deviation is allowed, as far as political and social matters are 
concerned there is room for ijtihad, creative elucidation.
9
 Ijtihad (reason) is stirring 
and there is evidence of a fresh wind blowing across Western Europe heralding a new 
generation of Muslim elites who are active in all levels of European society - civic 
and national - and have the ability to influence policymakers and leaders.
 10
 Alongside 
this vanguard are third and fourth-generation immigrants, who support integration and 
are in the process of developing de-ethnicised European-Muslim identities relative to 
their country of residence.  
                                                 
6
 Thomas Meyer, Identity Mania: Fundamentalism and the Politicalization of Cultural Differences 
(London: Zed Books, 2001), 50. 
7
 Joseph Camilleri, “Europe between Islam and the United States: interests, identity and geopolitics”, 
Global Change, Peace & Security 20, no. 1, (2008): 9. 
8
 Karen Armstrong, “We cannot afford to maintain these ancient prejudices against Islam” The 
Guardian, September 18, 2006. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/sep/18/religion.catholicism  
9
 Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 9. 
10
 Klausen, 28. 
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Europe too is undergoing a crisis of identity as it seeks to promote „unity in diversity‟ 
At present accord remains elusive, for unity relies on the imagination of a new 
„European identity‟ that can correlatively accommodate Europe‟s many minorities 
including Islam. Since belonging is rooted in identity, and identity, ultimately, 
constructed in opposition, the challenge for the EU is to create a „common identity‟ 
based on a mutually inclusive dialogue that enables a „self‟ identification with the 
„other‟. The challenge is to create a „homeland‟ in which a sense of belonging is not 
boundary driven but is open to all of the EU‟s inhabitants regardless of ethnicity, 
religion and colour. Accompanying the embryonic renaissance in Islam, there is also 
evidence of an emerging cosmopolitan identity “neither emotional, nor passionate” 
that is “founded less on memory than on reason”, which is more tolerant of cultural 
diversity.
11
 Cosmopolitanism allows for the accommodation of both the individual 
and the other by resolving the language of confrontation and suspicion through 
commonality and dialogue. It diminishes the emphasis on cultural homogeneity by 
favouring diversity through a plurality of ethnicities, religions and lifestyles. Whether 
cosmopolitanism will guide the development of a more integrated „social Europe‟ or 
not, remains to be seen but in order to prevent Europe from becoming an impossible 
project, „Intercultural Dialogue‟ based on ijtihad, could well be crucial to the 
acculturation of difference and to any multi-societal identity formation.  
 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE. 
 
The remainder of this chapter outlines the methodology and the literature review. 
Chapter two provides a brief history of Muslim immigration to Europe and an 
analysis of the marginalisation of these immigrants by the development of 
institutionalised inequalities. Subsequent chapters examine the scholarly debate 
surrounding the phenomenon of „identity‟, in relation to the concept of a nascent 
„European identity‟ and its compatibility to an emerging „Euro-Muslim identity‟. 
Using EYID as a tool, this treatise then seeks to analyse the themes emerging in the 
EU level debates and effectiveness of intercultural dialogue as a tool for changing the 
perceptions of Europe towards its Muslim communities.  
                                                 
11
 Dominique Schnapper, “Memory and Identity in the Age of the European Construction” in Identity 
and Memory, eds. Dominique Schnapper and others (Paris: CulturesFrance, 2007), 16. 
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Chapter 2. – Historical Barriers to Dialogue. 
 
Ethnic tensions and cultural clashes still mar the integration story in the EU. Racism 
and discrimination fuelled by age-old xenophobic tendencies and institutionalised 
inequalities directed against minorities and immigrants contribute to the failure of 
multiculturalism and integration policies in Europe. This chapter provides a historical 
and political background to some of these institutionalised inequalities by examining 
socio-economic and socio-cultural factors, including human rights. This section also 
examines the role of intercultural dialogue as a means to address these discriminatory 
practices. In the light of recent „clash‟ theories, it also situates the 2008 European 
Year of Intercultural Dialogue within the global debate on a dialogue between 
civilizations. The pertinent question being, is intercultural dialogue enough? 
 
Chapter 3. – European Identity. 
 
Given the ethnic tensions throughout the member states, the challenge for the EU in 
the 21
st
 century is to create a „common identity‟ based on a mutually inclusive 
dialogue that enables a „self‟ identification with the „other‟. This chapter begins with 
a brief examination of the primordialist versus constructivist debate concerning the 
theoretical structure of identity. It then traces the formation of collective identity as 
constructed by the nation-state and the affect of collective identities on Europe‟s 
minority cultures. Thirdly, this section examines the idea of an identity „crisis‟ 
brought about by the de-centring affects of globalisation, followed by an analysis of 
the argument for a cosmopolitan European identity, and the role of the EU as an 
identity builder. Cosmopolitan or not, is it possible for the EU to develop a European 
identity that transcends not only national borders, but the more difficult borders of 
colour, difference and otherness, thereby consolidating a meaningful „unity‟ within 
the „diversity‟? 
 
Chapter 4. – Muslim Identity. 
 
There is a tendency for European fears in relation to immigration and cultural 
diversity to be particularly weighted against Europe‟s Muslim population. This 
preoccupation derives from a perception that Muslims are making unreasonable 
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demands culturally, politically, and theologically. This chapter analyses the role of 
Islam in Europe in relation to Muslim identity. It returns to the previously mentioned 
primordialist/constructivist debate, again arguing for a constructivist approach. 
Secondly, it analyses the „space‟ allotted to Muslim immigrants by receiving states 
(using Britain, France and Germany as examples), and how their welcome or the lack 
thereof, affected identity construction. This chapter also discusses how the effects of 
globalisation, the terrorist threat in Europe and the perception of an „Islam in crisis‟ 
affects the construction of Muslim identity in Europe. Is a crisis in Islam the cause of 
ongoing conflicts involving Europe‟s Muslims, or is it the underlying tension driven 
by socio-economics and increasing marginalisation? Is Islam, in fact, a threat to 
European identity or is there evidence if a new embryonic Muslim identity in Europe 
that is compatible with a pluralistic society?  
 
Chapter 5. – Many Voices, Few Listeners. 
 
Intercultural dialogue is more than just syllables. It is not only a process but it is also 
an ethos, a journey and an opportunity for change. An analysis of the themes 
emerging in the seven EU level debates held throughout the 2008 year in Brussels can 
provide insight into the contemporary discourse in Europe regarding the integration 
of its ethnic minorities, including Muslims, through the medium of intercultural 
dialogue. 
 
The topics covered are: 
 
1. “Integrating Conversations: The Impact of Migration on Intercultural Dialogue”. 
2. “Negotiating Differences: A Responsibility of Artists and Cultural Institutions”. 
3. “New Horizons: Active Citizenship to Bridge Inter-religious Divides”. 
4. “Couscous Culture: is that what Intercultural Dialogue in the workplace is all 
about?” 
5. “Multilingualism: A Bridge or Barrier for Intercultural Dialogue?” 
6. “Education: Ready for the Intercultural Exchange?” 
7. “Talking Our Way Out of Trouble: How Media Debate Can Combat Intolerance”. 
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Chapter 6. – Whispers of Change? 
 
Typically, when cultural difference is experienced through arts, cuisine, fashion, 
dance, drama and music, it is exciting and enthralling, and thus, can create a real 
appreciation of other ethnicities. Legitimacy and visibility go hand in hand. Visibility 
of Europe‟s varied cultures, not only in local communities but also in art galleries, in 
craft and fashion stores, in restaurants, in the media, on the radio and in television 
programmes may well result in a legitimisation of their role in the multi-cultural 
patchwork that constitutes Europe.  
 
Despite this positive affect, however, serious questions remain. How can 
„Intercultural flavoured coffee‟ help disaffected youth living in the banlieues in 
France? What good is promoting understanding if one partner in the dialogue is 
unemployed, living in substandard housing, with children who are not performing 
well at school? How can intercultural dialogue address the serious problems of 
institutionalised and societal discrimination that exists in the EU today? Can 
intercultural dialogue facilitate a deeper discourse between the new Muslim elite and 
EU leaders and policy makers, thus helping bridge the Euro/Islam divide? This 
chapter attempts to answer these questions and suggest areas for further research in a 
discourse that remains significant to Europe‟s future. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
 
This thesis focuses specifically on dialogue with Islam. Its aim is to contribute to the 
present discussion concerning the perceived need for policy makers and citizens alike 
to redefine the space/identity allocated to Europe‟s Muslim population. It also 
contributes to the existing debate regarding a „pan-European identity‟ and more 
specifically the role of Islam within this dialogue. The principal argument being that 
for societal unity to become a reality in the EU, any „European identity‟ must provide 
a carapace for its chorus of multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-political voices - 
especially the voice of Islam. As Europe‟s traditional „other‟, however, compounded 
in recent years by the increase in terrorism, it is possible that institutionalised 
disparities and Islamophobic tendencies will continue to disadvantage Europe‟s 
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Muslims, by refusing to recognise that Islam is now a European religion and that 
Muslims are Europeans too. An analysis of the discourse in the seven EU level 
debates during the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue, as a valuable 
medium for promoting the dissolution of difference and the integration of Muslims in 
the EU, completes this thesis.  
 
The research question motivating this enquiry is: 
 
As the EU struggles to promote the concept of a „social Europe‟ and a 
„European identity‟, what themes emerged in the 2008 European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue debates and how can they facilitate meaningful 
channels of communication between Islam and contemporary Europe? 
 
The following sub-questions guide this treatise:  
 
1) How vital is intercultural dialogue to the integration of Muslims in Europe? 
2) Can a European identity accommodate Islam? 
3) Is a Muslim identity compatible with a European identity? 
4) Can EYID promote a better understanding of Islam in Europe, thus 
contributing to the development of policies and practices that will aid the integration 
process?  
 
The issues explored in this paper cut across several disciplines and theoretical 
frameworks encompassing historical, political, sociological, psychological, cultural 
and religious concepts, including the effects of globalisation, necessitating the 
adoption of a multi-layered analysis. The methodology firstly involves a statement of 
validity, followed by an explanation of the terminology used in this thesis. As well as 
providing an English translation for French, German and Arabic words, this section 
explains the rationale for using certain terms, the meanings of which overtime are 
sometimes subject to confusion. It also sets the parameters for the debate on identity 
formation, which is a vast, complex topic and worthy of a whole thesis in itself. The 
limitations and the literature review complete this section on methodology.  
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This approach is primarily literature based involving the use of materials held in the 
University of Canterbury Library along with the location of scholarly journals 
through generic and dedicated EU databases. The European Union internet portal 
www.europa.eu.int was invaluable for accessing official documents, the 
Eurobarometer polls and the European Parliamentary debates. The EYID specific 
portal www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu provided a comprehensive coverage of the 
events and debates held during the year. The video-recorded EU debates in Brussels 
along with the briefing papers pre and post debate, provided data by which to follow 
the recurring themes upon which the process of intercultural dialogue rests. 
 
Validity. 
In the 21
st
 century, the „clash‟ school of thought is widely accepted throughout 
Europe bequeathing “every conflict between Muslims and the West with moral 
purpose.”12 „Clash‟ terminology dominates academic discourse and media coverage. 
Worldwide conflict involving Islam adds urgency to the need to open up reciprocal 
channels of communication, and in this respect, the EU could play a vital role. With a 
population of 15 million Muslims, legally resident throughout the member states, it is 
becoming increasingly urgent for the EU to resolve internal conflicts that have 
hindered the integration process in recent years. Rather than attempting to „contain 
Islam‟ or to promote a moderate European style of Islam, is it possible for EU leaders 
and policy makers to work together with Muslims to provide structures that will allow 
Islam to evolve at its own pace? Aside from benefitting Europe, the natural 
emergence of a „Euro-Islam‟ compatible with western democracy would undoubtedly 
have international repercussions. The validity of this paper also rests on the concern 
that unresolved problems associated with integration may increase because in some 
member states, the Muslim population is growing faster than the „native‟ populace. 
Given its aging population, Europe may well continue to depend on Muslim 
immigrants to build its future labour force and, given the failure of multiculturalism 
and assimilation policies, it is possible that ethnic conflicts involving Muslims will 
continue throughout the member states. While the EU has mapped out its future 
economically and politically, is there a parallel socio-cultural vision for Europe‟s 
future? How pivotal is intercultural dialogue to this process of evolution?  
                                                 
12
 Klausen, 130. 
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Terminology. 
Language, though the dominant form of communication often requires explanation. 
Thus, this section clarifies meanings of terms, which through constant usage can take 
on subtle yet important differences. The term Europe, for example, requires careful 
delimitation because it has many guises – geographical, social, political and as a 
source of identification – to name a few. For the purposes of this paper, I am taking 
the liberty of using it in an extremely minimalist role, solely as a descriptor 
interchangeable with the term EU. Wherever the term Europe is used, it means the 
physical and psychosocial area comprising the member states of the European Union.  
 
The idiom identity conjures up a myriad of theoretical frameworks and contexts. It is 
beyond the word limit and focus of this thesis to explore this complex topic in depth 
and indeed a veritable library of scholarly thought exists on the many guises of 
identity, in the psychological, sociological and political realms. Suffice to say, this 
exposition briefly examines identity theories purely to formulate an understanding of 
the experience of Europeans and Muslims in Europe, who exist in a constantly 
evolving multi-ethnic environment, where the only certainty is change. 
 
Multiculturalism and multicultural are other debated terms, which require 
contextualization as the prolific and universal use of „multiculturalism‟ and 
„multicultural‟ has muddied academic discourse. Though multiculturalism, as a 
political and social theory, is a relatively recent phenomenon, as Bhikhu Parekh 
notes, “[M]ulticulturalism is not a homogenous body of thought”.13 Rather, as Homi 
Bhabha wrote in 1998, multiculturalism has become a “portmanteau term for 
anything from minority discourse to postcolonial critique”.14 For some, it is a single 
political doctrine, whereas for others the significance of multiculturalism is a strongly 
contested concept that can be both, a uniting and/or dividing force.
15
 For the purposes 
of this discussion, it is useful to adopt Stuart Hall‟s distinctions for these terms. Using 
multicultural as an adjective, it describes:  
                                                 
13
 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 349. 
14
 Homi Bhabha, „Culture‟s in Between‟, in Multicultural States – Rethinking Difference and Identity, 
ed. D. Bennett (London: Routledge, 1998), 31. 
15
 Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslims Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 2004), 245.  
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the social characteristics and problems of governance posed by any society in 
which different cultural communities live together and attempt to build a 
common life while retaining something of their „original‟ identity. By contrast, 
„multiculturalism‟ is substantive. It references the strategies and policies adopted 
to govern or manage the problems of diversity and multiplicity which multi-
cultural societies throw up.
16
 
 
It is difficult to specifically quantify or qualify the term Muslim in a European sense 
due to the practices of several member states refusing to gather accurate statistics 
regarding religious affiliation and ethnicity. Similarly, there are no statistics on the 
numbers of Muslims who practice Islam, or on those who have converted to Islam. At 
best, estimates rely on immigration statistics from Islamic countries but even these 
figures are dated.
17
 The number, of 15 million used in this thesis is taken from the 
2007, publication by the Centre for European Policy Studies and as noted in the 
introduction it uses the term Muslim as a cultural identification.
18
 Jorgen Nielsen 
noted in 1995 that his book, like others on Muslims in Europe, operates “on the 
assumption that anyone who comes from a Muslim cultural background and is not 
explicitly Christian, or some other non-Muslim religion, is Muslim”19. However, 
while acknowledging this weakness, Nielsen justifies this blanket definition because 
for all immigrants of Muslim origin Islam is an important “option of personal identity 
and social belonging” and is therefore a valid signifier for “all those who share a 
Muslim cultural heritage”.20 In this thesis, the term Muslim is also a blanket term, to 
denote the immigrants and their families of Islamic descent who have made Europe 
their home, as well as those who have chosen to identify themselves as followers of 
Islam. 
 
The idiom Intercultural dialogue, as used in this exposition, is more than just verbal 
communication between individuals, groups and organizations from diverse cultural 
backgrounds. It is also an ethos, an attitude and a journey. A study prepared by the 
European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research for the European Commission 
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released in March 2008 qualifies intercultural dialogue as a process, the aim of which 
is to:  
develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to 
increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to 
foster equality; and to enhance creative processes.
21
 
 
This thesis maintains, therefore, that intercultural dialogue is a fundamental key to the 
formation and implementation of immigration policies and for the accommodation of 
different ethnic minorities in Europe. Intercultural dialogue is also fundamental to any 
debate on European identity. 
 
French, German and Arabic Words. 
Banlieues- lower socio-economic suburbs in France inhabited mainly by Muslims. 
Bricolage – a consortium made up of whatever is at hand. 
Burqa – female Muslim clothing covering from head to toe, including the face. 
Dar-al-harb – Land of war. 
Darura – necessity. 
Gastarbeiter – immigrant guest workers in Germany. 
Hadiths – scholarly treatises recording the traditions of the prophets. 
Halal – the process of slaughtering animals according to the religious law of Islam. 
Hijab – Muslim headscarf. 
Ijtihad – reason. 
Imam – Muslim religious leader and teacher. 
Islamophobia – a morbid fear of Islam and Muslims. 
Jus sanguinis – bloodline. 
Jus solis – of the soil as in birthright. 
Laïcité – the strict separation between church and state legalised in France in 1908. 
Madrasses – Muslim religious schools. 
Mutaghayyir – subject to change. 
Qu‟ran – Holy Book of Islam. 
Sharia – Islamic law. 
Thabit – unchangeable. 
Umma – worldwide community of Muslims. 
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Limitations. 
 
This study does not present any new empirical data on the challenges that integration 
poses, both on the street or in the political corridors of member states. As a primarily 
literature based thesis, future research into the acculturation of difference and the 
accommodation of Muslims in Europe would undoubtedly be enhanced by in-depth 
interviews with Muslim leaders and EU policy makers, as well as with the subjects of 
this thesis who live with conflicting identities on a daily basis. A comprehensive and 
in depth analysis of every activity organized under EYID is also beyond the scope of 
this thesis in both volume and time scale. Therefore, it will be limited to a synopsis of 
intercultural and inter-religious dialogue with Islam through the framework of the 
seven EU level debates held in Brussels during 2008.  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW.  
 
The literature review summarises the theoretical paradigms relevant to identity 
formation of Muslim immigrants and „native Europeans‟ in the European Union. 
Identification indices, from nationalism to globalisation, cross multiple disciplines, 
and contemporary academic debates on a new emerging pan-European identity 
remain strongly contested. Similarly, theories on a budding Euro-Muslim identity are 
open to various academic interpretations. This thesis situates these hypotheses into 
the larger debate on the accommodation of Muslim immigrants and their families in 
the EU, through the prism of intercultural dialogue. 
 
The new hermeneutics of intercultural dialogue are vital to perspective and identity 
and to the problems associated with socio-cultural integration. In the past decade 
intercultural dialogue, as a „paradigm for peace‟ – at both a national and international 
level - is the moderators answer to the discourse of clash.
22
 Samuel P. Huntington‟s 
„clash of civilizations‟ theory continues to attract a strong rebuttal, as scholars like 
Jytte Klausen, refute the link to civilizations by arguing that, “domestic conflicts have 
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local causes”.23 Though local, these causes often have ancient roots meaning that if 
intercultural dialogue is to be effective it cannot “happen in a vacuum”.24 As Bhikhu 
Parekh writes, intercultural dialogue has a “historical dimension” involving the 
“exchange of memories and a better under standing of the past”, as well as being 
reliant on the provision of equal social opportunities.
25
 The 2008 European Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue provided an occasion for member states to move beyond mere 
tolerance and to explore the therapeutic qualities of the dialogic process. The former 
President of Iran, Mohammed Khatami, argues that the purpose of dialogue is to 
trigger a “paradigm shift away from violence…and cross-cultural 
misunderstandings.
26
 The problem with dialogue, however, as civil society leaders 
like Bashy Quarishy, President of the European Network Against Racism, (ENAR) 
contend, is that, historically, dialogue has been little more than a majority controlled 
monologue, rather than a reciprocal engagement between equals.
27
 Quarishy also 
raised the concern that EYID could be reduced to just another “symbolic gesture” like 
the previous 2007 Year of Equal Opportunities.
28
 In contrast to these concerns, a 
European Commission report promoted intercultural dialogue as a catalyst and a 
process that would “increase participation and…freedom” to make choices, for those 
previously denied a voice.
29
  
 
EYID also provided an opportunity for a reassessment of „European identity‟. Any 
mention of identity must necessarily involve an analysis of the primordialist versus 
constructivist debate. Stuart Hall posits that primordialists are convinced identity is a 
„fixed inner core‟ that emerges at birth and remains essentially the same throughout a 
person‟s life.30 Constructivists, on the other hand, as Christina Chimisso writes, see 
identities as relational and always incomplete – constructing meaning through 
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experience.
31
 This thesis argues from a constructivist perspective, agreeing with 
Thomas Meyer who observes that identity “is not a possession but a social process” 
that evolves through group interaction.
32
 Thus, a constructivist approach allows for 
change, for growth, for acceptance of difference, and for dialogue. It allows European 
identities to be formed and reformed, through daily interaction in the crucible of 
community. 
 
Identity is rooted in belonging, and without this sense of belonging, human life is 
meaningless. Benedict Anderson‟s theory of „imagined communities‟ is useful to 
explore how cultures create a sense of community in order to fulfil this need of 
belonging – communities, which, in Europe, have often entrenched the European state 
perspective at the expense of the „other‟ in their midst.33 For Anderson a political 
community exists only if legitimated by its people resulting in the phenomena of 
nation-ness. Nation-ness or nationalism, however, is always constructed in opposition 
to those outside, resulting in discrimination and exclusion. As Julia Kristeva posits, 
„national identity crises‟ exacerbate the “ups and downs of identity struggle” and 
nationalism becomes a „hate reaction‟, which rejects those outside the nation-state.34 
According to Will Kymlicka, nationalism also discriminates against those inside a 
nation‟s borders because the „inescapably national dimension‟ of political life 
naturally favours the majority.
35
 Thus, Europe‟s minorities have often suffered at the 
hands of nationalism. A nationalism, which, as Ulrich Beck argues, “denies the 
empirical reality of Europe” because for centuries Europe has been a multi-ethnic 
society just as the individual nation-states themselves have always been multi-
ethnic.
36
  
 
Convinced that nationalism is here to stay, however, Kristeva, contends for the need 
to transcend nationalism by embracing a tolerance and commonality based on 
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Montesquieu‟s esprit general in order to fuse together the individual and the „other‟ 
without erasing the borders of nationalism.
37
 Like Kristeva, Beck argues for a 
cosmopolitanism that aims for the „recognition of difference‟ rather than denial or 
dissolution.
38
 Philip Schlesinger, on the other hand believes that a European 
“cosmopolitan space that allows an escape from the prison-house of nationalism” is at 
present only a „temptation‟.39 Schlesinger reasons that it is the lack of public 
confidence in a collective European space, which prevents the development of a pan-
European cosmopolitan identity. Since belonging and commitment are reciprocal, 
citizens need to feel a sense of commitment from their political institutions in order to 
develop a sense of belonging and at present commitment seems weak. Martha 
Nussbaum, who argues that ethnic, religious and social conflicts throughout Europe 
continue to endanger the spirit of cosmopolitanism, also questions Europe‟s readiness 
for a cosmopolitan identity.
40
 While it may be premature to advocate 
cosmopolitanism, there are concerns over Europe‟s emerging „fortress‟ image. 
Exclusionary immigration practices resulting in the marginalisation of those who Ian 
Ward calls „other Europeans‟ are, according to Ward, in danger of breaching 
Community and International law.
41
 Jürgen Habermas echoes Wards concerns by 
arguing that Europe is in danger of attempting to provide a mandate for a “privileged 
cultural life form” through its restrictive immigration policies that seek to protect the 
nation state.
42
 Although nationalism remains as the main source of identification, it is 
under threat not only from those who advocate liberal immigration policies but also 
by the effects of globalisation.  
 
Globalisation has severely strained the customary indices of identification through the 
increasing mobility and interaction of different cultures, which is simultaneously 
challenging traditional ethnic, religious and national identities. As people suffer a 
sense of dislocation caused by globalisation, Christopher Lasch argues that 
postmodern people find themselves in a disposable world, where identities are 
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appropriated and discarded at will.
43
 Therefore, „belonging‟ and „identity‟ are no 
longer secure and hence, as Zygmunt Bauman comments, where once the nation-state 
offered a „modicum of security for its own‟, liquid modernity challenges old 
identifications for all.
44
 This has a particular affect on immigrants because as Manuel 
Castells argues, identity disruption through globalisation leads to the development of 
resistance identities that “function as refuge and solidarity, to protect against a hostile, 
outside world”.45 As immigrants and minorities seek to redefine their identities within 
their adopted homelands, they find themselves in what Bo Strath describes as a 
„double danger‟ of either “falling in between two cultures…[or] falling into the 
abysses of modernity” forever without a „home‟.46 Thus, globalisation has resulted in 
the fragmentation of identities, especially for Muslims attempting to redefine 
themselves in a Western environment. Bassam Tibi‟s theory on „societal change‟ is 
useful therefore, to explain the difficulties Muslims face in accommodating the “rapid 
social change” occurring in their societies and in their attempt to redefine their 
identities in the West.
47
 While globalisation had a homogenising effect on 
communication, transport, economies and political structures, it has not resulted in a 
universalism of values, norms and worldviews.
48
 Rather, as Tibi argues, globalisation 
has resulted in a cultural fragmentation bringing Islam to a crossroads. Olivier Roy 
also supports the fact, that Muslims are facing a dilemma in their faith. He maintains 
that some Muslims are choosing to adapt Islam to life in secular countries like France, 
while others, who feel marginalised, are turning to what Roy calls a Neo-
fundamentalism - a closed, scriptural, conservative form of Islam based on sharia 
(Islamic law) - in an effort to reconnect with „self‟ in an alien environment.49 Neo-
fundamentalism is just one reaction by Muslim youth as they attempt to redefine their 
identity in a western environment that often marginalises them because they „look 
different‟. 
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Thus, for Muslims adjusting to life in Europe the question of their visibility remains 
central to the perception/identity debate. Olivier Roy notes that because the West 
often “defines the space of the debate” any dialogue concerning Islam becomes a 
discourse on the meaning of the West.
50
 Throughout the EU, disputes concerning the 
hijab and burqa have been about the opposition to western identity rather than about 
understanding Muslim culture. In France, for example, instead of the headscarf being 
a debate about Muslim identity, it focused on the “redefinition of laïcité” becoming a 
polemical exercise about French identity.
51
 Similarly, in Denmark the cartoon 
controversy became a disagreement about the freedom of the western press rather 
than a debate about the religious rights of Muslims. The focus of these debates, 
reinforce the rejection of Muslim identifications. Thus, Thomas Meyer posits that the 
reasons behind some young Muslims assuming a fundamentalist identity lie “in the 
failed attempt to evolve a secure identity not against mainstream society but within 
it”.52 The inability for Muslims to establish a European identity due to discrimination 
and exclusion only serves to encourage the formation of a radicalised identity. The 
radicalised identity becomes more real than any other social /familial tie. Likewise, in 
relation to perceived injustice, perception becomes more important than reality.  
 
A global fear of Islamic terrorism and a clash of civilisations, endorsed by Samuel 
Huntington and compounded by increasing attacks in Europe in recent years, also 
contributes to the marginalisation of Europe‟s Muslims.53 However, Roy notes that, 
apart from the Madrid attack in 2004, terrorist action in Europe is rarely linked to 
global jihads.
54
 Radicals tend to be ethnically diverse, western educated converts who 
do not represent the Islamic traditions of their parents. This is supported by a study 
conducted by the Bielefeld Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and 
Violence, which revealed that 35.7% of third-generation Turkish youth in Germany 
felt “inclined towards religious fundamentalism of a violent nature” because of their 
perceived marginalisation by western society.
55
 Though world leaders dispel the 
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notion of a clash between civilisations, these youths make fertile ground for radical 
causes, because, as Benazir Bhutto wrote, the „clash‟ is occurring within Islam in the 
form of a “critical battle for the hearts and souls of…Muslims around the world.56 
Gilles Kepel concurs, arguing that this important “battle” will be fought in “European 
cities, where Islam is already a growing part of the West”.57 
 
Academics like Roy, argue that it is imperative for the West to recognise Islam as a 
„mere‟ religion, on par with other religions in order to avert the politicalisation of 
Islam. This would help to isolate extremists and prevent them from “building a 
political constituency”.58 Tibi concurs, arguing that due to deterritorialisation and 
globalisation, Islam has become politicized making it difficult for Muslims to 
accommodate the „societal change‟ involved with living in the West. If reformed, he 
argues, Islam can “be incorporated into a religious and cultural pluralism in western 
societies” because Islam is not only a religion but also a system of cultural symbols 
through which Muslims see the world.
59
 
 
Jytte Klausen, who writes of a new wind blowing across Western Europe heralding a 
European Islam, “based on a new epistemology of faith and a new hermeneutics of 
textual interpretation”, endorses Roy‟s argument.60 In her interviews with Muslim 
elites in the EU, Klausen discovered embryonic „national faith-based umbrella 
groups‟ who support integration and are focussing on political participation at a 
national level.
61
 Kepel agrees that the time is ripe for the “hybridization of two 
distinct cultures” and that it is possible “that a new generation of Muslim thinkers will 
emerge…[who] will present a new face of Islam – reconciled with modernity – to the 
larger world.
62
 Alongside other reformists, Bhutto reminds Muslims of the need to 
return to ijtihad, which means „reason‟ to reinterpret their faith according to their 
situation. Klausen supports this theory, commenting that Ijtihad,…has become the 
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rallying cry for self-styled moderate progressive Muslims” who are embracing western 
democracy while remaining faithful to Islam.
63
  
 
Therefore, as Muslims seek to rediscover their identities for themselves, the response 
of political leadership in the EU will be vital to the continuing security of Europe. 
Samir Amghar et al, argue that political leaders tend to limit political solutions to a 
national and local level rather than to adopt a pan-European approach.
64
 Amghar et al, 
argue that European Islam is already a reality and therefore Europe‟s Muslims should 
be given a chance to develop a European identity and to feel that they belong to 
Europe. Given the opportunity, it may be possible for Europe‟s new generation of 
Muslims…[to] become a valuable resource in the Union‟s foreign policy endeavours 
to come to terms with the challenge of globalised Islam”.65 Opportunity begins with 
acceptance. Acceptance begins with recognition, which is premised on being heard. 
As Khatami writes, dialogue “entails both speaking and listening…Listening is not a 
passive activity. It is an active engagement where the listener is exposed to the world 
created, discovered, or experienced by the speaker”.66 Intercultural dialogue, thus, 
relies on listening and the ability to hear the voce of the „other‟.  
 
This thesis attempts to chart the current discourse between Islam and contemporary 
Europe by examining the theories relating to a budding European identity and an 
embryonic Euro-Muslim identity through the paradigm for peace - intercultural 
dialogue 
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CHAPTER TWO 
INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE.  
 
 
“If I could start all over again, I would start with culture”. 
                                                                       Jean Monnet.
67
 
 
 
Introduction - Dealing with Difference. 
The importance of culture to the 21
st
 century cannot be underestimated. The impact of 
globalisation on cultures – shrinking borders, huge trans-global flows, fragmented 
societies – means that many people in Europe today interact with different cultures on 
a daily basis.
68
 This intercultural interaction still generates the same tensions that have 
plagued Europe for centuries. Traditionally, people viewed the „other‟ with suspicion, 
inevitably resulting in conflict as Europe‟s violent history testifies. Ethnic tensions 
and cultural clashes, fanned by political or religious ambitions, resulted in internecine 
wars that decimated one part or another of the landscape for hundreds of years. 
Remarkably, Monnet‟s vision brought unparalleled peace to an area previously 
crippled by conflict resulting in relative prosperity for nearly 500 million people. 
However, despite the fact that economic and political agreements united and 
transformed previously adversarial nations, the lingering shadows of ethnic tensions 
and cultural divisions continue to threaten the Monnet dream. Age-old xenophobic 
tendencies evidenced by discrimination and racism against minorities and immigrants, 
often reinforced by disparate social policies, threaten the integration story. 
 
This chapter looks at some of these institutionalised inequalities and at the necessity 
for a „dialogue‟ that will honestly address these discriminatory practices. The lack of 
harmonisation of social policies between member states disadvantages immigrants in 
various ways. The legal prohibition on the collection of personal data in some 
member states prevents the accurate recording of discriminatory practices, both direct 
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and indirect.
69
 Policies arising from the implementation of the Single European Act 
(SEA), the adoption of EU Citizenship at Maastricht, and the recalcitrance of some 
member states to efficiently implement Directives, all impact on Europe‟s 
immigrants, thus contributing to a form of legalised discrimination. The EU also 
struggles to coordinate policies regarding the prevention of racism and the protection 
of human rights. By declaring 2008 as the Year of Intercultural Dialogue, the EU 
institutions demonstrated their continued commitment to the development of 
intercultural competences and the promotion of intercultural dialogue involving not 
only public authorities but also civic society as well. The multitude of activities 
planned throughout the member states, during the year, provided the general populace 
with an opportunity to be exposed to, and interact with, a diversity of cultures, 
religions and ethnicities. It also presented an occasion for political leaders and policy 
makers to take ownership of the main issues involving minorities in Europe.  
 
Future chapters of the European chronicle are reliant not only on the preservation of 
majority cultures present within the member states but also on Europe‟s ability to 
allow minority narratives to be interwoven into the larger European meta-narrative. 
The ancient Greek philosopher Thrasymachus coined the term „might is right‟ to 
describe his belief that justice always protects the interests of the stronger party. It 
seems this philosophical bias permeated Western European polities, which have 
historically favoured majority rule at the expense of their minorities.
70
 Since 
Westphalia, and the creation of the nation-state, successive governments have sought 
to protect a majority homogenous polity by alienating, marginalising, expelling, 
cleansing or coercively assimilating their minority populations. The concern being 
that today, “ethnocultural conflicts have become the most common source of political 
violence in the world and they show no signs of abating”.71 Europe‟s future could 
thus, depend on its capability to recognise, accept and preserve the individual cultures 
of its minorities as much as on economic progress. In fact, with Europe‟s ageing 
population and slowing birth rates, minorities in the form of immigrants will probably 
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be the workforce that drives continuing economic growth. The reality being that 
Europe‟s future relies heavily on immigration. 
 
Europe‟s largest religious minority group is its Muslim population, and any vision for 
unity is limited by Europe‟s capability to embrace the diversity of its Muslim 
people.
72
 Precisely because of their „difference‟ studies show that Muslims are often 
subject to “discrimination and marginalisation in employment, education and housing, 
and are also victims of negative stereotyping and prejudicial attitudes”.73 While 
discrimination and Islamophobia has been aggravated in recent years by terrorism, 
and by the resulting „war on terror‟, the lack of political harmonisation of social 
practices has also reinforced the ongoing rejection and marginalisation of Europe‟s 
Muslims. Although the Maastricht Treaty provided a legal base for cultural policy 
(Art. 151 EC), thus providing a basis for supporting member states‟ actions in an 
effort to safeguard Europe‟s cultural heritage, “[A]ny act of harmonisation of Member 
States‟ legal and regulatory provisions is excluded from the scope of Article 151” 
meaning that Council decisions remain constrained by unanimity.
74
 This ongoing 
tussle between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism impacts more on those 
already marginalised because they are different. In order to safeguard „Europe‟s 
cultural heritage‟, all ethnic strands need to be equally valued, including the threads of 
Islam already interwoven into Europe‟s cultural heritage. The question being, can 
Islam be considered a legitimate part of European history and thus a part of Europe‟s 
future, or will prejudice allow the ancient shadows of Christian/Islamic conflicts in 
the fifteenth century to continue to haunt this relationship?
75
  
 
Increasingly, during the past two decades the rising visibility of Muslims as the 
„other‟, have presented a challenge not only to the disparate immigration policies of 
member states, but also to the multicultural paradigm. Ethnically, culturally, and 
religiously different, Muslims expose Europe‟s longstanding inability to accept 
minority groups.  
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Why dialogue? 
Enlargement of the EU coupled with rising transnational flows of people has led to 
increased contact between different cultures, religions, ethnic groups and diverse 
languages. In an effort to facilitate a mutual understanding and a deeper tolerance, the 
EU is committed to the development of intercultural competences and the promotion 
of intercultural dialogue, involving not only public authorities but also civil society. 
To realise this objective the European Parliament and Council established EYID 2008 
by Decision No. 1983/2006/EC, and subsequently launched the 2008 European Year 
of Intercultural Dialogue at Ljubljana in Slovenia on January 8. Intercultural dialogue 
has no legal mandate and is not specifically regulated by international, European or 
national law. However, several international and European conventions as well as EU 
directives and national legal frameworks do guarantee the prerequisite: 
 
safety and dignity, equality of opportunity and participation, where different 
views can be voice openly without fear, where there are shared spaces for 
exchanges between different cultures to take place.
76
 
 
 
These shared spaces are vital to the process of intercultural dialogue. At the opening 
ceremony in Slovenia, Ján Figeľ, the European Commissioner for Education and 
Culture said the aim of EYID was to: 
 
Move beyond tolerance…towards a genuine intercultural Europe…[by 
encouraging] respectful exchanges between groups of different cultural 
backgrounds on an equal basis.
77
 
 
 
Beneath the carapace of the European Agenda for Culture (2007), the aim of 
EYID is to promote a better understanding of Europe‟s complex cultural 
environment.
78
 With a budget of Euro 10 million and an event calendar involving 
every member state its aim was to make a real difference not only at the political 
level but also at the grassroots community level throughout the EU. Through a 
series of events at the EU, national, and municipal levels, involving art, debates, 
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theatre, exhibitions and inter-religious dialogue, the EU institutions hoped to 
forge closer links between all European peoples and their respective cultures. The 
importance of cross-cultural discourse, appreciating and accommodating diverse 
cultures, is, of course, not new to Europe. The history of a Europe (pre-EU) 
stretching from Russia to the Mediterranean, from Britain to the Balkans, 
encompassing many different ethnic and religious groups has all too often 
experienced ethnic cleansings, religious wars, pogroms and fear of the „other‟. As 
recently as the 1920s, the end of a century-long war for Greek liberation from 
Turkey resulted in a Greek-Muslim exchange of population involving 1 million 
Greeks and hundreds of thousands of Turks, Pomaks and Muslims.
79
 Since then 
“millions of Europeans, whose only fault was residence on the wrong side of an 
artificially created political border, lost the right to continue to live in the land of 
their ancestors”.80 Intercultural conflict is therefore, not foreign to Europe and 
while the EU has successfully stabilized its „political borders‟, minorities in many 
states still face discrimination and rejection, as do immigrants, the largest group 
of which, at an estimated 15 million, is Muslim.
81
 
 
In light of increasing tensions throughout Europe involving its Muslim population, 
dialogue between Islam and Christianity was a key part of EYID in addressing 
growing concerns. Academic literature suggests that it is the marginalisation and 
exclusion of Europe‟s Muslims that leads to conflict rather than inherent cultural 
differences.
82
 Inter-religious and intercultural discourse is vital, therefore, to a better 
understanding of the Euro/Islam debate and to determining a socio-cultural vision for 
Europe‟s future. Leading European experts are concerned over the lack of leadership 
by EU institutions and policy makers, in taking ownership of the main issues relating 
to the presence of Islam in Europe.
83
 A 2006 report by the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) on „Islamophobia in the EU‟, states: 
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Policy responses need to acknowledge that Muslim communities in general 
have experienced long-standing discrimination, whether direct or indirect, 
which has impacted on employment opportunities, education standards and 
social marginalisation.
84
 
 
 
High profile conflicts in the previous three decades have led to the perception of an 
„Islam in crisis‟, despite the fact that the vast majority of the EU‟s 15 million Muslims 
are peaceful law abiding residents. Political responses to this „crisis‟ fall into two 
approaches. One, an essentialist and culturalist view, which situates the „crisis‟ firmly 
within Islam, thereby insinuating that Islam itself is to blame and the solution must 
come from within Islam, meaning that Islam must be Europeanised in order to fit the 
Western democratic mould.
85
 The other approach is to limit political solutions to a 
national and local level rather than to adopt a pan-European approach.
86
 However, 
these approaches negate the legitimate political and social reasons behind the unrest 
and fail to develop policies at an EU level. Today European Islam exists as a powerful 
transnational phenomenon and academics argue that European policy must keep pace 
with this reality. Thus, an improvement in mutual understanding through intercultural 
dialogue and inter-religious dialogue, coupled with the implementation of 
inclusionary practices is crucial to Europe‟s future. For any „crisis‟ in Islam in Europe 
is, in fact, a „European crisis‟.  
 
Global Dialogue. 
The concept of intercultural dialogue has become increasingly important in recent 
years with the growing interaction of diverse cultures resulting from the unparalleled 
cross-global movement of people. This trans-global flow has brought new challenges. 
Though globalisation opened borders, standardized socio-economic and political 
structures, it has not created a unity of outlook.
87
 In his article in 1993, Samuel P. 
Huntington theorized that this diversity of outlook would eventually lead to a „Clash 
of Civilizations‟. His book (1996), warned of civilizational fault lines demarcated by 
inherent cultural differences that would replace the ideological clash previously 
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created by the Cold War.
 88
 In 1999, in response to Huntington‟s book Mohammed 
Khatami, the former President of Iran, introduced the idea of a „Dialogue Among 
Civilizations‟, reminding world leaders of the pre-eminence of dialogue as a means to 
prevent „clashes‟. The United Nations (UN) embraced the idiom, adopting resolution 
A/56/5 and named 2001 the “Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations”.89 On its official 
website Kofi Annan says: 
 
I see…dialogue as a chance for people of different cultures and traditions to get 
to know each other better, whether they live on opposite sides of the world or 
on the same street.
90
 
 
The propitious start to the new millennium hoped for by the UN was, literally blown 
apart by the attack on New York‟s twin towers. The tragedy of 9/11, in 2001, not only 
seemed to reinforce Huntington‟s prediction at a political level resulting in the 
subsequent „war on terror‟ but also generated a deep fear and suspicion of Muslims 
worldwide. In an opinion poll conducted in the United Kingdom (UK) after the 
London bomb attack in July 2005, the poll found that 32% of Muslims “felt they had 
been the object of hostility: and 42% felt they had been the object of suspicion”.91 
Whilst understanding the fear and anger generated by this act of terrorism, this 
suspicion can result in policies that adversely impact upon all of Europe‟s Muslims, 
not just a few extremists. The EUMC are concerned that: 
 
Policy responses for community cohesion and integration risk being based not 
on the promotion of equality and fundamental rights, but on the prevention of 
terrorism.
92
 
 
Meaningful dialogue is imperative, therefore, in Europe, in order to prevent Muslim 
communities from being subject not only to terrorist attacks themselves, but also to 
the policies invoked in response to such attacks. In September 2006, on the 
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anniversary of 9/11, Kaveh L. Afrasibi, the founder and director of Global Interfaith 
Peace, interviewed Mohammed Khatami. When asked to evaluate the progress of 
dialogue, he replied: 
 
Dialogue Among Civilizations was not conceived as a political project seeking 
immediate results. Rather, the purpose behind it has been to cause a paradigm 
shift away from violence, conflict, intolerance and cross-cultural 
misunderstandings.
93
 
 
While the tragedy of 9/11 and the ensuing „war on terror‟ was dramatically opposed to 
a „Dialogue Among Civilizations‟, Khatami believed “those events at the same time 
reinforced the need and importance of dialogue…as an antidote”.94 Terrorism, 
however, severely tests the therapeutic qualities of the dialogic process as it inflames 
the age-old divisions that have dogged the European journey. 
 
European Dialogue. 
In recent years, Europe has suffered its share of violence and „cross-cultural 
misunderstandings‟. Cultural divisions evidenced by discrimination, racism and 
xenophobic tendencies threaten to undermine that „limited but decisive step‟ set in 
motion by Jean Monnet fifty-one years ago. A „step‟ that saw an increasingly 
integrated Europe rise, as a Phoenix, from the ashes of two cataclysmic World Wars. 
Transforming an embryonic Coal and Steel Community of six nations into a 
geopolitical Union of twenty-seven, which today provides peace and relative 
prosperity for almost 500 million people is truly a unique achievement. The EU‟s 
economic and political journey benefited from a strong vision, and today the EU is 
undoubtedly a world player in both senses. Gone is the “expectations-capability gap” 
of the 1980s in terms of the EU‟s ability to perform on the world stage.95 It has 
consistently and successfully, performed, especially in the new millennium, as a 
humanitarian, civilian and military actor. Furthermore, policies such as those covering 
the EU Space Policy, EU Central Asia policy, Kosovo, the development of EPAs, 
climate change and security, Iran‟s nuclear policy and Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), all testify to the EU‟s wide ranging involvement as an international 
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actor.
96
 The „gap‟ continues, however, no longer in external policy, but in respect to 
internal social cohesion.  
 
Increasing conflicts involving minority groups and more especially the EU‟s Muslim 
population have exposed a social malaise deep beneath the fabric of European society. 
The Rushdie affair in Britain (1989), the headscarf affair in France (1989) and the 
Danish cartoon affair (2005) are all symptomatic of the complexity of cultural 
differences. Coupled with the riots in Bradford, England (2001), and Paris (2005 and 
2007), these „clashes‟ highlight not only a difference in ideology, but also a rejection 
of the „public space‟ allocated to Muslims in Europe. Pre 1970s, Muslims throughout 
Europe were „invisible‟ in that they kept to themselves and did not make too many 
demands on the societies in which they lived, but these incidences catapulted them 
onto centre stage. While immigrants accepted the status quo they could be ignored, 
but from the late 1970s, an Islamic identity began to assert itself. In France, for 
example, Muslims suddenly became highly visible in 1989 with the headscarf affair:  
 
Islam has been the second religion of France for more than a century, but 
France only discovered it then. Yazid Sabeg.
97
  
 
Symptomatic of social discontent, the conflicts above demonstrated a serious need for 
better communication, in order to understand what the issues are, so that both sides 
could then work together to find mutually satisfactory solutions. Unfortunately, these 
protests were overshadowed by actions of an increasingly sinister nature. The bomb 
attacks in Paris (1995), Madrid (2004), London (2005), and the murders of Pim 
Fortuyn (2002), and Theo Van Gogh (2004), in the Netherlands, and Anna Lindt in 
Sweden (2003), as well as the tragedy of 9/11, demonstrated the dark side of 
extremism. These actions also threw suspicion upon 15 million legal Muslim residents 
in the EU, who are equally vulnerable to these extremist attacks. An official report 
issued after the London bomb attacks stated, “The victims of the London bombings 
were people of many nationalities, British and non-British, whites and non-whites, 
Muslims and non-Muslims”.98 Nearly half of the 52 people killed in the attack were 
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foreigners and five of them were Muslims, showing that terrorism is no respecter of 
persons or culture.
99
 Thomas Meyer argues that it is not cultural differences per se but 
rather the politicalisation of cultural difference that leads to fundamentalism and acts 
of terror.
100
 The opportunity for politicalisation arises through marginalisation.
 
A 
study conducted in Germany in 1999, found that one third, of third-generation Turkish 
youth, felt inclined towards “religious fundamentalism of a violent nature” because of 
a “lack of orientation and recognition denied by mainstream society”.101 This sense of 
marginalisation by these third-generation Turkish-Germans, reflects the failure of 
integration policies. Considering that they were born on German soil as were their 
parents and their grandparents, it begs the question, how many generations will it take 
before „immigrants‟ can claim the same birth-right as mainstream society? How many 
generations before they can feel a sense of belonging to the land of their birth? 
Intercultural dialogue is vital to understanding the „others‟ experience in order to 
build a relationship between cultures resulting in the elimination of marginalisation 
and the politicalisation of cultural differences.  
 
In the lead up to EYID, Ján Figeľ remarked that while integration had to start with 
“simple materials and realities: coal and steel” today “business is not enough to keep 
people together”.102 Since the mid 1960s, the theory of intergovernmentalism had 
been dominant in European integration. Intergovernmentalism, which privileges the 
role of nation-states within the integration process, is a useful theoretical concept with 
which to explore the tension between the EU institutions. This state-centrist approach 
is particularly visible when policy areas encroach on fundamental issues of national 
sovereignty. While the Treaties provide the basis for EU law and give the European 
Commission the right to put forward proposals, it is the European Council, after 
consultation with the European Parliament that votes on the legislation. It is this 
secondary legislation passed by the Council, in the form of Regulations, Directives 
and Decisions, which forms the body of Community law. The need for consensus 
among the Councils‟ member state representatives, who remain fiercely protective of 
their sovereignty in politically sensitive areas, like immigration, means that progress 
is often conditional. Intergovernmentalism is further supported by the principle of 
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subsidiarity, which was established as a general rule in the Preamble to the Maastricht 
Treaty (now Article 5 of EC). It means that in all areas of non-exclusive competence, 
the Community may only “take action where objectives can best be attained by action 
at Community rather than at national level”.103 Although the Commission had the 
opportunity to expand the EU‟s competence over the rights of immigrants at 
Maastricht, the crossing of external borders, immigration policy and third-country 
nationals, specifically „conditions of entry and movement‟, „conditions of 
residence…including family reunion and access to employment‟ were all kept firmly 
under intergovernmental control under the third pillar, (Article K.1 EC).
104
 Thus, 
legislation concerning immigrants remains hindered by the power struggle between 
the Commission who sees its role as one of promoting European integration, and the 
member states, which want to retain sovereignty in this area. This resulted in 
confusing variances in policy between the member states. So much so that even the 
European Parliament criticized continuing inconsistencies in its 1992, Van Outrive 
report: 
 
For the moment, the Member States are in the ascendant in their long-standing 
rivalry with the Commission. The introduction of the third pillar is evidence of 
this. It ought to be realized that much power is being transferred to national 
officials. This is a threat to a democratic Europe; it definitely represents a step 
backwards and cannot be accepted without protest.
105
  
 
While the Commission touts itself as the „driving force behind European integration‟ 
((2000) COM 34) and the Community is the watchdog „to ensure fulfillment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty‟ (Article 10 (ex 5) EC), as mentioned, 
Community law is passed by qualified majority vote or unanimity of the member state 
representatives in the Council. Hence, the accusation of law according to the lowest 
common denominator, for, consensus on politically sensitive issues like immigration 
is often difficult to achieve. Placing immigration and third country nationals under the 
third pillar was a reaction to the impending loss of control over borders necessitated 
by the four freedoms resulting from the SEA. European integration, especially in 
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relation to the harmonization of social policies suffers from this protection of national 
interests meaning, “Co-operation within the EU…is essentially conservative and 
pragmatic”.106 Whilst member states concede the necessity of pooling sovereignty to 
further economic integration (low politics), integration in areas of high politics such 
as national sovereignty and national identity, remain „impermeable‟.107 
 
Dialogue, Economics and Politics. 
Following on from the UN year of “Dialogue Among Civilizations” and after 9/11, 
Romano Prodi, the then President of the European Commission, instigated a 
conference on Intercultural Dialogue in Brussels on 20-21 March 2002. Its aim was to 
encourage mutual tolerance, knowledge and understanding not only within the EU but 
also with its neighbours in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Run under the 
auspices of the European Commission‟s “Jean Monnet Action” the conference 
focussed on much more than „Inter-religious Dialogue‟.108 Continuing in this vein, in 
2004, Ján Figeľ, the EU Commissioner for Education and Culture proposed the Year 
of Intercultural Dialogue 2008. Equally concerned with promoting an understanding 
between Europe‟s multi-ethnic communities, Ján Figeľ remarked, that in recent years: 
 
Europe has seen major changes resulting from successive enlargements of the 
Union, greater mobility in the Single Market, and increased travel…[resulting] 
…in interaction between Europeans and the different cultures, languages, 
ethnic groups and religions…Dialogue between cultures would therefore 
appear to be an essential tool in forging closer links…109 
 
 
The mention of the Single Market highlights an area of legalised discrimination, 
which still has not been resolved 20 years later. Within Europe today there is an 
estimated 17 million third country nationals.
110
 These are immigrants, who have legal 
residence but not nationality status, and a large proportion of these people are 
Muslims. Whilst the adoption of the SEA in 1986 along with the four freedoms 
necessary for the creation of an internal market, gave a welcome boost to economic 
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integration between the member states, it disadvantaged third country nationals. 
Article 14 (ex 7a) EC created a single internal market: 
 
an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty. 
 
Although three of the four freedoms in the SEA were welcomed as a means of 
promoting economic growth across Europe, the fourth (persons) was problematical 
for member states. Understandably, member states are reluctant to give up 
sovereignty concerning their borders fearing an increase in illegal immigrants, drug 
trafficking and increased social welfare burdens. Immigrants in the form of third 
country nationals, found themselves caught in the middle of the struggle to remove 
barriers to integration on one hand, and the protection of state sovereignty on the 
other. While member states “agreed that the controls on all goods, services and 
capital had to go by the end of 1992” some argued that only EC nationals enjoyed 
the right of free movement of persons.
111
 This dispute over the free movement of 
persons across internal borders resulted in the General Declaration on Articles 13 to 
19 of the Single European Act and the Political Declaration being annexed to the 
SEA:  
According to the General Declaration „[n]othing in these provisions shall affect 
the right of Member States to take such measures as they consider necessary 
for the purpose of controlling immigration from third countries, and to combat 
terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works of art and 
antiques‟. In this declaration the Member States explicitly state that Article 14 
(ex Article 7A) EC Treaty does not affect their powers to adopt measures 
which they consider necessary to control…the crossing of internal borders by 
third country nationals legally resident in one of the Member States.
112
 
 
Including immigration from third countries in the same sentence as terrorism, crime, 
and drug trafficking, cast dispersions on all third country nationals and set the tone for 
future debates on immigration policies. This „legalized‟ form of discrimination 
insinuated that immigrants were synonymous with crime and therefore exacerbated 
racism and xenophobic tendencies. This was further exacerbated by the concept of EU 
Citizenship, an idea intended to promote loyalty to a European identity. While not 
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actually conferring any new significant rights on EU nationals, this legislation only 
reinforced the exclusion of third country nationals. 
 
Citizenship of the European Union was established by the addition of a new Part Two 
to the Treaty of Maastricht (Articles 8-8e EC, renumbered in the ToA to Articles 17-
21 EC). What did citizenship mean? Was it just another way of reinforcing the rights 
of economic actors in the EU or would it further the political and social rights of all 
„Europeans‟? Most importantly, who could become „EU Citizens‟ and who was 
excluded? Articles 18-21 EC proclaimed: 
 
- the right to move and reside freely within any Member State, subject to 
the limitations and conditions laid down by the Treaty and by the measures 
adopted to give it effect, Article 18 (ex Article 8a) EC. 
- the right to vote and to be elected in municipal elections held in any 
Member State by Member State nationals resident in that Member State and the 
right to vote and stand in elections for the European Parliament, irrespective of 
the Member State of residence, Article 19 (ex Article 8b) EC. 
- the right to diplomatic and consular protection from the authorities of 
any Member State in third countries, Article 20 (ex Article 8c) EC. 
- the right to petition the European Parliament and the right to apply to the 
European Ombudsman, Article 21 (ex Article 8d) EC.  
 
These rights, which do not replace any other rights already conferred by the Treaty, 
do not add anything substantial. They largely reiterate those already present, “albeit 
scattered across primary and secondary sources”.113 For the purposes of this paper, the 
most important Article is Article 17(1): 
 
Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the 
Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship. 
 
For third country nationals, limiting the rights of Union citizenship exclusively to 
member state nationals simply reinforced their marginalisation. Maastricht citizenship 
intended to promote a sense of belonging to a more „social Europe‟ only increased the 
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marginalisation of 17 million legal residents, thereby reinforcing the status of third 
country nationals as second-class citizens. As J. J. H. Weiler commented in 1991: 
 
It would be ironic that an ethos which rejected the nationalism of the Member 
States gave birth to a new European nation and European nationalism…We 
have made little progress if the Us becomes European (instead of German or 
French or British) and the Them becomes those…who do not enjoy the 
privileges of citizenship.
114
 
 
 
Further differences arise in relation to family reunification laws, which differ from 
state to state. Germany confines these rights to the immediate nuclear family; Italy 
extends them also to cover dependent parents; Britain is trying to limit these rights to 
first-generation migrants only, and France toughened it laws in July 2006 insisting 
that the breadwinner must be able to prove financial support for the family, and the 
family must speak French and understand French values. Increasing restrictions like 
the new test for family reunification in the Netherlands further entrench 
discriminatory policies. As C. Joppe comments, “most of the family migrants targeted 
by Dutch policy are Muslims of Turkish or Moroccan origin” and “what began as an 
immigrant integration policy …has turned into its opposite, a no-integration 
policy”.115 Furthermore, member states differ widely in their determination of 
nationality – an example being the United Kingdom, which passed the British 
Nationality Act of 1981 redefining British citizenship.
116
 In their struggle to 
accommodate the influx of immigrants since the 1970s, different member states have 
implemented separate immigration policies. Britain opted for a multiculturalism 
based on integration while France chose a model of assimilation. The Netherlands 
attempted to incorporate integration under its „pillarized‟ system and still other 
member states opted for a combination of these models.
117
 All of these systems were 
developed to deal with the „immigrant problem‟ without consultation with immigrant 
communities and their failure can in part be attributed to a lack of intercultural 
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dialogue, and concern for the rights of the very people these policies are charged with 
helping. 
 
Dialogue, Human Rights and Racism. 
The Post WW ΙΙ creation of a European identity has always purported to be based on 
the respect of human rights. The preamble in the Treaty, which formed the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) does not directly mention the protection of 
human rights. Yet, the language is heavy with symbolism, justifying the need for not 
only an economic union but also the need to achieve  „real solidarity‟, the „merging of 
essential interests‟, „community‟ „destiny henceforth shared‟ and „world peace‟.118 
The formation of the (ECSC) professed the creation of a “community long divided by 
bloody conflict”.119 Although in affect it was based on an economic merger, the 
underlying vision was for the creation of a community that could provide peace and 
protection for all. The reality, however, is that the founding Treaties omitted any 
specific references to human rights and rather than a cohesive approach, considerable 
differences have always existed within the various Member States.
120
 Though 
enshrined in the European Charter for Fundamental Rights (ECHR), the protection of 
human rights in Treaties is a relatively, recent phenomena. Clauses appear in the 1991 
Maastricht Treaty, Article 6(2), the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, Article 6(2) and the 
2000 Nice Treaty amending Article 7, which allow the EU to discipline any member 
state in breach of human rights issues. These recent provisions, though, have failed to 
equip the EU with the capacity or the resources to monitor human rights 
effectively”.121 At the opening ceremony of EYID, Ján Figeľ said: 
 
Creating good conditions for a genuine intercultural dialogue implies going 
beyond mere tolerance, overcoming the traditional logic of majority and 
minority.
122
 
 
The legacy of „traditional logic‟ means that today the EU still has no minority rights 
standard and no unified protection policy. In many areas, there is a vast gap in the 
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living standards and rights enjoyed by the majority and some minorities. While the 
focus on EYID is to raise awareness of the EU‟s multi-ethnic character in order to 
promote social cohesion the spin off must be also be a focus by policy makers on the 
harmonisation of standards between majority and minority. The EU is in need of a 
common framework of minority protection even though legalizing pan European 
minority rights would undoubtedly open a Pandora‟s box because social policy 
remains a “jealously guarded national domain” especially within the more powerful 
member states.
123
 The failure of the EU to develop cohesive human rights policies not 
only disadvantages minorities within the EU but also tarnishes the EU image abroad. 
Andrew Williams points out that a resulting bifurcation “along an internal/external 
fault line” jeopardizes the search for a European identity.124 While it is easy to lay the 
ground rules for countries wishing to join the EU,
125
 it is not so easy to ascribe, 
monitor or enforce human rights within the member states themselves.
126
  
 
The EU has long recognized that racism and xenophobic tendencies mar the socio-
cultural integration of Europe, and consequently established the European Union‟s 
Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), in 1996. In 1997, a 
Eurobarometer opinion poll on racism and xenophobia in Europe found that 33% of 
those interviewed described themselves as „quite racist‟ or „very racist‟ and this figure 
rose to 48% in France.
127
 Respondents thought that European Institutions should be 
more active in combating racism.
128
 The name changed in March 2007 to the 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) but the mission statement 
remains the same – to be a “thinking, acting and challenging network organization, 
working in all sectors of society for equality and diversity, and against racism and 
xenophobia in the European Union.”129  
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How does this work? After the July 7, 2005 London Bomb attacks the EUMC 
compiled a report to assess the extent of reprisals against the Muslim communities in 
the EU in the wake of this tragedy.
130
 Its purpose was to analyse the initial increase in 
faith hate violence against Muslims within various member states, and the endeavours 
of the political community to lessen this backlash. The report found that in the short 
term there was little backlash against Muslim communities as a result of “the swift 
responses by governments, politicians and opinion leaders, who made serious efforts 
to distinguish clearly between these criminal acts and Islam”.131 However, as 
expressed by some of the opposition parties, exclusionary politics are widespread. In 
the Czech Republic, the non-parliamentary National Party demanded the “expulsion 
of all Muslims and the closing of borders”.132 In Sweden the largest opposition party, 
the Swedish Democrats, declared the terror attacks in London to be the result of a 
“mass immigration policy”.133 In France, the government, the Press and the Council 
of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) all condemned the attacks while distinguishing between 
terrorism and the Muslim community as a whole, whereas the President of the 
Mouvement pour la France (MFP), Philippe de Villiers, denounced the “progressive 
Islamisation of French society”. 134 The EUMC report insists that with regard to 
integration of ethnic minorities, more especially the Muslim community, “positive 
change is possible provided that there is clear political leadership, support from the 
institutions and civil society, as well as sensitive reporting in the media”.135 But is this 
just rhetoric? 
 
As previously mentioned, the EU has purported to recognize the importance of 
human rights from its inception. Indeed, a legacy of the Council of Europe is the 
Council‟s most famous document, the ECHR, established in 1949. All members of 
the EU must sign the ECHR but signing does not necessarily mean action. In 
France, for example, it took 24 years to ratify the convention (1974), and another 
seven years to accept the right of individual petition although all French courts 
now recognize the convention and, “ECHR rights and legal concepts, alien to the 
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French legal tradition and culture, are now…well absorbed”.136 Though the EU is 
committed through the FRA to providing assistance and expertise to member 
states when implementing Community law, how effectively these well-absorbed 
„legal concepts‟ are in bringing about real change in society throughout the 
member states remains to be seen. Media reports support the findings by the FRA 
that Muslims suffer physical attacks or racial discrimination in one or other of the 
member states on a regular basis.
137
  
 
In 2007, the FRA published a report summarizing the development of racism and 
discrimination from 2000-2005 and describing the progress of EU and member 
state initiatives to combat these problems.
138
 The report compares data from 
Eurobarometer polls in 2001 and 2003 on the subject of racism. One of the 
difficulties encountered is that of insufficient official data on ethnic and national 
origins, which, the report says, hinders the development of anti-discrimination 
policies.
139
 Inconsistency of data makes it difficult to construct a pan- European 
picture of the affects of racism. In the UK 56,694 racist incidents were reported 
for the 2003-2004 period. This is believed to be a true indication of the level of 
the problem throughout the EU because the UK‟s “effective mechanisms and 
broad based legal definitions of „racist incidents‟ encourage reporting and 
recording of incidents”.140 In contrast, on its Intercultural Dialogue Country Sheet, 
France still clings to its „indivisible‟ paradigm, insisting that, “France‟s approach 
is universalist and “minorities are not recognised as such” and thus, there is “no 
general authority for Intercultural dialogue”.141 By refusing to collect data on 
                                                 
136
 Catherine Dupre, “France” in Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States, 
1995-2000, eds. R. Blackburn & J.Polakiewski (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 333.  
137
 A comprehensive study of the media is outside this thesis but any search brings up numerous 
reported incidences of violence, for example –„Racist attacks against Dutch Muslims on the rise‟, 
05/04/05. www.islamonline.net. „UK teen killed in racist attack‟, 31/07/05. www.theage.com.au  
„Islamic centre attacked in Italy‟, 11/08/07. www.tvnz.co.nz  „Muslims attacked by rightists in 
Germany‟, 22/06/08. www.earthtimes.org „French Muslim war graves defaced‟, 06/04/08 
www.bbc.co.uk   
138
 See Trends and Developments on Racism and Xenophobia 1997-2000 on Combating Ethnic and 
Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007). 
139
 Trends and Developments, 26. 
140
 EUMC, “Racism and Xenophobia in the EU Member States: trends, developments and good 
practice,” EUMC Annual Report 2005 - Summary, (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Committee, 2006), 17. 
141
 Country Sheets, http://www.interculturaldialogue.eu/web/intercultural-dialogue-country-
sheets.php?ai  
 48 
ethnicity, member states are not protecting their minorities but instead simply 
obscuring the facts.
142
 
 
Dialogue and Community Action. 
In 1957, at the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC), 
discrimination was only of importance to the extent that it interfered with the 
process of market integration. The Treaty of Rome contained only two general 
prohibitions against discrimination. One was on the grounds of nationality under 
Article 48 EEC (revised to Art. 39 EC) for workers of member states, and the 
other, at the insistence of the French, a provision on equal pay for men and 
women for equal work or work of equal value under Article 119 EEC (revised to 
Art. 141 EC). This limited conception of rights gradually evolved, assisted by the 
inclusion of Article 13 into the Treaty of Rome by the Treaty of Amsterdam. This 
allows the Council, “acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat 
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age or sexual orientation”.143 This resulted in the development of Directives. The 
EU‟s work to promote equality through its Community Action Programme to 
Combat Discrimination (2001-2006), saw the development of the EU Racial 
Equality Directive
144
 and the Employment Equality Directive
145
. However, 
although Article 13 of the EC Treaty established a basis for addressing 
discrimination, these resulting protective legal frameworks remain limited and do 
not cover key areas where Muslims (and other minorities) experience prejudice – 
education, housing, access to goods and services, and in their treatment by public 
officials such as police and immigration officers.
146
 Additionally, these Directives 
are limited by the fact that they are left to the interpretation of member states and 
“positive action is discretionary rather than mandatory”.147 Progress is further 
hampered because the EU does not have legal competence with regard to human 
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rights, and is not likely to achieve this in the near future. The challenge for the 
EU, therefore, is to develop an internal common framework for human rights 
policies despite this being a sensitive topic.  
 
EYID in Action. 
Despite the teleological development of the EU‟s social policies, the Commission, the 
Ministry for Education and Culture, and the Council of Europe have tirelessly 
promoted intercultural dialogue through conferences, exhibitions, debates, inter-city 
exchanges, film and media, and the field of education, encouraging the exchange of 
ideas in the promotion of mutual understanding. On May 7, 2008, the Council of 
Europe released a White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue entitled “Living Together as 
Equals in Dignity”.148 The White Paper stresses the need to strengthen democratic 
citizenship, teach intercultural competences, and to create and widen spaces for 
intercultural dialogue.
149
 When the European Commission adopted the EYID proposal in 
October 2005, it acknowledged the increasing importance of cross-cultural communication: 
 
…the European Union has for many years encouraged intercultural 
dialogue…However it appears necessary today to respond to the need for a 
deeper and more structured dialogue of cultures, which would involve not only 
public authorities but also civil society as a whole.
150
 
 
The events organised for 2008 encompass a wide range of activities at an EU level, 
national level and community level. An allocated budget of Euro 10 million funded:  
 
- an information campaign raising awareness of EYID objectives  
- grants for festivals and sports events at the Community level for youth 
- co-financing of actions at national level with a strong European dimension
151
 
 
At the EU level, Brussels hosted seven debates at the Residence Palace during 2008. 
These debates each featured four guest speakers including Commissioners and 
Members of the European Parliament as well as various stake-holders from civil 
society action groups. The topic covered included:  
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Debate 1 - 05 March.  
“Integrating Conversations: The Impact of Migration on Intercultural Dialogue”. 
 
Debate 2 - 02 April. 
“Negotiating Differences: A Responsibility of Artists and Cultural Institutions”. 
 
Debate 3 - 14 May. 
“New Horizons: Active Citizenship to Bridge Inter-religious Divides”. 
 
Debate 4 - 04 June.  
“Couscous Culture: is that what Intercultural Dialogue in the workplace is all about?” 
 
Debate 5 - 10 September.  
“Multilingualism: A Bridge or Barrier for Intercultural Dialogue?” 
 
Debate 6 - 01 October.  
“Education: Ready for the Intercultural Exchange?” 
 
Debate 7 - 05 November.  
“Talking Our Way Out of Trouble: How Media Debate Can Combat Intolerance”. 
 
 
These debates (analysed in chapter 5) provided an opportunity for in depth 
discussions on the issues and themes at the core of the immigration story - issues that 
are relevant to policy makers and EU leaders in their search for a more balanced 
socio-cultural vision. Alongside the debates, each member state developed a country 
strategy, incorporating music, drama, writing, art and media. A range of over 84 
events covering themes ranging from, Intercultural flavoured coffee (Romania), Let‟s 
Meet – difference does not mean alien (Poland), Celebrations of Music in Pecs 
(Hungary), to What the Religions say about World Peace (Greece) and Writers and 
Literary Translators Congress (Sweden), all of which can be accessed on the Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue website.
152
 
 
Is Intercultural Dialogue Enough? 
Intercultural dialogue could in fact be a powerful medium for promoting difference. 
The opportunity to interact at the grassroots level is vital to the creation of mutual 
understanding and to removing fear of the „other‟. When difference, is experienced 
through arts, cuisine, fashion, dance, drama and music it is exciting, attractive, and 
enthralling, and thus, can create a real appreciation of other cultures. Legitimacy and 
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visibility go hand in hand. Visibility of Europe‟s varied cultures, not only in local 
communities but also in art galleries, in craft and fashion stores, in restaurants, in the 
media, on the television and on the radio will result in a legitimisation of their role in 
the multi-cultured patchwork that constitutes Europe. Despite this positive effect, 
serious questions remain. How can „Intercultural flavoured coffee‟ help disaffected 
youth living in the banlieues in France? What good is promoting understanding if one 
partner in the dialogue is unemployed, living in substandard housing, with children 
who are not performing well at school? The EUMC‟s report on Islamophobia 
concludes: 
 
Member States need to develop, reinforce and evaluate policies aimed a 
delivering equality and non-discrimination for Muslim communities, 
particularly in the fields of employment, education, and access to goods and 
services.
153
 
 
 
The EU‟s strong political vision has been consistently hampered by a social vision 
that remains obfuscated and inconsistent. A vision beleaguered by the attempts of 
individual member states to jealousy guard national interests. Although, in 1991 
Maastricht introduced the concept of a „social Europe‟, the EU still has no clear pan-
European strategy for dealing with the problems arising from Europe‟s increasing 
culture diversity. Each member state has struggled separately with immigration and 
the problems of integration, developing disparate paths, thus further complicating the 
picture. Consequently, ongoing cultural unrest involving Europe‟s diverse minorities 
continues to reflect the failure of multiculturalism and integration. Long aware of a 
„cultural gap‟ the EU institutions have flirted with this concept of a „social Europe‟ 
for nearly two decades. It has been a difficult relationship affected by the ongoing 
intergovernmental versus supranational debate that has dogged the integration process 
since its inception. While the member states have gradually subsumed more and more 
of their state sovereignty to the EU institutions in order to further economic and 
political progress, they have remained staunchly protective of social policies, 
especially those regarding immigration and integration. This has led to individual 
member states implementing different policies regarding immigrants, creating not just 
disparities between residents within states but also disparities across states.  
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Essentially Europe was a geographical term not a cultural term; the close proximity of 
nation-states necessitated an economic and political association to prevent further 
destruction. While creating an extremely successful economic bloc, the EU has not 
succeeded in creating a European socio-cultural identity bonded by a common set of 
principles. While the EU has challenged the traditional unitary model of citizenship 
by replacing it with a new style multi-country citizenship, this has not resulted in a 
new multi-ethnic EU identity. The most pressing problem for the architects of the 
new Europe is to create an inclusionary EU identity incorporating more than just 
Judeo-Christian principles. For Muslims this necessitates an intercultural dialogue 
with Islam resulting in the development of a form of European identity and 
citizenship that is inclusive of their Islamic identity as well.
154
 As Roy argues, “What 
is at stake is more the reconstruction or recasting of a lost identity…” which is in 
danger of being attracted to Islamic extremism as Muslim youth seek to reconcile the 
opposing cultural systems of western marginalisation and traditional Islam.
155
 
Intercultural dialogue with an emphasis on recognising, accepting and affirming the 
„other‟ can reduce policy disparities and reconcile opposing cultural systems. By 
legitimising minority cultures and imbuing them with the same status as „national‟ 
cultures Europe can enlarge the „space‟ presently allocated to minorities, and change 
the emphasis, from one of exclusion to inclusion. Depending on the capacity of 
Europe‟s „cultural sponge‟ to accommodate difference, can Algerian Muslims, 
Turkish Muslims, Pakistani Muslims become French, German or British or simply 
Europeans?
156
 
 
In New York on the 31
st
 of May 2008, Tony Blair launched the „Faith Foundation‟, 
which is committed to “developing better understanding between faiths”.157 In his 
opening speech Blair stated, “Religious faith will be of the same significance to the 
21
st
 century as political ideology was to the 20
th
 century.”158 Regardless of whether 
the Faith Foundation achieves its aims or not, religious faith will, no doubt, continue 
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to pose challenges to the future of secular Europe. The important question of this 
millennium being, can the place of religious faith in Europe‟s future be resolved 
through intercultural and inter-religious dialogue? In his book, The European Dream, 
Jeremy Rifkin writes: 
 
The European Union is the first governing experiment to attempt an 
accommodation between the new forces of individuation and integration that 
are stretching human consciousness inward to the multiple identities of the 
post-modern persona and outward to the globalizing forces of the economy.
159
 
 
 
This „stretching‟ necessitates a re-conceptualization of „European Identity‟. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
EUROPEAN IDENTITY. 
 
“If identities are mutually exclusive, Europe is an impossible project”. 
                                                                                       Ulrich Beck
160
 
 
Introduction. 
For the „majority‟ of the EU‟s 490 million people, their sense of belonging stems 
from the land of their birth and their familial community. For the „minority‟, 
however, the question of belonging can be a traumatic one, even though minorities 
have resided in Europe for centuries. Europe‟s history is not one of a monoculture but 
rather it forms a richly woven tapestry of contrasting cultures, religions, and political 
systems – a smorgasbord reflected in art, architecture and cuisine, interlaced with a 
chorus of diverse voices. Europe‟s tapestry is criss-crossed by multiple borders of 
time, space and meaning, which have shifted according to the ebb and flow of 
religious and political energies.
161
 Modern Europe, therefore, represents the 
culmination of centuries of cross-pollination and interpenetration of these „diverse 
voices‟, resulting in a political and cultural hybrid.162 Despite its hybrid nature, 
however, the European narrative has been one of a majority culture favoured over and 
above its minorities. Thus, while Europe would now celebrate its diversity, unity 
remains elusive, relying on the stretching of a „European identity‟ that can 
correlatively recognise and accommodate its minorities. Since belonging is rooted in 
identity, and identity, ultimately constructed in opposition, the challenge for the EU is 
to create a „common identity‟ based on a mutually inclusive dialogue that enables a 
„self‟ identification with the „other‟. The challenge is to create a „homeland‟ in which 
a sense of belonging is not boundary driven but is open to all, regardless of ethnicity, 
religion and colour.  
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There is a new emphasis by academics and theorists on the construction of a 
collective cosmopolitan identity in Europe “neither emotional, nor passionate” that is 
“founded less on memory than on reason”.163 A reason, that acknowledges “both 
equality and difference at the same time” whilst based on a commitment to humanity 
per se.
164
 Cosmopolitanism is not a new idea, and some academics would dismiss it as 
Utopian.
165
 However, it provides a meeting place for dialogue, for possibilities, for 
inclusion, and it therefore deserves debate. Any discussion of identity is problematic 
because identity itself is not a fixed, immutable object. Whether it be scrutinised 
through a psychological, philosophical, sociological, historical or political lens, 
identity appears fluid, ever changing and increasingly fragmented.
166
 As complex as 
the human physiology itself, identity weaves its way through and around the social 
sciences, both affecting, and affected by, these spheres. Whilst this chapter is 
primarily concerned with the construction of a European identity that can 
accommodate Europe‟s Muslim population, identity in Europe, personal or otherwise, 
is always influenced, not only by historical events but also by the political, social and 
cultural spheres that are presently moulding the „new Europe‟, including the affects of 
globalisation. Thus, any analysis of a European identity necessitates the adoption of a 
multi-layered framework looking at historical and political factors as well as societal 
influences. It also necessitates a discussion on the concept of what identity is. 
 
This chapter begins with a brief examination of the primordialist versus constructivist 
debate concerning the theoretical structure of identity. It will then trace the formation 
of collective identity as constructed by the nation-state and the affect of collective 
identities on Europe‟s minority cultures. Thirdly, it will examine the idea of an 
identity „crisis‟ brought about by the de-centring affects of globalisation, followed by 
an analysis of the argument for a cosmopolitan European identity, and the role of the 
EU as an identity builder. This thesis argues, that if there is to be any kind of „unity‟ 
within the „diversity‟, there is a need for the EU to develop a European identity that 
transcends not only national borders, but also the more difficult borders of colour, 
difference and otherness. Using the word „develop‟ presupposes a constructivist 
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approach as opposed to a primordialist approach and indeed this is the path that this 
chapter adopts, arguing that identity, whether personal, cultural, social or 
collective/political, is always constructed.  
 
Primordialism versus Constructivism. 
Primordialists argue that identity is a „fixed inner core‟ that emerges at birth and 
remains essentially the same throughout a person‟s life.167 This inner core is 
something intrinsic within human beings, an essential part that denies “the identity‟s 
social and historical construction”.168 Constructivists, on the other hand, posit that 
identities are relational and always incomplete, being shaped and reshaped in 
response to circumstance and interaction with others – whether personal or 
institutional – constructing meaning through experience.169 Primordialists like Herder 
(1744-1803) stressed the link between thought and language. Language was the 
expression of thought and because language differed between communities, it 
demonstrated that different communities think differently. This difference, he argued, 
was inherent and unchangeable. Thus, Herder saw cultural groups as „closed spheres‟ 
forever separated from other cultures by linguistic and territorial boundaries. For 
Geertz also, “the primordial bonds of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to 
have an ineffable and at times overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves”.170 
Huntington‟s provocative book echoes this view, by positing the unavoidability of a 
clash between world civilisations separated by primordial differences. He argues, 
“[F]or peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential, and 
the potentially most dangerous enmities occur across the fault lines between the 
world‟s major civilizations”.171 Primordialism therefore limits identity to intrinsic 
unchangeable characteristics dichotomously united by innate hostility. 
 
Conversely, constructivists do not see identity in any form as absolute, concrete and 
indivisible. Rather identity is malleable, fluid and composite. Identity is always a 
work in progress in which hereditary and environmental factors collide and 
collaborate in its design. As Amin Malouf writes, “[e]ven sex and colour are not 
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“absolute” ingredients of identity” for “[t]o be born a girl is not the same in Kabul as 
in Oslo” and „[t]o be born black is a different matter for some one in New York, or 
Pretoria”.172 For Meyer, identity “is not a possession but a social process” only 
becoming effective when the individual recognises him/herself in the image reflected 
back by his/her peers.
173
 Thus, identities are sources of meaning and a catalyst for 
belonging, constructed by the internalisation of “negotiations and arrangements 
between individuals” and “by norms structured by the institutions and organisations 
of society”.174 Identities are shaped in the crucible of experience. Though often 
regarded as immutable, particularly in relation to the „other‟, both personal and 
collective identities are vulnerable to evolutionary processes and change over time.
175
 
 
In a time of increasing uncertainty, is it possible to reach back and retrieve a 
primordial essence – a fixed inner core – that can provide stability and comfort? On 
the other hand, can identity only transcend time and space (wars and globalisation) 
because it is fluid, multi-layered, constructed, decentred, fragmented and re-
constructed? This thesis argues for a constructivist approach because whilst 
acknowledging that identity is, to varying degrees, constructed in opposition, 
constructivism allows for a more inclusive universal or cosmopolitan identity, which 
encompasses diverse cultures, meaning that identities can be constructed „with‟. 
Primordialism, on the other hand argues that identities can only be constructed 
„against‟. The question for Europe ultimately being, is it possible to construct a 
European identity that can safely steer 490 million multi-cultural, multi-lingual, 
people of differing faiths, into the next millennium? 
 
What is Identity?  
The concept of identity, in this paper, is that „kernel‟ within human beings that 
develops in an ever-changing tripartite relationship, involving the internal, with the 
familial culture (tradition, religion, language and locality) and the wider society (all 
other external forces). It is fluid, multi-layered and mouldable – constructed, 
deconstructed and reconstructed over time according to experience. It is capable of 
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being both, progressive and regressive, open and closed, expansive and fundamental. 
Identity in all its guises – political/collective, social, religious or cultural - always 
begins at home. The self is born into a familial landscape incorporating location, 
language and religious influences, which set the cultural context.
176
 Within this 
landscape, allegiance to these influences is variously absorbed according to their 
perceived importance. For some (practising Muslims or Christian fundamentalists) 
religion is so tightly woven into the cultural context it is almost impossible to separate 
belief from self, and for others (Christmas and Easter churchgoers) religion is a cloak, 
to be worn or discarded at will. Anthony Giddens argues that, “self-identity is not a 
distinctive trait possessed by the individual”.177 Rather it is the understanding of self, 
set within the context of „biography‟ – within the context of one‟s cultural 
background. According to Meyer, this cultural background is itself “a construct just 
like the keys on a typewriter”.178 Identity is also constructed and understood within 
the context of one‟s political background. As Meyer argues, it is the „political 
instrumentalization‟ of cultural identities (resulting in the promotion of 
fundamentalism) that leads to conflict rather than inherent cultural differences per 
se.
179
 The danger facing post-modernity is that fundamentalism offers a sense of 
purpose and a sense of belonging for those marginalised by majority 
identifications.
180
 For this reason identity, which is synonymous with belonging is as 
important issue for Europe‟s future. 
 
Enlightenment to Modernity. 
The Enlightenment period stirred an awakening, which recognised the importance of 
the individual rational being “over and above his place in a rigid hierarchical 
society”.181 European culture, essentially founded on universal rights and equality, 
stems from Rene Descartes‟ (1596-1650) concept of a rational being whose sense of 
self stands independent without the need of others. 
182
 However, „Cartesian identity‟ 
bestowed at birth, remained static, ignoring the affect of the external, and ultimately 
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privileging white, middle-class males over and above all others who were different or 
„deviant‟.183 This „privileging‟ has remained a European trademark in the 
majority/minority tussle. Enlightenment also introduced the idea of progress, which 
was fundamental to the way Europeans interpreted history and their place in it. It lead 
to a belief that they were united in the search for a better future and this was 
reinforced by the nation-state, which promised to provide security and progress in 
return for allegiance. 
 
Modernity saw an emphasis on the nation-state as welfare provider inducing a loyalty 
to the state and to a „common people‟ connected through territory and shared history. 
It brought an awareness of the affect of relationship on the formation of identity. 
People were social beings and their identity formation resulted from the interaction 
between the personal and the public. As Stuart Hall argues, the sociological subject‟s 
essence was “modified in a continuous dialogue with the surrounding cultural 
worlds.”184 Identity fused the internal and external, acting as a suture, anchoring the 
“subject into the structure”.185 However, a symptom of modern societies is one of 
“constant, rapid and permanent change marked by discontinuities” in which changing 
societal landscapes result in increasing fragmentation.
186
 Identities once considered 
fixed, essential and permanent have become fluid, complex and ephemeral. Where 
once sociologists argued that identities reflected a common experience providing a 
united people with “stable, unchanging and continuous frames of reference and 
meaning” now it is widely recognised that “cultural identity is a matter of „becoming‟ 
as well as „being‟”.187 In a world where identity is no longer secured by working for 
the same company for forty years, and careers now change as often as clothes, 
„becoming‟ is fraught with anxiety. For many the act of becoming is unsettling, more 
especially for immigrants who find their traditional points of reference do not make 
sense in their new „homeland‟ and efforts to fit in, meet with a studied indifference. 
As Julia Kristeva writes: 
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Nowhere is one more a foreigner than in France…[because France] rejects the 
notion of difference and sets aside for the foreigner a solitary curiosity, the weird 
charms of which soon prove to be a source of scorn.
188
  
 
 
While the nation-state attempts to infuse a loyalty and sense of belonging among 
those born within its territorial boundaries, this is coupled with a suspicion of those 
who come from outside. „Difference‟ has no place in the „imagined community‟ of 
nationalism.  
 
Identity, Nationalism and Minorities. 
A political community exists only if legitimated by its people. Within certain 
territorial parameters, nation-states undertook to provide the staples of life and in 
return demanded an allegiance from their citizens. As protector of the people the 
nation-state, became a major source of collective identification. Benedict Anderson 
examines the creation of a collective identity by the nation-state. Taking a 
constructivist approach, he acknowledges that identities vary across time and space 
because identity construction incorporates a reciprocal dynamic. Thus, group 
identities both change, and conversely are changed by, the societal conditions of the 
day. Anderson coins the term „imagined community‟ to describe the phenomena of 
nation-ness.
189
 A nation, he writes, is an imagined political community – a 
community socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive 
themselves to be part of that community. A community that is „imagined‟ because the 
members of even the smallest nation will never know even a tiny percentage of their 
fellows yet they imagined themselves united, with a common identity.
190
 Despite 
inequalities that exist in all nations, the nation is imagined as having a “deep 
horizontal comradeship” for which people are even willing to sacrifice their lives.191 
This imagined community, argues Anderson, is a cultural construct based on 
perceived „natural ties‟ – parentage, birth, skin-colour, language and an alleged 
connection to the land.
192
 It is a construct promoted through communication systems 
like the media, and unifying symbols, and it is the protection of this „imagined 
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community‟ that underpins the ethos of nationalism. Nationalism is fuelled by the 
belief that the community must be protected from the „other‟ – protected from those 
who are different and who, because of their difference, threaten the status quo. Hall 
agrees, arguing that because collective identities are constructed within „discourse‟ 
they “are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than the sign 
of a naturally constituted entity”.193 Not only are they constructed in opposition to 
those outside their territorial boundaries, they also deny difference within. Foreigners 
are different and therefore inherently incapable of belonging. Consider George Mikes 
comment in his children‟s book, How to be an Alien: 
 
 
It is a shame and bad taste to be an alien…A criminal may improve and become a 
decent member of society…A foreigner cannot improve…He may become 
British; he can never become English.
194
 
 
 
Nationalism is rooted in territory, yet those born within the territory, from foreign 
parents also remain outsiders. Nationalism is as much about classifications (race, 
colour, ethnicity) as it is about jus solis. Hence, its intolerance of minorities. 
The worst excesses of nationalism remain engraved forever on Europe‟s soul. The EU 
is testament to the desire to prevent any further wars on European soil but virulent 
nationalism lingers still. According to Kristeva, the end of the Cold War effected a 
new identification with origins.
195
 The late 1980s, early 1990s saw a rise in neo-Nazi 
groups across Eastern Europe and Germany alongside an increase in popularity for 
the Front National in France.
196
 Jean Le Pen‟s party played on the fear of those who 
felt threatened by increasing immigration numbers, promising to halt immigration and 
to protect the rights of the „French citizen‟. Nationalism, while framed within a 
political ideology, is based on a cultural ideology, which arouses passionate defence 
when that culture (imagined community) is threatened. In 1973, a massive outburst of 
racist violence, spurred by high unemployment, spread across France. Politicians 
campaigning for the 1974 elections (Le Pen included) were quick to blame 
immigration policies and, by association, immigrants for these conflicts and the new 
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government reacted by halting immigration. They portrayed the problem not in terms 
of the discriminatory practices that disadvantaged Muslim youth and needed 
changing, but as being directly attributable to immigrants, who threatened the „French 
community‟.  
 
Thus, modernity‟s emphasis on nationalism as the ultimate identification presents an 
obstacle to millions of refugees and migrants. Minorities suffer under nationalism 
because its paradigmatic nature reinforces the strength of the majority through 
weakening the „other‟. Bauman explains that nationalism “demands unequivocal 
allegiance and exclusive fidelity” and does not recognise nor accommodate 
opposition.
197
 Therefore, “nationalism denies the empirical reality of Europe” because 
while Europe may not as yet be fully united in its diversity it is, and has been for 
centuries, a „unit‟ of diversity just as the individual nation-states themselves have 
always been „units‟ of diversity.198 Minorities thus challenge the core of nationalism 
by their very presence, by their visible difference. France prides itself on the strict 
separation between church and state and the refusal to recognise minorities – resulting 
in an indivisible and laique society. Laïcité, which bans the wearing of religious dress 
in public spaces forces France‟s Muslims to be invisible, begging the question, can 
France only be „indivisible‟ by forcing its minorities to be „invisible‟? 
  
The problem with French-style Republicanism is that you are accepted as long as 
you fit a certain mould. As soon as you have something that comes from outside 
you are no longer viewed as entirely French. You are suspicious.
199
 
 
 
In recent years many EU member states, have been squeezed between the 
immigration dilemma on one side, and the increasing demands of European 
integration on the other, resulting in a „national identity crisis‟. Immigrants not only 
compete for jobs, housing and social benefits but also challenge the strict separation 
between the church and the state, a right passionately fought for in many EU states. 
Thus, any attempt purposeful or otherwise, to confuse the demarcation lines between 
church and state cause anxiety. Perceived challenges to the status quo from Muslims 
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who sometimes turn to their religious organisations to meet their physical needs 
prompted defensive responses from a Liberal Party (D166) Councillor in Utrecht. 
 
The laws of the Moroccan-man are interwoven with their religion, well that is a 
problem… We keep church and state separate and I consider that an acquired 
right that should not be changed.
200
 
 
 
When under threat – perceived or real – all identities regress behind a defensive 
shield, blaming the immigrant for any problem, and often resorting to the „if you do 
not like our ways, then go home‟ response. This is the case irrespective of whether 
the „immigrant‟ was born in the EU or is a legal citizen, and this response arises in 
both the big issues (free speech in the Denmark „cartoon affair‟) and the seemingly 
innocuous. In Scotland, the „police puppy in the hat campaign‟ caused offense to 
Muslim shopkeepers because dogs are considered unclean in some Muslim countries 
like Pakistan and India – the traditional homeland of the shopkeepers.201 Many 
Scottish people were equally offended by the rejection of „man‟s best friend‟. Their 
vitriolic responses on various websites, however, showed a disproportionate response 
to the concern of the Muslim shopkeepers, and are indicative of the intolerance 
spawned by nationalism. Comments such as if “Muslims don‟t like Scottish customs 
then …[go] back to your stone-age countries” and “If they want to live in 
England/Scotland/Europe they should assimilate themselves to the culture and not 
impose their stone-age non-sense on others” reinforce the Us and Them attitude 
endemic to territorial identification.
202
 Kristeva comments that these „national identity 
crises‟ exacerbate: 
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the ups and downs of the identity struggle that human beings have been waging 
forever, one that henceforth has lost its ideological masks and is being carried out 
protected only by a shield of origins.
203
  
 
 
As Will Kymlicka posits, “political life has an inescapably national dimension” which 
naturally favours the majority.
204
 Therefore without a sincere attempt to 
accommodate minority peoples “talk of „treating people as individuals‟ is itself a 
cover for ethnic and national injustice”.205 Thus, whenever disagreements erupt into 
racial conflict the „nation‟ ultimately sides with the majority, highlighting the fact that 
the issue of racist violence is also situated within a political framework. Rob Witte 
argues that once racist violence is acknowledged as a social problem by the state it is 
then put on the political agenda and states react in one of two ways – „including 
recognition‟ or „excluding recognition‟.206 If the group, facing discrimination is a 
valuable part of society (inclusion), the discrimination or violence is treated as an 
attack on society at large, and the state will put policies in place to deal with it. 
Conversely if the group discriminated against (usually a minority) are considered to 
be to blame (exclusion), policies will be directed against the minority group – the 
Roma, the Basque, the Muslim. 
 
Kristeva argues that unless one regresses in order to transcend, the „shield of origins‟ 
(nationalism) becomes but a „hate reaction‟.207 A defensive hatred, which rejects all 
„others‟ or, conversely, a hatred of self inevitably caused by a rejection of one‟s 
roots.
208
 Rather than searching for solace behind the shield of nationalism, Kristeva, a 
self-confessed cosmopolitan, argues for tolerance and commonality based on 
Montesquieu‟s esprit general.209 A theory “more concerned with respect for the 
other, more watchful of citizens rights…more concerned with individual 
strangeness”.210 Esprit general advocates the integration of the individual and the 
„other‟ within a higher body, which not only values each person but also gives 
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sustenance to their difference by providing a „guaranteed hierarchy of private 
rights‟.211 Since, ultimately, all are but strangers, this form of nation-hood, Kristeva 
posits, could well provide the longed-for commonality uniting individuals both 
“different and free”.212 Thus with esprit general it is possible to “bring together the 
national and the cosmopolitan without erasing national boundaries” for national 
boundaries will continue to remain important as a stabilising force in this fast 
changing world – both within and without the EU”.213  
 
Identity and Globalisation. 
Among its many affects, globalisation has sparked a renewed interest in the concept 
of identity. Old identities, which „stabilised‟ the social world have been displaced 
through the fragmentation of the “cultural landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, 
ethnicity race and nationality” resulting in a „crisis of identity‟.214 If the problem for 
modernity was how to construct a strong national identity, the problem for 
postmodernity is the opposite. As Bauman writes, “In the case of identity…the 
catchword of modernity was creation: the catchword of postmodernity is 
recycling”.215 For the postmodern person finds themselves in a world “with 
disposable products designed for immediate obsolescence” where “identities can be 
adapted and discarded like a change of costume”.216 In this world of no boundaries, 
everyone becomes a stranger and life is, reduced to a “journey through a foreign 
land”.217 While the pilgrim has always accepted that he is a „stranger in a strange 
land‟ and has always known that “the truth is elsewhere: the true place is always 
some distance, some time away” the postmodern wanderer is dislocated and 
disorientated.
218
 As transience becomes a permanent affliction the immigrant finds 
themselves in „double danger‟ of either “falling in between two cultures…[or] falling 
into the abysses of modernity” forever without a „home‟.219 
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Giddens writes, “Modern institutions differ from all preceding forms of social order 
in respect of their dynamism, the degree to which they undercut traditional habits and 
customs, and their global impact”.220 These external institutions radically alter the 
daily experience of social life. The more globalisation impacts on self-identity, the 
more tradition (one‟s cultural foundation) loses its hold. Giddens argues that late 
modernity effects a tension between the internal and external in which „globalising 
influences‟ compete with traditional forces causing a „reflexive‟ re-structuring of self-
identity.
221
 A re-structuring in which individuals find themselves confronted with an 
ever-increasing diversity of „lifestyle choices‟ from which they must choose.222 
Choice, however, is only for the elite, the outwardly mobile who can smoothly 
transcend time and space, moving between the local and the global with apparent 
ease. As Castells argues, only the elite have the ability to master the disjunction 
between the global and the local.
223
 For the rest “[A] chooser life is an insecure life” 
and insecurity leads to vulnerability.
224
 
 
Trapped on a journey that gathers speed with every passing decade, in a chameleon 
world where nothing is static and everything is disposable, because it can be 
synthetically, mechanically or technologically reproduced the postmodern person 
searches for the concrete, the absolute, the solid. He/she wanders in a world where the 
real is obscured by the hyper-real, the original is swallowed by the simulacrum, and 
where values and identities change moment by moment. In a world in which progress 
is measured by the global expansion of McDonalds, shopping malls and theme parks, 
identification with cultural roots is complicated by the fact that “everywhere is made 
up of everywhere else – a polycentric anagram” and the authentic is even more 
elusive.
225
 Thus, „belonging‟ and „identity‟ are no longer secure. Instead, they are 
“eminently negotiable and revocable”.226 If one belongs, they do not question their 
identity – it is only in the face of uncertainty that identity becomes an issue. Hence, 
Bauman argues that globalisation has inflicted a „liquid modernity‟ on humanity, 
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resulting in individual lives “cut into a succession of ill-connected episodes”.227 
Where once the nation-state offered a „modicum of security for its own‟, liquid 
modernity challenges old identifications for all. 
 
For the majority “the search for meaning takes place…in the reconstruction of 
defensive identities around communal principles”, and thus identity building 
“revolves essentially around the principle of resistance identities”.228 Castells argues 
that these identities are culturally constructed, based on the raw materials moulded by 
external forces into “defensive identities that function as refuge and solidarity, to 
protect against a hostile, outside world”.229 Hall concurs, positing that the dislocating 
of national identities simultaneously produces a trend towards a „global 
homogenisation‟ while reinforcing the resurgence of nationalism, ethnicity and 
fundamentalism.
230
 Hall cites the increase in nationalism in Eastern Europe and the 
rise of fundamentalism as evidence of an attempt to “reconstruct purified identities, to 
restore coherence, „closure‟ and Tradition, in the face of hybridity and diversity”.231 
If, however, security can only be provided by „closed cultural spheres‟ resulting in 
mutually exclusive identities, what hope for Europe? 
 
Identity and Cosmopolitanism. 
The idea of a cosmopolitan society traces back to the ancient Greeks. When Diogenes 
the Cynic stated, “I am a citizen of the world” he rejected the proclivity for divisions 
of birth, gender, class and status, choosing to indentify himself in universalistic 
terms.
232
 By definition, cosmopolitan means all of humanity belongs to a single moral 
community but unlike universalism, cosmopolitanism does not seek to „dissolve 
difference‟ by replacing it with one unified norm.233 It also differs from nationalism, 
which (because of its territorial foundation) strives to dissolve internal disparities by 
highlighting external ones, and, as history constantly reminds us, nationalism all too 
often leads to the dissolution of internal differences only through the promotion of 
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hierarchical subordination – majority rule.234 Martha Nussbaum comments that the 
failure of nationalism has prompted some postmodern theorists to look for inspiration 
from the past in the hope of developing an: 
 
alternative paradigm for our own political lives, one based less on reason and 
more on communal solidarity, less on principle and more on affiliation, less on 
optimising for progress than on a sober acknowledgement of human finitude and 
mortality.
235  
 
 
For Ulrich Beck, cosmopolitanism affirms that which universalism and nationalism 
both exclude, because it does not try to „dissolve difference‟. Instead, it aims for the 
“recognition of difference”, both collectively and individually.236 Aware of the 
divisiveness of politics, which seek to classify people in terms of „us‟ and „them‟, 
Stoic Cosmopolitanism emphasised the idea of an „empathetic understanding‟ - the 
concept that people are „born to work together‟.237 Life in and of itself is a unifying 
factor – a commonality shared by all and to empathize is to cross over and experience 
the other‟s struggle. Jeremy Rifkin argues that whereas universal human rights, is the 
“new legal code of behaviour”, empathy, is the “new social glue” necessary to 
transcend difference.
238
 According to David Beetham, the common needs of 
subsistence, security and respect coupled with common threats, “justify the claim that 
the human rights agenda is universal”.239 Emmanuel Kant adopted Stoic ideas in his 
essay Perpetual Peace (1795) believing that Jus Cosmopolitan was a guiding 
principle, morally founded on the principle of universal hospitality. In The Passions, 
Kant remarks in Hobbseian tones, “War…does not require any particular kind of 
motivation, for it seems to be ingrained in human nature”.240 Jus Cosmopolitan, he 
argued, would protect people from war by essentially protecting them from 
themselves. The rise in religious fundamentalism and neo-Nazi sentiment in recent 
years, however, suggests that Europe is not quite ready for Jus Cosmopolitan. As 
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Nussbaum warns, “Cosmopolitanism seems to be in grave jeopardy…[because] we 
see so many regions falling prey to ethnic and religious and social conflict…”.241  
 
Why does the EU need a cosmopolitan approach? To achieve any sort of unity in 
diversity Europe needs to provide a model of identification for its multi-ethnic 
society, a „public space‟ in which identity is not constructed in opposition but is 
constructed in conjunction. Marginalisation, the by-product of modernity‟s obsession 
with defining identities in relation to the other, threatens the European project
242
. Ian 
Ward argues that Europe must adopt a post-modern approach to „otherness‟, an 
approach that incorporates „humane‟ human rights.243 Ward‟s argument is not for 
cosmopolitanism by name. Rather he argues that the EU needs to address what he 
terms „other Europeans‟, those marginalised by the system of nation-states. He 
suggests that the EU‟s “procedures for controlling immigration flows are essentially 
extra-legal, and themselves in breach of Community and international law”.244 Since 
immigration and asylum policies “remain essentially in the preserve of the nation-
state, both individually and in their intergovernmental capacity” immigrants remain a 
pawn, reduced to a „means to an end‟ in capitalist societies.245 The main danger of 
exclusionary practices for Ward is that all too often “The exclusion of the other from 
the legal process was always the first symbolic step, because the taking away of legal 
rights from any individual represented the removal of legal rights for all”.246 More 
than 10 million third country nationals who are legal residents of the EU but are not 
eligible for citizenship reinforce the perception of discriminatory practices in a 
Europe that wants to keep the other out. 
 
Habermas echoes this concern over „Fortress Europe‟ urging the European states to 
agree upon liberal immigration policies. He writes, “They should not draw their 
wagons around themselves and their chauvinism of prosperity, hoping to ignore the 
pressures of those hoping to immigrate or seek asylum”.247 While democracy allows 
for the preservation of a state‟s political culture, he argues, this does not provide a 
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mandate for a “privileged cultural life form”.248 A cosmopolitan model, would thus, 
allow for the introduction of a theoretical framework for the discussion of otherness 
and for the resolution of this exclusivity/inclusivity problem. Kristeva argues that 
otherness is intimately bound up with the question of nationality, whereas in reality 
otherness is the only universal.
 249
 She argues, “I am convinced, in the long run, only 
a thorough investigation of our remarkable relationship both with the other and 
strangeness with ourselves can lead to people to give up hunting for the scapegoat 
outside their group”.250 Kant also argued for the accommodation of both the 
individual and the different. He argued for the need to broaden our sense of 
judgements by “putting ourselves in the place of any other man” thereby attributing 
the same rights to others as we attribute to ourselves.
251
  
 
Philip Schlesinger, on the other hand believes that a European “cosmopolitan space 
that allows an escape from the prison-house of nationalism” is at present only a 
„temptation‟.252 Any serious move towards a cosmopolitan Europe, according to 
Schlesinger, must be premised by a serious move towards federalism because the 
development of a European public sphere rests on the development of common pan-
European policies.
253
 Though the EU institutions have challenged the norms of 
statehood, citizenship and identity, Schlesinger doubts that the EU can make the leap 
to a cosmopolitan polity because, to date, member states continue to be the key 
constructors of collective identities by controlling the public space, which shapes the 
daily lives of the demos.
254
 Schlesinger argues that the rejection of both the 
Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty signifies the public‟s lack of confidence in a 
collective European space, given that traditionally, public space is constructed 
through „mediated communication‟ by a committed elite, based on a „national‟ 
language. However, Habermas argues that a constitution would provide the necessary 
„common value orientation‟, and legitimate a distinctive political space, thus allowing 
for the creation of a cosmopolitanism identity.
255
 It becomes a „chicken and egg‟ 
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scenario. A constitution would create a European public space thus legitimising the 
EU polity but without a sense of identification provided by a European public space, 
the citizens of Europe have trouble trusting that the EU polity has their best interest at 
heart and their only form of protest is to vote no. Thus, a European identity remains 
weak. 
 
European Identity. 
Symbolic elements such as the EU flag, EU passports and drivers‟ licences, the 
anthem and a common currency (Euro) progressively introduced by the EU 
institutions since the 1980s mirror traditional nation-building methodology. These 
symbols are designed to induce a commonality, a shared space, a sense of belonging, 
a common identity, in other words a collective public sphere. Theorists agree that a 
common European public sphere is necessary to provide a political identity, which is 
essential to the continued legitimacy of the EU. This public space needs to be 
politically based, and must not threaten the national sphere, nor attempt to replace 
Europe‟s cultural diversity with a single monoculture. Difference has always existed 
in Europe and will remain and where there is difference, there will be conflict, so it 
would be naïve to expect conflict to disappear from the European landscape. Unity in 
diversity is about discovering an identity tolerant of the other, about finding 
agreement on the other side of difference, about finding a mutual platform through 
dialogue. Therefore, as Cathleen Kantner, argues, a shared European identity should 
be “conceived as a „normative corridor”, one that is large enough for internal 
conflicts” and one that can allow for an “agreement upon common policies without 
„speaking with one voice‟”.256 Vocal diversity expressed through the medium of 
intercultural dialogue should be able to channel dissonance into harmony.  
 
For Bo Strath, the “only viable model for a European identification is one that 
challenges the exclusivist kind of cultural identity”.257 He argues that the recent pre-
occupation with a European identity has been wrongly focussed on trying to prove 
that Europe is a “distinctive cultural entity united by shared values, culture and 
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identity”, stemming from its classical heritage.258 Historically Europe has been 
fabricated as an entity on a quest for perfection, having a cultural identity based on 
core values and consensus „united‟ against the Other. Strath argues that this concept 
of a European identity is an “abstraction and a fiction without essential proportions” 
and it actually prevents the creation of a common public space.
259
 For Strath the 
building of a European identity/public sphere must be based on an acknowledgement 
of Europe‟s „cultural contention‟ and „pluralism‟ because cultural cohesion in Europe 
is a myth.
260
 Intercultural dialogue can only emerge when Europe‟s obsession with 
„cohesion‟ against „distinction‟ dissolves. In order to transcend the mire of 
„distinction‟ Strath suggests that Europe needs to adopt the role of active listener or 
mediator rather than that of role model.
261
 Only by deconstructing Europe‟s cultural 
ideology of exclusively and acknowledging that Europe was and is constructed 
through contention and bargaining, and by acknowledging that Europe‟s “symbolic 
and geopolitical boundaries…[have been] historically and discursively shaped” will 
Europe be free to rewrite its future as a global mediator and bridge-builder, thereby 
uniting rather than essentializing difference.
262
 A cosmopolitan Europe is one that 
does not need an „other‟ to construct identity against, for as Gerard Delanty argues, it 
“does not have a clear distinction between east and west or between Self and 
Other”.263 To be European in a cosmopolitan sense, he argues, is to simply 
acknowledge that today “one lives in a world that does not belong to a specific 
people”.264 
 
Meyer suggests that the EU needs a shared political identity that is not based on a 
shared cultural identity.
265
 He posits that a political identity is a common meeting 
point, a sphere, which all citizens share irrespective of their culture and religious 
differences. While cultural diversity is an identifying factor of the EU it is not a 
sufficient foundation for a political identity. The requirements for a political identity, 
according to Meyer, are an institutional script (a defined set of values and objectives) 
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and a political socio-culture (a sense of identification with the script by the 
citizens).
266
 Meyer argues that a political European identity is validated at the script 
level through the values and objectives enshrined in the Treaties and the Constitution. 
Quoting from Gerhards (2005) Meyer argues that recent empirical research in the EU 
showed that 70-90% of people favoured a “social democracy with a strong welfare 
state” as enshrined in the Treaties.267 The „deficit‟ crisis in the implementation of 
these policies at an EU level occurs because, as Meyer argues: 
 
most national governments are extremely hesitant to agree to European solutions 
in the realm of social policies not due to ideological and economic reasons but 
more over because this is a national electoral arena.
268
 
 
 
The problem for the European demos, as demonstrated by the rejection of the 
Constitutional Treaty by France and the Netherlands in 2005 and the rejection of the 
Lisbon Treaty by Ireland in 2008 is a lack of confidence in the EU‟s ability to 
transform the rhetoric of the script into policy actions in the social domain. This 
contradiction reinforces the fragility of the European public sphere. While there 
continues to be a lack of enforcement of binding regulations with regard to social and 
employment policies at the EU level, the demos believe “social protection at the 
national level is endangered by the EU pressing for more liberalisation”.269  
 
Furio Cerutti agrees that any European identity must be politically, rather than 
culturally based. He argues for a „thin political identity‟ founded on reason rather than 
emotion, which does not compete with national identities.
270
 For Cerutti, political 
identity is also legitimated by public recognition – an act of self-identification and an 
acceptance of social and political values, which engender a commonality through 
interpretation and debate.
271
 Therefore, while the values in the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, the Maastricht Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty may be intellectually 
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agreed upon by the European public, for these values to be validated and inculcated 
into daily life, they must be brought to life through policy formation at the local, 
national and supranational levels. These institutions, Cerutti argues, “are the 
embodiment of the normative element that is essential to political identity”.272 At 
present, those issues that remain closest to the hearts of European citizens (medical 
care, law and order, education, welfare benefits and taxation) are jealously guarded 
by national states, thus monopolising loyalties. The EU as a regulator of trade, 
monetary policies, environmental issues and foreign aid does not strike a passionate 
note. Europeans tend, therefore, to be more passionate about their nation than they do 
about the EU. For the majority it all comes back to „self-preservation‟. Cerutti argues, 
therefore, that the EU needs a different „glue‟ from the member states if it is to 
establish a common European identity. Rifkin would argue for a „new social glue‟ 
called empathy while cosmopolitans like Kristeva argue for esprit general. Ward 
argues for a „glue‟ of universal human rights and Schnapper remarks that there is 
evidence of a „glue‟ called reason. In his book, David Green argues that there is 
evidence of an embryonic European identity based on “the cerebral rather than 
emotive, instrumental rather than devoted”.273 It is as yet a weak identity but one that 
is unlikely to inspire the passions and disasters associated with nationalism.  
 
Traditionally, identity is constructed by the political elite but there is evidence that 
this weak embryonic European identity is driven by a different elite. Those young 
educated Europeans that look outward rather that inward. In 1998, a journalist 
described this new generation in an article in the New York Times as: 
 
Mobile, fluent in several languages and aggressively non-nationalistic, they are 
already living a borderless, cosmopolitan existence that the single European 
currency is supposed to advance. They do not share their parents‟ memories of 
World War II or their parents‟ sense of national identity.274  
 
These are Castells‟ elite, those, who have the ability to master the disjunction 
between the global and the local, the national and the transnational. What about the 
rest? Those who have not mastered liquid modernity and, as Strath warned earlier, 
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find themselves in danger of falling in between two cultures, or falling into the 
abysses of modernity. What about the majority who are reliant on the nation-state to 
provide the basics of life, and the immigrants who are reliant on the nation-state to 
protect their right to life? How can they benefit from a European identity? In order to 
create a common European identity the EU institutions must address the basic needs 
of the common people. Identity is reciprocal, inclusion fosters loyalty, exclusion 
fosters rejection. Only as the demos see genuine leadership by the EU institutions in 
the areas that concern them most, will they lend legitimacy to a European political 
identity – when the polity values the people, the people value the polity. Thus, it 
seems unity keeps coming back to policy. 
 
Pettigrew argues that policy makers need to be proactive in integrating the areas of 
employment, education and housing to facilitate opportunities for natural interaction, 
thus dispelling misperceptions.
275
 Segregation, he writes, is the enemy of integration 
because “intergroup separation magnifies negative stereotypes”. 276 If groups work 
and live separately and their children are schooled separately, there is little occasion 
for cross communication and intergroup marriage. There is less opportunity for what 
Clinton Bennett calls „virtual insidership‟ - the ability to think, feel and see the other 
point of view.
277
 A study by the British Sociological Association in 2006, found that 
parents who have specifically chosen to send their children to multicultural schools 
reinforces the idea of „virtual insidership‟. As Avril Smart, a journalist and parent 
remarked:  
 
I think there is an understanding of others you can only have if you are sort of 
with them all the time. It is something to learn of other cultures, but to actually 
learn with other cultures, of other cultures, it is a completely different thing.
278
  
 
Maalouf contends it is the people of “mixed ethnicities and/or mixed allegiances” that 
can act as a “mortar joining together and strengthening the societies in which they 
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live”.279 These people, he argues, live in the „frontier zone‟ of identity and these 
„frontier dwellers‟ have a role to play as mediators, and bridge builders.280 Luca 
Viscenti, a professor at Bocconi University in Milan concurs, saying, “Second 
generation [Muslim] immigrants are a huge resource because they live in the middle” 
and are able to bridge both cultures.
281
 Echoing Rifkin‟s call for „empathy‟, and 
Bennett‟s „virtual insidership‟, Maalouf argues for reciprocity – the more one 
immerses oneself in the culture of the other, the more one can identify with them. The 
more one can identify with others the more tolerant one is of the others‟ right to 
belong, and since identity is validated by belonging, life is meaningful only if it is 
shared.
282
  
 
The challenge for the EU in the 21
st
 century then, is to create a collective European 
identity, which validates its multi-ethnic population. In 1988, the EU conducted a 
„prejudice‟ survey in France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany. The 
Eurobarometer 30 survey (Euro 88) asked a number of prejudice related questions 
whilst also measuring the respondent‟s identification to either a national, or 
European, identity.
283
 The survey designed to quantify both blatant and subtle 
prejudice, measured a threat-and-rejection factor and an intimacy factor. While a third 
of the interviewees were both proud of their nation state and also considered 
themselves to be Europeans, the survey discovered that “strong national identity is 
linked to greater prejudice on both measures, while European identity is linked to 
reduced prejudice on both measures”.284  
 
Fourteen years later, in 2002, a probability phone survey conducted in Germany 
(GMF02) replicated the same prejudicial leanings.
285
 It found that Germans, who 
identified more highly with Europe rather than Germany, were the least prejudiced 
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and the least pro-violence. Thus, it appears that a more expansive European identity 
has a moderating affect on prejudicial and pro-violent nationalistic tendencies.
286
 The 
results in both surveys were also affected by other social indicators such as education, 
age and political affiliation. Those who identified strongly with their nation-state thus 
projecting stronger prejudices, tended to be older, politically conservative and less 
well educated.
287
 The dichotomy for Europe being, that Europe‟s aging population 
does not want the very people (immigrants) that Europe‟s future depends on. The 
study found that while the “existence of multiple overlapping…identities inhibits 
collective violence and promotes social cohesion…intense conflicts of interest, 
pressure individuals with diverse, fluid identities to valorize their loyalty to one 
group…prompting social hostility and mutual hostility”.288  
 
If the uncertainty generated by globalisation entrenches the building of resistance 
identities (national, ethnic or fundamental), how can the EU construct an expansive, 
inclusive, tolerant identity? If hybridity and diversity intensify a thirst for „purified 
identities, how does the EU construct a „heterogeneous identity‟? While „Europeans‟ 
identify with the universal values and norms promoted by the EU on an intellectual 
plane, hearts and passions remain with their nation-states for historical reasons of 
loyalty, and in this topsy-turvy world, for security and self-preservation. Beneath the 
democratic deficit lies a security deficit. Can the citizens of Europe trust the EU 
institutions to deliver? Robert Picht writes:  
 
Where traditional institutions, habits and beliefs fail and where no new authority 
can be easily established, dialogue – the patient search for common ground, 
shared interests and mutually acceptable arguments – constitute the only hope for 
new rationality.
289
  
 
 
The challenge for the EU institutions is therefore to engage in a dialogue that will 
result in the expansion of the „imagined‟ European identity (without losing individual 
national or cultural flavours) and thus, provide a carapace for its chorus of multi-
ethnic, multi-religious, multi-political voices. The perception at present is that the EU 
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is competing for loyalty against the member states. If European identity is presented 
as an either or choice, as a competition for loyalty for the supranational over and 
against the national, then any European political identity will indeed be „thin‟. A 
cosmopolitan identity does not threaten national allegiances but how does one give 
substance to the notion? How does one legislate esprit general? Cosmopolitan or not, 
in order to prevent Europe from becoming an „impossible project‟ any European 
identity must find a way to accommodate a dialogue with its traditional other –Islam.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 79 
CHAPTER FOUR 
MUSLIM IDENTITY. 
 
 
“Before being Muslim, they are citizens, with their political opinions,  
and every element of their personality”.290 
 
 
Introduction. 
Islam has been present in Western Europe for centuries but in recent decades a 
growing apprehension of cultural and religious „difference‟ has brought forth an 
“unfounded hostility toward Islam, and therefore fear or dislike of all or most 
Muslims” throughout the EU.291 Coined „Islamophobia‟ by the Runnymede Trust in 
its 1977 report, this „fear or dislike‟ has grown from a perceived invasion by the 
voluntary mass-migration of Muslims into EU states in the last thirty to forty years. 
Understandably, fear has escalated due to terrorist attacks throughout Europe during 
the previous fifteen years, unrest in the Middle East and by the United States led „war 
on terror‟. Anti-Muslim prejudice in Europe has resulted in the perception that every 
Muslim is a potential terrorist, thus stretching the fabric of European unity and 
endangering Europe‟s socio-cultural vision. The rising visibility of Muslims 
throughout the EU is forcing a re-conceptualisation of European identity by 
challenging age-old religious, political and secular paradigms. The emergence of 
Mosques, challenge Europe‟s architectural landscapes, burqa clad women challenge 
western feminist stereotypes, prayer groups challenge western secularism, and 
Muslim burial requirements and the slaughter of halal meat challenge national and 
municipal policies. Thus, by demanding recognition, Islam is questioning core 
European norms and values.  
 
European Islam is now a powerful transnational force in Europe and as such, it 
challenges the fundamental concept of European identity. The search for a European 
public identity looks to remain problematic unless it can validate Europe‟s Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike by guaranteeing social, religious and political representation 
for all. Is Euro-Islam about a clash of civilisations or is it about historical church-state 
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power struggles, national politics and equal rights? Is Islam, in fact, a threat to 
European identity or is there evidence if a new embryonic Muslim identity in Europe 
that is compatible with a pluralistic society?  
 
Mid 1940s, there were less than a million Muslims in Europe, living mostly in France 
and Great Britain. This number has risen to an estimated 15 million plus Muslims, 
who are now widely spread throughout the EU member states.
292
 Throughout the 
1970s and 1980s, various EU states adopted differing integration paradigms for 
dealing with the influx of Muslims into their societies. Britain‟s multiculturalism 
treated Muslims as a separate, collective minority group, entitled to specific benefits 
because of their „difference‟. Conversely, France enacted a policy of assimilation, by 
refusing to acknowledge minority rights and ignoring cultural, religious and ethnic 
differences. Other member states adopted a variation on these approaches. Both 
models led to the creation of marginalised societies and ghettoisation, in turn leading 
to discontent and riots. The rapid rise in visibility of Islam within Europe due to 
ongoing conflicts, coupled with the failure of multiculturalism and assimilation now 
presents a challenge for EU leadership and for policy makers alike, to construct a 
mutually inclusive European identity encompassing not just Judeo-Christian based 
secularity but also Islam. 
 
Opinion polls, released by The Pew Foundation 2006,
293
 and The Gallup Organisation 
2007,
294
 reported that Muslims do not disagree with fundamental European values per 
se. However, many Muslims believe they are not treated equally concerning religious 
tolerance, equality before the law, or the right to personal dignity. While there is a 
perception in Europe that Muslims are demanding special treatment, their search for 
recognition is not irrational. In November 1996, Prince Hassan Ibn Talal of Jordan 
remarked: 
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…the principles of Islam require a Muslim minority to obey a state in which  
it is resident,…The Muslims of Europe are therefore not asking for special 
privileges,…They are merely asking for their religion to be recognized within  
the European context.
295
  
 
 
This request continues to be pivotal to the integration of Muslims in the EU. Despite 
the traditional notion of Islam as immutable, history testifies that Islam is indeed 
adaptable, fluid, pragmatic and accommodating of change. Given the opportunity, 
scholars believe Islam is equal to the task of adapting to modernity, globalisation and 
the challenges presented by life in non-Muslim countries.
296
 As Cem Ozdemir 
comments in the Pew Poll, “Being a Muslim and a Westerner are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive”.297 Arguably, Muslim identity, whilst constrained by specific 
parameters laid down in the Qur‟an, is capable of accommodating western 
democratic values and has the potential therefore of being compatible with a 
European identity - if equally recognised.  
 
This chapter seeks to analyse the role of Islam in Europe in relation to Muslim 
identity. It will return to the primordialist/constructivist debate, again arguing for a 
constructivist approach. Secondly, it will analyse the „space‟ allotted to Muslim 
immigrants by receiving states (using Britain, France and Germany as examples), and 
how their welcome or the lack thereof, affected identity construction. This involves 
an analysis of the problems arising from the rapid growth of Islam in the EU post 
WW 2 due to the influx of recruited migrants and subsequent family re-unification 
policies, to explain how integration policies failed to address important socio-cultural 
differences. This chapter will also discuss how the effects of globalisation, the 
terrorist threat in Europe and the perception of an „Islam in crisis‟ affects the 
construction of Muslim identity in Europe. Is a crisis in Islam the cause of ongoing 
conflicts involving Europe‟s Muslims, or is it the underlying tension driven by socio-
economics and increasing marginalisation? Finally, this chapter will argue for the 
right and necessity of Muslim voices to be heard in the European context, advocating 
that once the EU takes responsibility for its „European Muslims‟ providing for their 
                                                 
295
 Speech delivered by the then Crown Prince of Jordan, cited in Alsayyad, Nezar “Muslim Migrants 
in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization” in Nezar Alsayyad & Manuel Castells eds. Muslim 
Europe or Euro-Islam, p. 45. 
296
 Tibi, Accommodation, 74. 
297
 Ozdemir, Cem, Member of European Parliament for Germany‟s Green Party, Pew Report, 29.  
 82 
physical and spiritual health, education, employment and housing on an equitable 
playing field with all European citizens, a European Islam will naturally evolve. A 
European Islam that is not vulnerable to politicalisation by foreign funding or foreign 
imams, but one supported through religious, cultural and political pluralism, thereby 
acknowledging that Islam is now a European religion and Muslims are Europeans 
too.  
 
Primordialism versus Constructivism 
As noted in the previous chapter primordialists argue that identity is a „fixed inner 
core‟, an „essence‟ untouched by external factors that emerges at birth and remains 
primarily the same throughout a person‟s life.298 Conversely, constructivists argue 
that identities are relational and always incomplete, being shaped and reshaped in 
response to circumstance and interaction with others – whether personal or 
institutional – constructing meaning through experience.299 Constructivists posit that 
identity is a process in which inherited traits, are moulded and shaped in the crucible 
of experience. Identity is malleable, fluid, composite and unique for even identical 
twins can develop radically different social, religious and political views relative to 
their individual experiences. Validation that Muslim identity is as much a construct as 
western identity can be found in the fact that European Muslims are not a 
homogeneous bloc - a fact that should be encouraging but which, Western Europe 
finds difficult to accept because the political institutions prefer to deal with one 
representative body. British Pakistani Muslims differ from German Turkish Muslims 
who in turn differ from French Algerian Muslims. As Bassam Tibi notes: 
  
My own identity is made up of diverse cultural sources. Religio-culturally I am a 
Euro-Muslim, ethnically I am a Damascene Arab, and politically I am a German 
citizen. I believe that the combination of these components can grow together to 
form a complex identity.
300
 
 
 
Thus, the debate concerning Muslim identity is not primarily one of a single 
„essence‟, but one that must acknowledge the multi-layered dimension of ethnicity 
and culture constructed through the lens of Islam. Although Europe is comprised of 
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many ethnicities and cultures, it is the essentialist nature of Islam (Christianity‟s 
archetypal „other‟), that strikes fear into the hearts of Europeans. Any debate 
concerning Muslim identity is in fact a debate about the primordial nature of Islam, 
the fear for Europeans being, can Islam accommodate a pluralistic western society? 
This apprehension stems from a belief that Islam, as a legalised set of precepts fixed 
in stone is unable to adjust or accept liberalism. Certainly, for the practising Muslim 
the Qur‟an is the primary source of holy law, which is an indispensable part of a 
Muslim‟s faith. This law is “divine not human, revealed not enacted, and cannot 
therefore be repealed or abrogated, supplemented or amended”301. It is this 
understanding of Islam as immutable, and as a religion that promotes absolute 
adherence to a rigid dogma, that leads to the perception that Islam is not compatible 
with western democracy  
 
Undeniably, Islam is founded on the sacred undisputed text of the Qur‟an - an 
„eternal commandment‟ relevant for all time. However, while there is little room for 
movement where the Qur‟an is explicit, where the command is allusive, there is an 
opportunity for creative interpretation.
302
 Supporting the Qur‟an are the traditions of 
the Prophet known as hadith. While also binding in principle, there are numerous 
hadiths, which over time Muslim scholars assembled into an authenticated body of 
traditions. These traditions allowed Muslim scholars licence to adapt the law to meet 
changing circumstances and even the Qur‟an itself allows for interpretation according 
to necessity (darura).
303
 Thus, over centuries doctrine evolved as different schools of 
jurisprudence arose and as circumstances dictated a need to accommodate different 
political and social climates, proving that even the absolute must bend before the 
winds of change. Laws covered the treatment of non-Muslims living in Muslim states, 
and codes for Muslims as warriors, seafarers, prisoners, and as temporary visitors in 
non-Muslim lands, known as the land of conflict (dar-al-harb). There was however, 
no precedent in Islamic law for the voluntary and permanent migration of Muslims to 
predominantly Christian countries.
304
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Muslim immigrants to Europe therefore found themselves between two worlds, 
“seeing themselves as eternal foreigners living parallel or marginalised lives outside 
main-stream society”.305 As Tariq Ramadan writes, this necessitated a return to the 
principles of Islam “in order to delineate and distinguish what, in their religion, is 
unchangeable (thabit) from what is subject to change (mutaghayyir).
306
 Unlike 
Christianity, Islam is not a theology. It is an essential part of a Muslims identity. 
Ramadan explains: 
 
Above and beyond the diversity of their national cultures, the essence of their 
faith, their identity, their belonging in the world, is the same; they define 
themselves on the basis of points of reference that…root them in the universe of 
Islam.
307
 
 
 
Despite these „points of reference‟, identities are still variously constructed according 
to the separate schools of thought that evolved under the Sunni or Shia traditions 
during the Middle Ages.
308
 These schools tended to have diverse ethnic and 
geographical boundaries, explaining why Muslims in Europe do not belong to one 
homogenous bloc, for example, Turks in Germany differ from Pakistanis in Britain. 
Even within countries, Muslims can differ in their practice of Islam according to their 
ethnicity and place of birth. Just as there is room for different interpretations amongst 
the various schools of thought, there is also room for discussion regarding the Islamic 
principles. Although the teachings of Islam provide precise laws regarding religious 
ritual, from which no deviation shall be permitted, as far as political and social 
matters are concerned there is room for creative elucidation. As Ramadan explains, 
Muslims need to decide individually “using their reason, their freedom and, and more 
broadly, their imagination”, what their commitment will be concerning the social and 
political levels.
309
 Thus, Ramadan argues that there is room for interpretation within 
Islam for Muslims to accommodate western democracy. However, how much „room‟ 
is there in western democratic states to accommodate Islam? How accommodating 
are western pluralistic societies in Europe, to their Muslim populations? Like all 
                                                 
305
 Siobhan McPhee, Muslim Identity: The European Context, Sussex Migration Working Paper No. 
34, (Sussex: Sussex Centre for Migration Research, September 2005), 10. 
306
 Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims and The Future of Islam (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2004), 9. 
307
 Ramadan, Western Muslims, 9. 
308
 Lewis, 5. 
309
 Ramadan, Western Muslims, 145. 
 85 
identities, Muslim identity is constructed by the interaction of both internal and 
external forces. It involves the internalisation of individual cultural experiences 
(family, ethnicity, country of origin, gender, occupation and citizenship) filtered 
through the lens of Islam and fused with the external imposition of institutionalised 
societal norms. The primary influential factor for Muslim immigrants with regard to the 
formation of a „European identity‟, therefore, is the way in which Europe receives them. 
 
Identity - From Guest Worker to Citizen? 
Today, Europe has a Muslim population of approximately fifteen million stemming 
largely from the immigration policies of the early twentieth century.
310
 Facing severe 
labour shortages post WW 1 and WW 2 Europe actively encouraged the recruitment 
of male migrant workers to swell the depleted workforce. To make up the labour 
shortfall the former colonial powers of France and Great Britain, recruited immigrants 
from their colonies in North Africa, and India and Pakistan respectively while 
Germany recruited „guest-workers‟ primarily from Turkey. Initially, these European 
states considered themselves merely „host‟ nations and the migrants themselves, who 
supported families back home also considered their status as temporary. The oil-
induced recession in 1974, resulting in high unemployment, caused a quandary as 
member states sought to restrict immigration. However, reunification policies 
produced a second wave of immigrants as families flocked to join their men-folk thus, 
dramatically changing the sociological dynamics throughout the EU. 
 
European states struggled to accommodate the influx of Muslim families, discovering 
that hosting guest workers in single men‟s quarters was completely different to 
providing accommodation and social services (health, education) for their wives and 
children. Permanent settlement challenged the political calculus as questions of 
cultural and religious rights overlaid political and economic concerns for Muslims, 
testing governments‟ ability to accommodate religious diversity. Crucial to their 
perception of their host nation was their treatment by officialdom – were they 
awarded citizenship, was their religion legally recognised and were they granted the 
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freedom to practice Islam without constraints?
311
 Hussain argues that the “self-image” 
of a nation reflects its treatment of minorities.
312
 Colonial Britain, with its long 
history of migration prided itself in its multicultural society and its pragmatic ability 
to accommodate different ethnicities whereas for Germany national identity sprang 
from their bloodline, (jus sanguinis) forming a defence against external threats. 
Conversely, French identity (epitomized by the cry „liberty, equality and fraternity‟) 
was forged in the internal conflict in a tripartite battle between the people, and the 
Monarchy, the ruling elite, and the Catholic Church. Since the Revolution, French 
political and social life has developed on the philosophy of equality for all and 
freedom from religious domination. Consequently, France does not recognise any 
form of class structure including minorities. Fetzer and Soper maintain that the 
different historical legacies of „institutional church –state patterns‟ within the EU are 
also highly significant in explaining the methodology employed in the development 
of public policy concerning the religious rights of their Muslim populations.
313
 
Klausen concurs, maintaining, “There is a popular fallacy that public life in Europe is 
secular. On the contrary states have given privileges to the Christian churches for 
centuries”.314  
 
In Britain, the strong church-state relationship eventually worked to the benefit of the 
Muslim population because church-state structures provided a context through which 
religious accommodation for Muslims could be negotiated. Thus, after a long struggle 
Muslims benefited from the existing practices of religious instruction in state schools, 
state aid to religious schools and aid for the building of mosques.
315
 Britain‟s 
multicultural policies encouraged all cultural groups to create their own institutional 
structures in order to protect their customs and religious practices and the 1948 
British Nationality Act allowed Commonwealth immigrants access to British 
citizenship with all the civil and legal rights and privileges that entailed prior to the 
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1970s.
316
 However, the Anglican faith - with the Queen as Head of the Church - is the 
supreme symbol of British national identification, thus favouring the Church of 
England over all other faiths. Fetzer and Soper argue that the state has not granted the 
same benefits to Muslims that the Church of England enjoys and, despite granting 
citizenship, the state did not accord Muslims the right of protection from religious 
discrimination, thus denying them their “distinctive religious identity”.317 Although 
Britain established the 1976 Race Relations Act, to prohibit discrimination on “racial 
or ethnic grounds” it did not provide protection from discrimination on “religious” 
grounds meaning that while ethnic minorities, like Sikhs and Jews, benefit from legal 
protection, Muslims as a religious group did not.
318
  
 
Germany introduced the concept of the Gastarbeiter (guest worker) as a short-term 
solution to labour shortages, with the majority of migrants coming from Turkey. As 
these migrants and their families settled permanently, Germany also found itself ill 
equipped to provide for their social and religious needs. While the German 
Constitution does protect the right of an individual to religious freedom, Germany 
refused to accord Islam the same „public corporation status‟ that legitimises the 
Catholic and Protestant Churches.
319
 Withholding public corporation status 
symbolises a legal rejection of Islam within the German religious topography thus 
again marginalising Muslim identity. Citizenship in Germany stems from ethnic 
descent rather than birthright (jus solis) meaning that second and third generation 
people of German ancestry who have never lived in Germany can become German 
citizens while the children of Muslim immigrants, born on German soil, could not. 
Although they lived, worked and paid taxes in Germany, the lack of citizenship 
robbed them of a political voice. Denied the right to vote, they found it difficult to 
identify with the country of their birth.
320
 By contrast, in German speaking Austria, 
where Muslims have citizenship and the state officially recognises Islam, Muslims are 
proud to call Austria home. The same is true in Poland where the state officially 
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recognised Islam in 1936. Muslims of Tartar descent regard themselves as “loyal 
citizens of Poland and a Muslim at the same time”.321  
 
While most Muslims in France are citizens, paradoxically, it is the legacy of a 
backlash against the Catholic Church in the eighteenth century that complicated the 
integration story.
322
 Mandated in 1905 the principle of laïcité – the strict separation of 
church and state – refused to recognise either religions, or minorities, resulting in a 
policy of assimilation where „difference‟ is not acknowledged, nor accommodated.323 
Modood argues that French secularism became the: 
  
justification for imposing an essentialist definition of religion as an intrinsically 
private matter upon powerless minorities who have a different conception of 
religious duties.
324
 
 
 
While secularism facilitated the separation of church and state in order to foster 
equality and tolerance, official secularism (evidenced by laïcité) marginalises 
minority religions leading to ethno-religious separatism and communalism.
325
 
Ziauddin Sardar agrees, positing that Europe‟s Muslims are rendered powerless 
because: 
 
freedom of expression belongs to those with secular power, or access and 
opportunity within the secular structures of power…. As the pre-eminent truth 
and doctrine of the West, it renders insignificant and makes invisible all that is 
outside its purview, all the possibilities and potential outside its framework of 
power.
326
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Thus, Muslim immigrants (often unemployed) found themselves marginalized in 
what was to become the ghettos of the future, setting the pattern for the next two 
decades. As Harlem Desir, (President of SOS Racisme) said in 1990, “Ghettos and 
educational failure threaten the French melting-pot and the republican idea of a 
France which can integrate everyone in its territory”.327 Modood argues this 
communalism turns aggressive when alienated from the centre.
328
 Hence, the many 
conflicts with youths in the banlieues in the 1990s.  
 
Throughout Europe, Muslims found themselves marginalised by secular societies, ill 
prepared to cope with the public face of Islam. Initially, Islam was the hidden religion 
with prayers being conducted in run down buildings in back alleys. For decades, 
Muslims have struggled for the accommodation of their religious practices in both 
state institutions – hospital, prisons and schools – and in the workplace. They have 
fought for the right to build mosques, to have halal slaughterhouses, and to have 
Muslim cemeteries. Unprepared for the social ramifications of accommodating 
permanent families, inadequate social and national policies, and the lack of 
recognition of their religious identity disadvantaged these „unwanted immigrants‟ in 
the mid 1970s and, 30-40 years later, the lack of recognition continues to hamper 
integration. The irony being that Muslims only want to work and raise their families 
with the same rights to education, opportunity and religious freedom accorded to their 
neighbours: 
 
Muslims would like to be able to visit their mosque and say their prayers 
peacefully without interruption, without being beaten up, without being picked 
up for interrogation.
329
  
 
Personal experience and reflected political mirror images validate identity. Failure by 
state authorities to grant citizenship, to recognise Islam as an official religion, and to 
guarantee the same living conditions, stigmatised Europe‟s Muslims. Like immigrants 
worldwide, Muslims in the EU found themselves confined to the edges of mainstream 
society, marginalised by language, education and economics. A study of third 
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generation youths in Germany in 1997 discovered that despite being born in 
Germany, speaking fluent German and understanding German culture they felt a 
“lack of orientation” because mainstream society refused to recognise them.330 Living 
in municipally endorsed ghettos or in self-initiated isolation, Muslims are under 
pressure to adapt and integrate according to parameters set by the majority – a 
majority, often constrained by fear.  
 
Identity – The Lens of Islamophobia. 
Ethnic conflicts seldom have shallow roots – they are, instead, nurtured over 
generations by an almost pathological fear of „difference‟ especially when the 
difference threatens the status quo. Ancient conflicts between Islam and Christianity 
led to a perception of Islam as a violent and inherently antagonistic faith. Islam was 
the antithesis of Christianity, the epitome of a “moral and cultural otherness” 
inhabiting a “non-Christian geographical space”.331 Scholars like Husband argue that, 
“historically derived stereotypes of Islam and „the Orient‟ are continuously latent 
within British [and European] popular culture and learning”, leading to a “negative 
bricolage of imagery” resulting in the perception of ethnic minority communities as 
an “enemy within”.332 A columnist echoed these words in the British media after the 
2001 September 11 attack on New York‟s Twin Towers: 
 
We have a fifth column in our midst…Thousands of alienated young Muslims, 
most of them born and bred here but who regard themselves as an army within, 
are waiting for the opportunity to help to destroy the society that sustains them.
333
 
 
All too often the media reinforces the concept of Islam as alien, radical and 
dangerous. In 2004, a report for the Commission on British Muslims comments on 
the proclivity of the media to “elevate fringe figures to a place of mainstream 
importance”.334  One such example was the focus on the radical Muslim cleric Abu 
Hamza after September 11 whose extreme views were repeatedly featured in the 
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Daily Mail. Frustrated by this emphasis the Muslim Council of Britain complained 
saying: 
 
There are over 800 mosques in the UK and only one of them is run by a known 
radical. Yet this one mosque (Finsbury Park, London) seems to get more 
coverage than all the rest put together! The situation is akin to taking a member 
of the racist BNP and saying his views are representative of ordinary 
Britons.
335
  
 
This focus on an „enemy within‟ stems from a long legacy of Christian/Islamic 
conflicts beginning in the fifteenth century - a legacy, which has coloured Europe‟s 
long history of racism?
336
 Italian, Russian, Spanish, Polish, and Jewish immigrants all 
suffered discrimination in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
337
 
Although, overtime these immigrants along with their children and grandchildren 
gradually integrated into European society, integration of the increasing Muslim 
population continues to be problematic. Whereas European immigrants melded in 
with the general populace, Muslims are conspicuously different and ancient fears 
linger still. Bauman maintains that, “Identities are for wearing and sharing, not for 
storing and keeping” but much of the difficulty surrounding the acceptance of Muslim 
communities in the EU has to do with their visibility.
338
 It is precisely this visible 
„difference‟ that incites Islamophobia.  
 
The visibility debate erupted in France in 1989, where three Muslim schoolgirls 
wearing the headscarf (hijab) were sent home, resulting in national chaos. The 
headscarf symbolized a multifaceted challenge – not only to French nationality, but 
also to citizenship, church-state relations, gender issues, civic education and human 
rights. While laicism mandated the privatization of religion in order to guarantee its 
free exercise, the staunch secularisation of French society means laicism has become 
a type of civil religion in itself.
339
 Now, laicism effectively robs Muslims of their 
sovereign rights as the highly publicized hijab issue demonstrated, by demanding that 
they adopt the „uniform of France‟. Today laïcité represents the preservation of the 
„public space‟ in France, insisting that being discreet with one‟s religion is an 
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essential part of being French. However, what does being discreet mean? As Sardar 
writes, “A French woman with a scarf is chic, but a Muslim woman with a scarf is a 
threat to civilisation”.340 This reaction in France resounded throughout the member 
states in the succeeding years, with hijabs and burqas seen by many as a visible 
reminder of a different ideology - one that many native Europeans feel is 
incompatible with western values. A report issued by the Gallup World Poll, 
undertaken in London, Paris and Berlin in 2006-07, assessed the antipathy that exits 
among the European public towards the Muslim headscarf or veil. Sixty-one percent 
of French people polled, believed Muslim women should remove the headscarf as a 
condition of integration. Similarly, 55% of British people and 49% of Germans saw 
the veil as a hindrance to integration.
341
 
 
Islamophobia can be blatant or indirect, legalized or illegal and it is prevalent 
throughout all levels of European society. A report by the Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia, released in 2004, tracked the events and trends in Britain 
in the seven years following the 1997 seminal Runnymede Report.
342
 The report 
highlights progress in several areas at a national level (acknowledging religious 
affiliation in the 2001 Census, higher sentences for religiously aggravated offences 
and legislation against discrimination by employers on religious grounds). Despite 
these advances, the report notes that anti-Muslim prejudice is still increasing in 
frequency and in intensity at both a civic and social level: 
  
The Stop and Search figures released by the Government on July 1
st
 2004 
revealed a staggering 302% increase in the number of Asians stopped by the 
police in 2002/2003 under the new anti-terror laws. Even with the regrettable 
absence of the breakdown of these figures in terms of religious affiliation, it 
appears safe to assume that the single biggest increase in those stopped will have 
been amongst young Muslim men. 
 
Following the race riots in Bradford in 2001, the Institute of Race Relations 
found a huge discrepancy between the sentences handed out to the rioters from 
the Bradford district of Manningham – who happened to be Muslims – and those 
handed out to non-Muslim rioters… 343 
                                                 
340
 Ziauddin Sardar, (1995, 5) cited in Islam in Europe: The Politics of Religion and Community, eds. 
Steve Vertoc & Ceri Peach (New York: St Martins Press, Inc., 1997), 7. 
341
 2006-07 Gallup World Poll, 
http://media.gallup.com/WorldPoll/PDF/WPTFMuslimsinEuropeExecSumm.pdf  
342
 Robin Richardson, ed. Islamophobia: issues, challenges and action. A report by the Commission on 
British Muslims and Islamophobia, (London: Trentham Books, 2004) 
343
 Richardson, Islamophobia: issues, 36 and  38 respectively.   
 93 
 
Other statistics document the phenomenal increase in the number of British Muslims 
in prison, which rose from 731 in 1991, to 6095 as of 30 September 2003.
344
 The 
report also reveals that 75% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households are classified as 
living in poverty, with 35% of Muslim children living in workless homes (the 
national average is 17.6%) and 42% of Muslim children living in overcrowded 
accommodation (the national average is 12.3%).
345
 These statistics are replicated 
throughout the member states (Muslims make up over half of the prison population in 
France) and testify to the invisibility of Europe‟s Muslims.346 
 
When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves or figments 
of their imagination – indeed everything and anything but me…347 
 
 
On the campaign trail in 2006, Prime Minister Berlusconi stated “we do not want 
Italy to become a multiethnic, multicultural country; we are proud of our culture and 
of our tradition”.348 Ironically, one of Italy‟s biggest concerns is its aging population 
and its desperate need of immigrants to maintain productivity. Although immigrants 
are vital to Italy‟s (and the EU‟s) future economic growth, Berlusconi prefers they 
remain invisible. Sentiments expressed at the governmental level, filter down to the 
workplace. Although French law prohibits statistics based on religion, frequently 
young applicants are asked if they are practicing Muslims.
349
 A Parisian research 
company, the Institut Montaigne, discovered that applicants with a „traditional‟ 
French name were five times more likely to be interviewed than applicants with an 
Arab name even with identical CVs.
350
 On the street, and in the halls of government, 
Islamophobia is widespread throughout the EU. It distorts the image of Islam and the 
identity of its followers: 
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Identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence…Non-recognition… can 
inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, in a 
distorted and reduced mode of being.
351
 
 
 
Often in her interviews with Muslim leaders, Klausen found their main concern was 
the lack of recognition, “We have only one problem; it is they do not respect us and 
do not recognize us. We demand only one thing: respect and recognition.”352 When 
mainstream society continues to reject the projected image, reflecting back a distorted 
simulacrum, they come to believe that the simulacrum is real, the hyper-real, the uber 
threat, the terrorist.  
 
Identity –The Lens of terrorism 
Terrorism is no longer something that happens on foreign soil – it is now a part of the 
European landscape.
353
 After the Madrid bombings in 2004, Gilles Kepel wrote, 
“Europe emerged as the primary battlefield on which the future of global Islam will 
be decided”.354 The London bombings, a year later, on 7 July 2005 tragically 
reinforced this fear. At eighteen years of age, Hasib Hussain was the youngest 
London suicide bomber. A former school friend offered the only hint to his 
transformation from unassuming child to terrorist, by commenting on the racial unrest 
at Hasib‟s former comprehensive school, “Maybe that played a part in making him 
feel alienated from the country of his birth and western society.”355 Hasib was not an 
academic but loved cricket and football. However, the football pitch closed down in 
2003, the same year that he dropped out of school. He „found Islam‟, grew a beard 
and began to wear traditional Muslim clothes. Although his parents noticed Hasib‟s 
attraction towards fundamentalism, they could not believe their son had become a 
murderer. On 7 July, they took a photo of him to the police station, fearing that he 
was a victim of the bombings. The London bombings were an inexplicable and 
indiscriminate attack on British citizens of multiple ethnic backgrounds, including 
Muslims. The youngest of the Hasib‟s 55 victims, was a twenty-year old Muslim 
bank teller, Shahara Islam: 
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She was a thoroughly modern Muslim, a young woman who loved her Burberry 
plaid handbag and fashionable clothes while at the same time respecting her 
family‟s wishes that she sometimes wore traditional shalwar kameez at home. 
She went shopping in the West End of London with friends but would always be 
seen at the mosque for Friday prayers.
356
 
 
 
After her death her family released a statement saying, “She was an Eastender, a 
Londoner and British, but above all a true Muslim and proud to be so”.357 How could 
these two young Muslims, European born, be so far apart in their practice of Islam? 
A small minority of disenchanted youth, recruited by politically driven extremists 
have thrown suspicion on all Muslims in Europe, despite the reality that the vast 
majority of the EU‟s fifteen million Muslims are peaceful, law-abiding citizens who 
desire to be part of European society. Parekh notes that Muslims of all ages 
“appreciate the rights and freedoms” available to them in Europe and they, “value the 
support of their fellow citizens in their struggle for equality and justice”.358 In Britain, 
an ICM Survey for the BBC (December 2002), showed that 67% of the Muslims 
surveyed said “they felt very or fairly patriotic”.359 In 2007, a Gallup World Poll 
revealed that 73% of Muslims in Paris feel loyal to their country of residence. This 
finding was replicated by 74% of Muslims in London and 72% of Muslims in Berlin. 
In recent years the 1995 Paris Metro bomb attacks, 9/11, the war on terror, the 2004 
Madrid train bombing, the 2005 London bomb attacks, the ongoing destruction in 
Iraq, Iran‟s determination to pursue a nuclear power programme and continued unrest 
in Algeria have all contributed to an image of Islam as a violent and unreasonable 
religion. The fracas over the hijab in French schools and the government‟s 
subsequent ban on the headscarf provoked a reaction by the Islamic Army in Iraq 
who, in an attempt to force the abolition of the French law, kidnapped two French 
journalists in August 2004. Incidences like this, including the worldwide protest over 
the „cartoon affair‟ in Denmark along with the fact that the attack on New York was 
planned by terrorists on European soil, serve as a reminder of the connection of 
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Muslims in Europe to the wider network of Islam, to the Muslim brotherhood, to the 
worldwide umma. As Parekh comments:  
 
the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London had a traumatic effect on 
Europeans. Hitherto they had seen Muslims as a culturally threatening but 
manageable presence; they now developed a morbid fear of them.
360
 
 
 
The idea that the radicalisation of Western Muslims in Europe is the result of a 
worldwide crisis in Islam originating out of the Middle East compounds this fear. 
However, Roy notes that, apart from the Madrid attack in 2004, terrorist action in 
Europe is rarely linked to global jihads.
361
 Radicals tend to be ethnically diverse, 
western educated converts to fundamentalism who do not represent the Islamic 
traditions of their parents. According to Roy, they represent a “lost generation, 
unmoored from traditional societies and cultures, frustrated by a Western society that 
does not meet their expectation”.362 A study conducted by the Bielefeld Institute for 
Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, supports this hypothesis. 
Released in 1997, the study revealed that 35.7% of third-generation Turkish youth felt 
“inclined towards religious fundamentalism of a violent nature” and 56% “rejected an 
adaptation to the Western way of life.
363
 Despite being educated in Germany, fluent 
in the German language and cognisant with German customs and culture these youth 
felt attracted: 
  
by the fundamentalist version of their root culture,…after their attempt to find a 
more open identity between the root culture and the mainstream culture of their 
country of adoption has failed painfully.
364
  
 
Excluded from mainstream culture, some young Muslims reject the „space‟ allocated 
to minority societies and seek instead to redefine the „space‟ for themselves. One way 
of silencing extremist voices, therefore, is to prevent social exclusion. As Roy argues: 
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A second and third generation of Muslim migrants may recast their feelings of 
being excluded by importing a psychological frontier to their spaces of social 
exclusion in suburbs or inner cities. Islam is cast as the “otherness” of Europe 
and thus may be cast as an alternative identity for youngsters in search of a 
reactive identity.
365
 
 
 
In her book, Reconciliation, the draft of which was finished on the morning of her 
assassination, Benazir Bhutto (returned exile and parliamentary candidate for 
Pakistan) reinforced the concern over Muslim identity. She dispelled notions of a 
clash between civilisations, arguing that the clash is not between Islam and the West 
but rather it is a clash within Islam. It is a “critical battle for the hearts and souls of 
the successor generation of Muslim leaders, and for the passion of the Muslims 
around the world…366 Kepel concurs, arguing that: 
 
The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds during the next decade 
will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers on 
the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already 
a growing part of the West. If European societies are able to integrate these 
Muslim populations, handicapped as they are by dispossession, and steer them 
toward prosperity, this new generation of Muslims may become the Islamic 
vanguard of the next decade, offering their co-religionists a new vision of the 
faith and a way out of the dead-end politics that has paralysed their countries of 
origin”.367 
 
Bhutto argues that the internal and external conflicts in relation to Islam are in fact, “a 
battle between the past and the future” and that Islam is facing a crisis between 
“inflexible traditionalism and adaptable modernity”.368 Inextricably caught in this 
battle for Muslims minds, Europe has a responsibility to provide the „space‟ and 
support systems – politically, theologically and socially - for its 15 million Muslims 
to establish a peaceful, pluralistic Islam that rejects extremism. A „space‟ in which 
parents have access to jobs, families have access to housing, food and clothes and 
children have access to education without discrimination. Where governments 
provide opportunity and address the every day concerns of its people, it is harder for 
religious fundamentalism and political extremism to take root. Camilleri warns that 
Europe has a vital role to play in this transitional crisis and the way in which 
European leaders and society handle the “problems posed by potentially ghettoised 
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rapidly growing Muslim minorities” could well “shape the geopolitics of the Middle 
East and Islam‟s response to the challenge of modernity”369. The question of identity 
is pivotal to this war for Muslim hearts and minds in Europe, for ultimately, the crisis 
is one of self-definition - it is a battle for the right to belong and the right to be 
different. 
 
Emerging Identity - Euro-Islam 
Muslims in Europe today are not only facing problems associated with being part of a 
minority group struggling with inadequate housing, restricted employment 
opportunities and rejection of their cultural and religious identity. Islam itself is in a 
state of flux caught between the traditional ways and the increasing imposition of 
western values. Post modernity is an era in which ethnic and religious borders no 
longer correspond with geographical territories, it is an era defined by perspective – 
by “minds, attitudes and discourses.”370 Though globalisation opened borders, 
standardizing socio-economic and political structures, it has not created a unity of 
outlook.
371
 By facilitating large-scale immigration and the mass movement of Islamic 
peoples to western countries, globalisation resulted in the cultural fragmentation of 
Islam.
372
 Islamic fundamentalism arose as the result of Islam‟s confrontation with 
modernity and the associated challenge to traditional ideology coupled with the 
rejection of Islam as a European religion. Confronted with the restraints imposed by 
the Western values system, Islam remains “suspended between adjustment to the 
ongoing changes and resistance to the needed accommodation”.373 Likewise, Muslims 
in Europe find them-selves caught between adjustment to European societal values 
and a resistance to changes that impinge on their cultural and religious identity. Tibi 
argues that, “Islamic civilization is at a crossroads oscillating in determining its 
identity between cultural and political Islam.” 374 Young Muslims in Europe are 
facing an identity crisis and a choice in terms of their faith. A return to what Roy calls 
Neo-fundamentalism, a closed, scriptural, conservative form of Islam based on sharia 
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(Islamic law), which believes in a universal community of all Muslims (Umma) ,or 
the political normalization of Islam within the framework of the nation-state.
375
  
 
This identity crisis is compounded by the fact that young Muslims find them-selves 
living a „double life‟ caught between the traditional teachings of foreign imams who 
do not speak the local European language and have no understanding of European 
customs, and the modern western society in which they live. Klausen cites the 
Muslim Labour peer, Nazir Ahmed: 
 
Young British Muslims go to the mosque and hear an imam deliver a sermon in a 
foreign language about the past. It has no relevance to…the problems affecting 
Muslims in Britain. At the same time, it fills them with absurd notions about the 
British. They leave the mosque feeling angry and confused and walk straight into 
the arms of extremist groups such as al-Muhajiroun which talk to them in a 
language they understand.
376
  
  
 
An outcast from school, Hasib Huassain (the youngest London bomber) complained 
about the contradictory messages he heard in different mosques, saying that he would 
„go his own way‟, with disastrous consequences.377 Klausen argues that it is a 
„misreading of the facts‟ to presuppose that terrorist attacks are carried out solely by 
young Muslims who feel socially alienated because the terrorists behind the London 
bombings belonged to an extremist network who coordinated their assaults over a long 
period of time.
378
 However, the study of the Bielefeld Institute supports the theory that 
marginalised youth who seek a sense of belonging are susceptible to recruitment by 
extremist cells. As evidenced by one young German Turk, “The Germans reject us, the 
Turks in Turkey do not understand us, but the Muslims accept us”.379 
 
Ramadan argues that schoolchildren find themselves caught between being encouraged 
to question everything and to express themselves at European schools with non-
Muslims, and passively having to absorb verses of Islam dating back to the ninth and 
tenth century by foreign imams educated in madrasses, leading to an “unhealthy 
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schizophrenia”.380 It is imperative, therefore, for Western Europe to encourage the 
development of native-born, European educated imams who can teach an Islam that 
equips young Muslims with the means to live in the west. For Roy this goes hand in 
hand with acknowledging that multiculturalism and assimilation have failed because of 
the west‟s insistence on embedding the religion of Islam within the culture of Islam.381 
Roy and Tibi argue that Islam is both a culture and a religion, and that confusing the 
two exacerbates the failure of integration in Europe. Rather than pushing for an ethno-
cultural identity, the majority of European Muslims simply want recognition for Islam, 
in the same way other religions are recognised (especially Christianity), and to be 
allowed to practice their faith without being stigmatised. According to Roy, the 
recognition by the state of Islam as a „mere‟ religion, on par with other religions would 
prevent the politicalisation of Islam, thus isolating extremists and preventing them from 
“building a political constituency”.382 Tibi concurs, arguing that due to 
deterritorialisation and globalisation, Islam has become politicized making it difficult 
for Muslims to accommodate the „societal change‟ involved with living in the West. If 
reformed, however, Islam can “be incorporated into a religious and cultural pluralism in 
western societies” because Islam is not only a religion but also a system of cultural 
symbols through which Muslims see the world.
383
 A cultural system that not only 
reflects past social patterns but one that is also able to influence the present, even as it 
is simultaneously being shaped by the present.
384
 Although Muslims learn that the law 
of Islam is immutable, Islam as a cultural system is capable of fluidity and can embrace 
secular democracy and human rights given the opportunity.
385
  
 
Accommodating societal change, however, does not mean uniformity and the onus is 
on Europe to adopt a cultural pluralism. An emphasis on the honouring of legitimate 
differences would enable Muslims to truly become European citizens and allow for the 
separation of Islam as a cultural identity, and Islam as a politicised identity.
386
 Europe 
needs to guard against “Eurocentric attitudes of exclusion” that, through alienation only 
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serve to increase the appeal of fundamentalism.
387
 Although, historically Islam has been 
“a pragmatic and accommodating religion” alienating Muslims in Europe only 
increases the appeal of Islamic extremism for second-generation youths living in 
ghettos and facing job discrimination.
388
 Second and third-generation Muslim youth 
who perceive themselves, to be disadvantaged provide fertile ground for Roy‟s Neo-
fundamentalism. A minority within a minority tired of struggling against social 
injustices and the failure of Europe to empower all of its residents both politically and 
socially, they find themselves unable to identify with the nation-state. Their identity 
struggle can “translate into a spiritual vacuum, which extremist recruiters fill with their 
own narrow interpretations of Islam via the internet and direct interaction”389. Thus, 
their „imagined community‟ becomes one of a politicized Islam, a “defensive-cultural 
phenomenon” directed against the West.390 Islam then becomes the linchpin, recreating 
identities and connections “separated by geographies, languages and cultures.”391 
 
Muslims are Europeans too. 
There is a new wind blowing across Western Europe heralding a European Islam 
“based on a new epistemology of faith and a new hermeneutics of textual 
interpretation”.392 In her interviews with Muslim elites in the EU, Klausen discovered 
embryonic „national faith-based umbrella groups‟ who support integration and are 
focussing on political participation at a national level.
393
 Most of these political 
Muslim leaders are new immigrants, educated, talented, moderates, who came to 
Europe primarily as university students or refugees. They are part of a small but 
growing number of Muslims who are now active in all levels of European society - 
civic and national - and have the ability to influence policymakers and leaders. 
Alongside this vanguard are third and fourth-generation immigrants who (like 
Shahara Islam before her untimely death) are developing de-ethnicised European-
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Muslim identities relative to their country of residence as “opposed to the ethno-
national culture” of first generation immigrants.394 
 
Muslim leaders across the world agree that reform must come but it cannot “be 
imposed externally, especially if it violates a people‟s traditions and culture”.395 It is 
this violation of tradition/religion and culture in Europe, which led to the formation of 
resistance identities among Muslim youth. Benign neglect to outright racism forced 
Muslims to take the defensive path and pushed dislocated youth towards 
fundamentalism. Europe insisted on integrating Muslims as a separate religio-cultural 
group rather than welcoming them as equals who have the right to practice whatever 
religion they chose. Rights that „native‟ Europeans fought for in the past and now 
„rightly‟ take for granted. Ironically, as Kepel argues, the rudiments for unleashing 
the forces of reform in the Muslim world, is the separation of the secular and religious 
realms. Indeed, Cesari maintains there is evidence of a nascent “acculturation to 
secular society” occurring in Islam with the emergence of numerous “transethnic” 
forms of Islam.
396
 However, this is not an acceptance of state refusal to recognise 
Islam as a European faith nor is it an acceptance of the imposition of laïcité. One of 
Klausen‟s interviewees states, “Muslims are always explaining who they are not and 
never have a chance to say who they are”.397 For Muslims, separating the secular and 
religious spheres means separating Islam as a culture from Islam as a religion, and 
conferring the same rights and privileges on Islam as other religions enjoy. It also 
means accepting the right of cultural difference. As Ellison‟s invisible man remarked, 
“Now I know all men are different and that all life is divided and that only in division 
is there true health…Let man keep his many parts and you‟ll have no tyrant states”.398  
 
Acceptance of difference provides a security, thus loosening the bonds of resistance 
identities. It enables immigrants to move out of ethnically concentrated areas and to 
“acquire cultural self-confidence, [and] improve their economic prospects” because 
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they feel safe.
399
 Kepel posits that, the time is ripe for the “hybridization of two 
distinct cultures” and that it is possible: 
 
that a new generation of Muslim thinkers will emerge – men and women 
with a universalist perspective…[who] have opportunities to exercise 
democratic rights…and will present a new face of Islam – reconciled with 
modernity – to the larger world.400  
 
 
One such person is a Dutch Muslim, Hikmat Khan who argues that Muslims must do 
more to protect them-selves from extremists. He suggests a ban on foreign imams and 
calls for mosques and Islamic organisations to be more accessible and for Islamic 
schools to be open to all. He also suggests that Muslim leaders must publicly 
acknowledge women‟s equality, and that there should be more emphasis of Muslim 
pastoral care in hospitals and prisons.
401
 Other Muslim elites agree that it is vital for 
member states to provide public funding for Islamic schools in order to prevent 
outside influence from countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia who are not 
committed to a moderate Islam.
402
 Roy agrees there needs to be a tighter control on 
fund-raising and subsidising from abroad and advocates establishing links between 
Islamic teaching institutions and European universities. He also argues that 
citizenship should be favoured above any communal affiliations. 
403
 Citizenship is 
ultimately about national identity, about a two-way process of ownership. It is both a 
validation of the citizen by the country and a validation of the country by the citizen.  
With other reformists, Bhutto reminds Muslims of the need to return to ijtihad, which 
means „reason‟ to reinterpret their faith according to their situation. Klausen concurs: 
 
Ijtihad, the practice of using reason to reinterpret the meaning and application 
of religious law, has become the rallying cry for self-styled moderate 
progressive Muslims, who want to bridge faith with integrated lifestyles and 
professional occupations.
404
  
 
 
While Muslim extremists portray Islam as dictatorial, intolerant, bigoted and 
fanatical, a new generation of European Muslims are heading the call to revisit the 
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teachings of Islam for them-selves. They are discovering that Islam is compatible 
with western democracy and that it is possible, in the words of Mohammad Iqbal to: 
  
Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in 
the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed 
purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of 
Islam.
405
                      Muslim poet-philosopher Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938)  
 
 
Historically, the West and zealous Islamic leaders have portrayed Islam as a single 
monolithic entity, whereas in fact, Islam has always contained “a de facto plurality of 
opinions…as to what Islam is…”.406 As Ramadan argues, Islam has always provided 
the means for Muslims to live peacefully amongst non-Muslims: 
 
Islamic law and jurisprudence command Muslin individuals to submit to the body 
of positive law enforced in their country of residence in the name of the tacit 
moral agreement that already supports their very presence.
407 
 
Thus, concerns regarding the development of a Muslim European identity hinge not 
so much on the adaptability of Islam to the west, but more on the adaptability of the 
„tacit moral agreement that already supports their presence‟. It hinges on the 
malleability of Western European states and mainstream society to allow a European 
Islam to evolve. Identity is defined both in dialogue with, and in the struggle against 
the significant others in our lives.
408
 The significant others for Muslims in Europe 
encompass not only their familial and cultural group but also the majority socio-
cultural or political group within their countries of residence. Taylor writes that 
modernity has brought with it not so much a “need for recognition but the conditions 
in which the attempt to be recognised can fail”.409 Integration and the accommodation 
of Muslims in Europe, rests on the recognition that Muslims are Europeans too. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MANY VOICES, FEW LISTENERS? 
 
 
“The danger when calling too systematically for intercultural dialogue is 
that of „culturalisation‟ of differences. We run the risk of misusing 
culture and intercultural dialogue as a way of hiding social and 
economic differences, and of stigmatising these differences as cultural”. 
Odile Chenal, Deputy Director, European Cultural Foundation.
410
  
 
 
 
Introduction. 
Stakeholders and academics agree for intercultural dialogue to be real, it has to be a 
catalyst for change, an interactive process through which disagreement and discord 
are transformed into action. As noted earlier in chapter one, intercultural dialogue is 
more than just verbal communication between individuals, groups and organizations 
from diverse cultural backgrounds. It is also an ethos, an attitude and a journey, the 
aim of which is to change perspectives, eliminate prejudices and “to increase 
participation and the freedom and ability to make choices”.411 It is also fundamental 
to the formation and implementation of integration policies, which enable different 
ethnic minorities to access the same rights and conditions as their neighbours. The 
seven EU debates provided an opportunity to emphasis the importance of intercultural 
dialogue, the need for political responsibility and the value of education as a means to 
promote understanding and social cohesion in order to aid the integration process.  
 
The debates were organised by the European Commission in co-operation with the 
European Policy Centre (EPC).
412
 Held in the Résidence Palace in Brussels, they 
featured a panel of experts representing the European Commission, the European 
Parliament, civic society groups, academics and religious leaders. Shada Islam, 
journalist and Senior Programme Executive at the European Policy Centre, chaired 
the debates. Four guest speakers featured at each debate, which were open to the 
public and provided an opportunity for stakeholders and interest groups to meet and 
discuss the various issues involved in accommodating diverse cultures. The EYID 
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website posted pre-event background papers prior to each event, as well as wrap-up 
papers post debate, written by various stakeholders. The EYID website also provided 
short edited highlights from each debate as well as news releases. This study is 
limited by the fact that full copies of all of the speeches were not available. However, 
themes are evident throughout the debates, which can be linked to the recurring 
strands involved in the contemporary discourse in Europe, regarding the integration 
of its ethnic minorities including its Muslim population.  
 
EU Debate One. 
Integrating Conversations: The Impact of Migration on Intercultural Dialogue. 
The four guest speakers in the first debate included: Franco Frattini, European 
Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security; Bashy Quraishy, Chair of the 
Advisory Council for the European Network Against Racism; Joris Rijibroek, Deputy 
Director, Social Cohesion for the city of Amsterdam and Cem Őzdemir, a German 
MEP of Turkish origin. 
 
The pre-event paper to this debate, written by the EPC, highlighted the fact that 
Europe is a continent of increasing immigration and this has resulted in rapid social 
change in recent years.
413
 These changes fuel concerns that the “influx of migrants 
will disrupt the social fabric and dilute national identities” leading to an increase in 
the fragmentation of Europe‟s communities.414 The paper said, intercultural dialogue 
could be an important mechanism to facilitate cohesion and understanding by 
minimising confusion and miscommunication but it must avoid being a “dialogue 
between a self-defined „host society‟ and a single migrant group”.415 For intercultural 
dialogue to be successful, it must be reciprocal. 
 
The second speaker, Bashy Quraishy echoed this sentiment, commenting that 
previous attempts at dialogue all too often disintegrated into monologues with the 
majority society expecting the minority to change. Quraishy argued that it is the 
majority society, which holds the power to orchestrate change. He said, “Minorities 
do not have the power to ask for a dialogue based on mutual understanding. The 
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majority has the key to the front door, not the minority”.416 Quraishy stressed that 
Europe will continue to need immigrants because of the “dramatic falls in the 
European birth rate” but for integration to be successful, intercultural dialogue cannot 
occur “in a vacuum” since dialogue is invariably linked to economic and social 
preconditions.
417
 He argued that many studies highlight the fact that minority groups 
often faced high unemployment, substandard housing, education problems and 
racism. Quraishy said, “Minorities do not seek cultural domination, but want 
language training, good relations with their neighbours, education for their children 
and access to the legal system”.418  
 
Justice Commissioner, Franco Frattini, who spoke first, strongly refuted clash 
theories saying, “There is no ongoing clash” and dialogue can help to “eradicate the 
abuse of religion and culture”.419 Frattini announced the establishment of the 
European Fund for Integration, initially proposed in 2005.420 Frattini emphasised that 
successful integration required active participation not only at the EU level but also 
from local governments, civil society, and through establishing good practices at the 
grassroots level.
421
 The Commissioner stressed, however that “integration and 
dialogue do not imply accepting ideas that contradict European values of individual 
rights, human dignity [or] equality between the sexes”.422 Frattini underscored the 
importance of education, saying that children “are the best ambassadors” and finished 
by saying that there “can be no immigration without integration”.423 
 
Joris Rijibroek agreed with Quraishy that integration policies must focus on social 
and economic preconditions because “in the end real dialogue is in the streets of 
every city in Europe”.424 Rijibroek commented that over half of Amsterdam‟s 
population is now of non-native descent and therefore the city was focussing on 
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developing programmes that confronted polarisation and attempted to stimulate social 
cohesion. He mentioned the initiative entitled “We, the peoples of Amsterdam” which 
worked with local councils to unite minority networks.
425
 The “City Olympics” was 
another initiative, which provided an opportunity for culturally diverse city districts 
to compete in various disciplines such as cooking or dancing. These programmes, he 
said, were a direct response to minimise the violent backlash against the Muslim 
community that occurred after the killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh. 
 
Cem Őzdemir wrapped up the debate by reiterating the fact that integration policy 
should be a top propriety at all levels of governance. He also stressed the need for a 
separation between politics and religion alongside a respect for national constitutions. 
He remarked that young people from immigrant societies wanted to be able to interact 
with those in their host countries without having to be concerned about ethnic or 
religious issues.
426
 All four speakers thus agreed that while intercultural dialogue is 
essential to help integrate migrants, intercultural dialogue should not be confused 
with inter-religious dialogue “as most minorities do not want religious domination, 
but for their basic needs for housing, education, etc, to be met”.427 
 
EU Debate Two. 
Negotiating Differences: A Responsibility of Artists and Cultural Institutions. 
The four guest speakers in the second debate included: Ján Figeľ, European 
Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth; Ahmet Polat, a Dutch-
Turkish photographer; Jette Sandahl, Director of the City Museum of Copenhagen 
and Claire Gibault, French MEP. 
 
This debate was organised by the European Commission in cooperation with the 
European Forum for Arts and Heritage (EFAH), (now called Culture Action Europe) 
and the European Cultural Foundation (ECF).
428
 The pre-event background and wrap-
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up papers were prepared by the ECF and the EFAH who are initiators of the Civil 
Society Platform for Intercultural Dialogue known as the Rainbow Platform.
429
 
 
The aim of this debate was to explore the different ways in which artists and cultural 
institutions can challenge identity perceptions and facilitate an appreciation of “non-
fixed, multiple identities”.430 The paper stated, “These myriad identities, fragile or 
robust, are in continuous evolution and negation. What is more, they are the soil out 
of which the Europe of the future will grow”.431 The paper stressed that artists are 
especially important because they challenge people‟s visions of the world, their 
interpretation of the facts and their place within this perceived world. 
 
Photographer Ahmet Polat, whose father is Turkish, was born in the Netherlands. He 
shared how the medium of photography enabled him to reconcile two vastly different 
aspects of his identity. Ahmet stressed that the artist‟s role is to be at the forefront of 
questioning identity and that artists can challenge awareness of other identities and 
thus build bridges between cultures.
432
 He emphasised that artists had the ability to 
understand another‟s perspective saying, “If you do not have the sensibility or just the 
idea that you can try to put yourself into somebody else‟s shoes then how are you 
going to talk about them, how are you going to photograph them, how are you going 
to make movies about them, tell stories about them?”433 
 
Jette Sandahl also focussed her speech on the importance of identity, which though 
intrinsically linked to history and tradition, must also adapt to modern pressures 
arising from living in multicultural societies. “Identity is continuously reinterpreted 
and it is as much a concept of the future as it is a concept of the past. It contains who 
we want to be, where we are going, the future as we dream of it”.434 Sandahl 
explained that while several European countries created cultural policies in the 20
th
 
century to promote active involvement for all, these policies were rendered 
ineffective due to a “lack of access to economic and education resources” for 
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minority groups.
435
 Sandahl posited that access to culture is still class based in Europe 
and systematic exclusions were common. She stressed the need for a cultural 
democracy. Sandahl also challenged the role of museums as caretakers of culture. 
“Museums have a responsibility of transmitting memory, traditions, history and a 
sense of identity” but must also transmit “identity as aspiration and hope, as a striving 
toward the future. Seeing, understanding and even empathizing with the view of the 
Other is a core issue for contemporary society” and through exhibitions museums can 
show “that different ways of life carry their own qualities that are sometimes beyond 
simple comparisons and hierarchies”.436 
 
Ján Figeľ remarked, “politics grow from culture” and questioned how a Europe of 
knowledge could be built without first providing sufficient resources to build a strong 
cultural society based on dialogue.
437
 Figeľ commented that artists, “have a capacity 
and ability to express…to show reality, to stress some of the aspects which are not so 
visible” and therefore art has the ability to connect value systems and open new 
spaces for communication.
438
 
 
Claire Gibault, French MEP and orchestra director said, “the artist has a central role 
in intercultural dialogue and the EU must ensure that s/he had the means to play it”.439 
Mobility was a difficulty that artists often faced and she said this was a policy area 
that needed to be addressed. Ahmet Polat also mentioned artistic censorship and 
restrictions to mobility depending on ethnicity.  
 
EU Debate Three. 
New Horizons: Active Citizenship to Bridge Interreligious Divides. 
The four guest speakers in the third debate included: Ján Figeľ, European 
Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth; Imam Dr. Abduljalil 
Sajid, Chairman of the Muslim Council for Religious and Racial Harmony UK; 
Nadine Larchy, European Vice-President of the International Council of Jewish 
Women and Mario Mauro, Vice-President of the European Parliament. 
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The background paper to this debate, written by the EPC, noted that while several 
initiatives provide important opportunities for dialogue between policy makers and 
church leaders who are committed to promoting harmonious community 
relationships, tension between people of different faiths remain. One way of 
addressing this issue was to encourage active citizenship where “everyone has access 
to equal opportunities for economic and political participation, and takes part in 
public service, volunteer work and other efforts to improve life for all citizens”.440  
 
Chairperson Shada Islam opened the debate saying the aim of inter-religious dialogue 
was to ensure an inclusive society and to promote active citizenship. Imam Sajid 
agreed saying that “People are discriminated against because of their differences” and 
“The EU needs to harmonise laws across Europe to produce a “single equality” and 
fight discrimination. We are all Europeans and can share resources and bring about 
change through active citizenship”.441 He explained active citizenship as “a 
democratic process in which everyone‟s voice is heard and differences are aired 
within the rule of law.”442 He also stressed the need for “working together through 
sharing common projects and going to the grassroots, not only top level dialogue 
which happens everywhere. I want ground level dialogue, bottom up approach, where 
we get active citizenship and respect for all our societies”.443 He also dispelled the 
idea that religion provokes wars, saying, “97% of wars are based on the desire for 
power and land, not religion”.444 
 
Nadine Larchy explained that for some religion is part of their identity and it must be 
respected before dialogue can begin. She herself had learnt, through an encounter 
experience with Catholic, Protestant and Jewish families, that words have different 
meanings for different groups, hence the importance of inter-religious dialogue.
445
 
For Larchy, education was the key and she believed that intercultural dialogue should 
be about “working with children and teaching them about different faiths, to 
understand difference and to learn to respect the difference of opinions and ideas”.446 
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She related an example of where religion was seen as negating national identity when 
a child questioned her as to whether a Jewish girl could marry a Belgium boy. Larchy 
also remarked that politicians and the media often mixed politics and religion and this 
simplified the issue.
447
 
 
Mario Mauro endorsed the necessity of education as an effective vehicle for 
intercultural dialogue, stressing that Europe needed a “pedagogical or educational 
policy that helps develop each individual to the full”.448 Education could teach respect 
for other value systems and provide “indispensable elements” for a vision inclusive of 
all cultures. Ján Figeľ agreed that education was a uniting tool. Understanding the 
past, he said, helps people to “combine our values and wisdom, bringing solidarity in 
the 21
st
 century”. In response to a question from the floor, Commissioner Figeľ said 
that education policy must not only boost technological excellence but must also 
stimulate an emphasis on human values in order to build tomorrow‟s European 
citizens.
449
 When questioned about the meaning of Article 16 of the Lisbon Treaty
450
 
Commissioner Figeľ remarked that open and transparent dialogue would be 
maintained with both religious and non-religious institutions and said that “after 50 
years of evolution, [it was] very normal, very natural when we speak about Europe of 
people not Europe of business”.451 
 
EU Debate Four. 
Couscous Culture: Is that what Intercultural Dialogue in the Workplace is all 
about? 
The four guest speakers in the fourth debate included: Vladimír Špidla, European 
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; Benoît van 
Grieken, Corporate Social Responsibility Manager of Randstad, Belgium; Chibo 
Onyeji, Vice-President of the European Network Against Racism and Kyriacos 
Triantaphyllides, MEP.  
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The pre-event background paper, written by ENAR commented that increasing 
migration and subsequent diversity in the workforce means that cultural diversity is 
“not only a foreign affairs issue, but an internal and social one”.452 The paper 
maintained that „Interculture‟ is a process and the aim of intercultural dialogue is to 
facilitate a change within people. Considering that workplaces are microcosms of the 
wider community and often reflect privileged power structures and discriminatory 
practices found in mainstream society, could intercultural dialogue effect real change 
in the workplace or was diversity merely a symbol?
453
 A member of the audience 
welcomed the opportunity to attend the debate saying,  
 
I represent the word „intercultural‟ in my mind. I was born in Africa, I was raised 
in an EU country (UK) and I‟ve moved to Brussels in order to work so I feel that 
I understand and really embody what intercultural dialogue is all about, so I 
really wanted to hear what‟s being done by the EU. 
 
 
Commissioner Špidla stated that working was not just about earning money, it also 
“helps to give each of us a role in society”.454 He stressed that immigrant workers 
contribute more than just their labour. They also contribute “their culture, their 
lifestyle, their habits as citizens and consumers”.455 Diversity could therefore benefit 
companies economically as well as socially because businesses which accommodated 
diversity and condemned discrimination, were able to increase their productivity, 
enlarge customer bases, fill labour shortages and enhance their company reputations. 
Despite this, he said, companies were still reluctant to instigate diversity management 
policies and thus, the EU needed to legislate in order to “guarantee effective 
enforcement mechanism and dissuasive sanctions, accompanied by positive action 
measures”.456 Commissioner Špidla emphasised the Commission‟s commitment to 
diversity training initiatives, saying that while international groups understood the 
advantages of diversity policies, smaller businesses did not. 
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Our prime target are therefore the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
particularly as they play such an important role in the European economy, with 
some 23 million SMEs in Europe representing around 75 million jobs.
457
 
 
Benoît van Grieken also emphasised that “intercultural diversity from top 
management levels creates a win-win situation for all groups involved”.458 In his role 
as manager of a recruitment company, he said that sometimes employers would 
refuse to employ workers of different origins. In this situation, the matter would be 
reported to the Belgian employment ministry and it was up to the authorities to 
“decide on whether to take the company before a labour court”.459 As an example van 
Grieken mentioned that 40% of workers in Belgium today come from other countries 
and his firm recruits approximately 30,000 workers a day, thus, implying that 
effective diversity management is crucial to the future of Europe.
460
 
 
Chibo Onyeji challenged the effectiveness of „soft tools‟, saying, despite 
“commendable efforts equality has not quite arrived in the workplace”.461 He spoke in 
favour of stronger anti-discrimination measures, “If companies do not learn to 
respond to certain legal provisions, then there has to be sanctions.”462 Onyeji “urged 
the commission to speed up efforts to win approval from all EU countries for an 
exhaustive – horizontal anti-discrimination directive” that would cover discrimination 
in all its forms, not just the least controversial aspects.
463
 Onyeji also said, “workplace 
diversity is no longer just about anti-discrimination compliance. It focuses on social 
inclusion and the impact on minorities”.464 Onyeji stressed: 
 
Although EU anti-discrimination measures have lead to improved protection for 
ethnic minorities, social exclusion is on the increase, and distances between 
individuals and communities are wider than ever before. People of migrant and 
ethnic minority backgrounds lack intellectual confidence, professionals and 
academics with Masters and PhD qualifications are working as taxi drivers and 
cleaners.
465
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Onyeji commented that while anti-discrimination laws alone could not effect change 
they were important for setting minimum acceptable standards. Kyriacos 
Triantaphyllides closed the debate by stressing that intercultural dialogue was vital in 
all areas of life because the major obstacle to achieving peace in any area of conflict 
was dialogue.
466
 
 
EU Debate Five. 
Multilingualism: A Bridge or a Barrier for Intercultural Dialogue? 
The four guest speakers in the fifth debate included: Leonard Orban, European 
Commissioner for Multilingualism; Claude Moraes, British Socialist MEP; Abram De 
Swaan, Emiritus Research Professor of Social Sciences at the University of 
Amsterdam and Sandra Pralong, Romanian National Ambassador of the Year and 
former UN Executive. The debate was organised by the European Commission and 
the European Union National Institute of Culture (EUNIC).
467
 
 
The purpose of the debate was to discuss whether multilingualism was an obstacle or 
an aid to intercultural dialogue. Instead of the usual concept paper, EUNIC Brussels 
conducted a survey, prior to the EU debate, asking people how the knowledge of two 
or more languages impacts on integration in Europe.
468
 While the majority of 
respondents agreed that knowledge of more than one language in the EU facilitates 
better communication, some believed that acceptance and integration is not solely 
about language. One respondent says that even when immigrants speak the official 
language of a country:  
 
Integration, alas, is not simply a question of immigrants wanting and knowing 
how to integrate in their country of destination; it is also and most probably about 
how much the locals want and know how to integrate foreigners.
469
  
 
Commissioner Orban opened the debate by stating “languages are one of the most 
effective tools for achieving intercultural dialogue” and therefore, “Europe‟s 
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abundance of mother tongues is a source of wealth”.470 However, the Commissioner 
also recognised that linguistic diversity can be a barrier to communication, leading to 
misunderstandings between cultures and conflict. “Excessive assertion of identity” he 
said, “can lead to intolerance and fanaticism. Therefore, a sense of belonging based 
on accepting linguistic and cultural diversity is a powerful antidote to extremism” 
because language learning deepens the sense of kinship between EU citizens.
471
 Then 
Commissioner Orban described the Commission‟s new multilingualism strategy as an 
ambitious, comprehensive package to improve Europe‟s social cohesion and 
prosperity.
472
 One of the aims of the non-binding strategy would be for EU citizens to 
speak at least two foreign languages in addition to their mother tongue.
473
 The 
Commissioner “was not convinced by the arguments of those who propose just one or 
two languages as the sole means of intercultural exchange. To do so would not only 
impoverish out society: it would contradict the very ethos of the European project. 
The variety of languages used in the EU is proof that our motto „unity in diversity‟ is 
not just an empty phrase, but a tangible reality”.474 Commissioner Orban emphasised 
that “multilingual people are precious assets for Europe that act as the glue between 
our different societies” and multilingualism is also crucial to the bloc‟s economic 
prosperity, as the lack of language skills means the EU is losing out to other 
countries.
475
  
 
Abram De Swaan saw multilingualism as a hindrance to integration, arguing that, 
“language diversity is not a treasure in itself, it is an obstacle”.476 He criticised the 
EU‟s tendency to promote noble aims that are difficult to achieve in practice, calling 
for two or three cross-border languages to be employed in the EU rather than all 
23.
477
 De Swaan said multilingualism “makes it very difficult for us to communicate, 
to have a shared public space in which the citizens of Europe can congregate and act 
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out European politics”.478 He also believed that promoting a large number of 
languages only served to strengthen the dominance of English over and above native 
European languages.
479
 He did, however, concede, “all politicians should have the 
right to speak their own language and all the bloc‟s tongues should be publicly 
spoken by the top EU officials to raise awareness of Europe‟s linguistic diversity.480 
 
Sandra Pralong stated that, “bilateral relations are the key to cherishing 
multilingualism” and thus, it was important for every European to „adopt‟ another 
language as a second mother tongue.
481
 This would enable all of the languages in the 
bloc to be covered, thus, eliminating the need for a common third language.
482
 
 
Claude Moraes closed the debate by saying it was necessary to look at the bigger 
picture and “Understand that multilingualism is not about communicating in other 
languages. It is about confidence, respect. It‟s about culture”.483 He said 
multilingualism was a “strengthening process” and it was impossible to separate 
languages from history and culture and that language learning was intrinsically linked 
to a “wider economic and geopolitical perspective”.484 
 
EU Debate Six. 
Education: Ready for the Intercultural Challenge? 
The four guest speakers in the sixth debate included: Ján Figeľ, European 
Commissioner for Education, Training, Culture and Youth; Professor Jagdish Singh 
Gundara, UNESCO Chair in International Studies; Fred van Leeuwen, Secretary 
General of Educational International and Marianne Pocelet, Secretary General of the 
International Yehudi Menuhin Foundation. This debate was organised by the 
European Commission in co-operation with the European Youth Forum (YFJ), which 
wrote both the background and wrap-up papers for this event.
485
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Culture, education and intercultural dialogue are being widely discussed by civil 
society organisations at the grass roots level as well as at the institutional and political 
levels. The background paper noted that there were two ways of promoting 
intercultural dialogue through education because “promoting dialogue among cultures 
implies a reflection on the place occupied by cultural differences in this 
dialogue”.486One view advocated the protection of national and cultural identities and 
therefore believed education could be used as a tool to bridge differences between 
various cultural identities. The other view believed that cultural differences per se are 
not “necessarily the key element of intercultural dialogue, due to the increased level 
of globalisation” and the focus of education should be on promoting universal values 
like human rights and equality between all cultures.
487
 
 
Ján Figeľ began the debate by highlighting “the importance of intercultural 
competences in the field of education and the need for formal and non-formal 
education in order to debate the challenges posed by intercultural dialogue”.488 Ján 
Figeľ remarked that Europe still struggled to provide equal access to education for 
some migrant groups and that “Access to education and the quality of the education 
system are factors of cohesion, understanding and integration”.489 Commissioner 
Figeľ remarked that it was important to promote diversity in schools and said that the 
mobility programmes, cross-border school and university course (Comenius, 
Erasmus) helped to promote “intercultural understanding, co-operation and respect.490 
According to the Commissioner, “education unites” and “united we learn”.491 
 
Professor Gundara emphasised “education has a major role to play in integrating 
identities”.492He continued, “Europe has a very long experience of dealing with issues 
of diversity and this process has led to the mutual recognition of other and their 
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„otherness‟ and this has become a distinguishing mark of a shared identity in this 
continent”.493 In Europe today, he believed “developing teacher‟s intercultural 
competencies and abilities to transfer European values is of central importance for 
building a cosmopolitan citizenship”.494 Professor Gundara touched on the, “role of 
religion as an important component of culture, and the key role played by non-formal 
education in terms of developing key competences for intercultural dialogue”.495 He 
also mentioned that it was necessary to educate youth in how to manage the 
“increasingly complex world of the media”.496  
 
Marianne Pocelet emphasised the importance of interactive education, using the work 
of the Yehudi Menuhin Foundation as an example. The Foundation coordinates pan-
European projects like the “iyouwe SHARE THE WORLD” project, which supports 
artistic workshops involving intercultural exchanges between primary school 
children.
497Marianne Pocelet described the performances in which “Artists hold 
workshops for children, helping them to experience other cultures through 
storytelling, playing, singing and dancing” and she added, “It‟s not just the children 
and artists who are working together and learning, but also the teachers and children‟s 
parents”.498 
 
Fred van Leeuwen stressed, “Quality education built upon values, universal values of 
understanding and tolerance, of respect for human rights and dignity, of seeing 
cultural differences as an opportunity rather than a threat….Separation and exclusion 
in education bring hatred and conflicts….The classroom will be the place where we 
start breeding tolerance”.499 Mr van Leeuwen also raised concerns over a projected 
shortage of teachers saying, “We are facing a tremendous shortage of teachers and it 
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is very important that our governments start thinking about plans and strategies to 
recruit enough quality teachers for quality education where needed”.500  
 
EU Debate Seven. 
Talking Our Way Out of Trouble: How Media Debate Can Combat Intolerance  
The four guest speakers appearing at the seventh Brussels debate included: Viviane 
Reding, European Commissioner for Information Society and Media; Bettina Peters, 
Director of the Global Forum for Media Development; Forward Maisokwadzo, 
Exiled Journalists‟ Network and Christa Prets, an Austrian Socialist MEP. The 
background and wrap papers were prepared by the International Federation of 
Journalists (IFJ).
501
  
 
The background paper highlighted the increasing difficulty that journalists face in 
reporting sensitive issues because of the EU‟s complex multicultural and political 
character. The paper noted that, “Journalists need to navigate with care around racism 
and extremism to avoid stirring up intolerance, while reporting fairly the mosaic of 
languages, religion, cultures and different historical perspectives that shape modern 
society”.502 Unfortunately, while „sensationalism‟ sells newspapers in an increasingly 
tighter market, it also fuels fears between communities. Thus, according to the paper, 
a co-ordinated approach including European and national policy makers is vital to 
promote intercultural dialogue and ethical reporting. In line with this, the paper 
acknowledged that a number of stakeholders in the media, have established guidelines 
aimed to combat racism, in order to promote accountability and the benefits of 
diversity.
503
 
 
Chairperson, Shada Islam, agreed that, “journalism is now functioning in a much 
more challenging society” and “today‟s competitive media environment is making 
our task as journalists even more difficult”.504 Commissioner Reding emphasised 
Europe‟s historical multicultural and multilingual dimension, saying, “this is our 
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biggest wealth and we are witnessing the possibilities of using new technologies in 
order to reach out to the world and spread this wealth of ours”.505 Therefore, the role 
of “European and national policy makers is to support the exchange of production and 
access to knowledge”, she said.506 She also commented that, “Media has been an 
intercultural dialogue tool from the very beginning, even before the internet era. New 
technologies are a great opportunity to seize. Due to interactive media, we can now 
overcome geographical and financial barriers”.507 She said that because films can 
easily travel across borders, they contribute to the cultural enrichment of all people as 
they learn about their neighbours “culture, about their history, about their dreams”.508  
 
Bettina Peters remarked, “There have, unfortunately, been many examples of how 
mainstream media in Europe fail to take up the challenge of fair and balanced 
reporting that provides readers, viewer and listeners with relevant information put 
into context”.509 She provided examples of biased, discriminatory stories from the 
UK, Italy and Germany to show “how certain media adopt anti-immigration points of 
view, develop relationships with racist political parties or fail to report fairly about 
well-settled minorities”.510 Bettina Peters raised the difficulty of ensuring freedom of 
the press while promoting good practice and noted that journalists themselves, along 
with public broadcasters and national Press Councils were working together to adopt 
“codes which challenge intolerance” through the “Ethical Journalism 
Initiative”(EJI).511 She also emphasised that, “Good journalistic conduct 
requires…that government policies are challenged and politicians taken to task when 
they propagate intolerance, xenophobic and racist views”.512 She finished by saying, 
“Active investment by EU institutions in promoting diversity in media, and 
supporting dialogue in the media industry and beyond go a long way towards 
strengthening media coverage that is diverse, pluralistic, fair and informed”.513 
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Forward Maisokwadzo questioned how the media could properly reflect diversity 
without a diverse staff, “When you talk of diversity you also have to look at the 
diversity of the newsroom itself and also look at the diversity of the content.” 514 He 
stressed that ethical journalism relied on public involvement saying, “The public also 
have a responsibility of telling their stories and challenging some of the inaccuracies. 
It is important not only to look at the role of media but also to look at how society is 
changing”.515 
 
Christa Prets agreed with the call for public responsibility and emphasised the need 
for media education, “We need more competent media literacy at school [and]...we 
need educated teachers in media literacy” so that we are “able to sort out what is 
important for me, for myself, for my development and what is rubbish and what is 
manipulating me”.516 The MEP commented that youth often consumed media without 
being equipped to distinguish good information from bad. In order to combat this, she 
had initiated a report on “media literacy in a digital world”, aimed at providing the 
necessary skills to safely use the internet. The panellists agreed that the media 
industry, policy makers and the public were jointly responsible for promoting 
intercultural dialogue and fighting discrimination.  
 
Thematic Analysis.  
In the EU level debates the strongest consensus concerned a call for responsible 
political leadership to ensure economic and social provision for minorities, coupled 
with an emphasis on education. In all, seven themes emerged: 
1)  A disputation of the clash theory. 
2) The EU needs immigrants. 
3) Integration needs economic and social pre-conditions, which relies on 
responsible leadership at the local, national and supranational levels. 
4) The importance of education. 
5) The need for a separation between politics and religion. 
6) The role of identities. 
7) The role of the media. 
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Claire Gibault 
Dr. Sajid 
Vladimír Špidla 
Chibo Onyeji 
Leonard Orban 
Abram De Swaan 
Fred van Leeuwen 
Viviane Reding 
Bettina Peters 
Forward Maisokwadzo 
Christa Prets 
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Table Four:  Education. 
Franco Frattini 
Bashy Quraishy 
Joris Rijibroek 
Cem Őzdemir 
Ján Figeľ 
Jette Sandahl 
Nadine Larchy 
Mario Mauro 
Vladimír Špidla 
Benoît van Grieken 
Chibo Onyeji 
Leonard Orban 
Sandra Pralong  
Professor Gundara 
Fred van Leeuwen 
Marianne Pocelet  
Christa Prets 
 
Table Five:  Religion/Politics 
Franco Frattini 
Bashy Quraishy 
Joris Rijibroek 
Cem Őzdemir  
Nadine Larchy 
 
Table Six:  Identity 
Ahmet Polat 
Jette Sandahl  
Leonard Orban 
Professor Gundara 
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Table Seven:  Media 
Professor Gundara 
Viviane Reding 
Bettina Peters 
Forward Maisokwadzo 
Christa Prets 
 
During the EU debates, the guest-speakers repeatedly emphasized that intercultural 
dialogue is more than just communication. They argued that intercultural dialogue 
relies on economic and social pre-conditions, which require a commitment from 
political leaders at all levels, to provide access to employment and adequate housing, 
and to promote understanding through education and the media in order to dispel the 
fear of „difference‟. The speakers argued, that in order to formulate effective policies 
for immigrants and minorities, not only do policy-makers need to understand the 
problems that minorities encounter on a daily basis, they also need an appreciation of 
these problems from a minorities‟ perspective. They emphasized that intercultural 
dialogue can help to facilitate reciprocity and understanding and thus, function as a 
catalyst for change. The following section analyses the main themes that emerged 
from the debates and situates them within the current academic discourse explored in 
the preceding chapters. 
 
ANTI-CLASH. 
While acknowledging the increasing diversity of Europe‟s population and the 
resulting tensions, four of the guest speakers (14%) refuted the clash paradigm. This 
stance echoes that of many academics who strongly rejected Huntington‟s „clash‟ 
theory, arguing instead that conflict was more likely to occur within civilisations than 
between them.
517
 Political and religious leaders concurred and advocated dialogue 
between cultures as a medium by which to facilitate “a paradigm shift away from 
cross-cultural misunderstandings” that inevitably lead to intolerance and conflict. 518 
Commissioner Frattini dismissed the idea of an ongoing clash between cultures and 
emphasised the need for dialogue to eradicate the abuse of religion and culture. Bashy 
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Quraishy stressed that minorities do not want to dominate the majority; they just want 
the opportunity to live peacefully and provide well for their families. In relation to 
Europe‟s Muslim population, scholars like Klausen, support this position, 
acknowledging that while historical tensions exist, “domestic conflicts have local 
causes”, invariably linked to local socio-economic factors rather than cultural 
clashes.
519
 Roy agrees, writing that there is a tendency to “overemphasise the role of 
Islam in problems pertaining to Muslim migrants” rather than examining the impact 
of Westernisation on migrant groups.
520
 Roy also supports the anti-clash school in 
terms of Muslims in the EU by noting that terrorist acts in Europe are seldom linked 
to global jihads.
521
  
 
Kyriacos Triantaphyllides stressed that dialogue was the key to promoting peace and 
preventing conflict. Tibi warns, however, that dialogue needs to be reciprocal since 
conflict is often generated within Europe‟s Muslim population because the West 
“defines the space of the debate” and any dialogue concerning Islam is reduced to a 
discourse on the meaning of the West.
522
 This argument was reinforced by the 
conflict over the „Cartoon Affair‟ in Denmark, which became a disagreement about 
the freedom of the western press rather than a debate about the religious rights on 
Muslims. Similarly, in France, the hijab debate became a conflict about the meaning 
of laicité rather than the rights of Muslim women and girls to express their identity.
523
  
On this note, Quraishy emphasised the need for intercultural dialogue to be reciprocal 
rather than dominated by the majority because, he said, “minorities do not have the 
power” to orchestrate equal dialogue.  Academic discourse also stresses the global 
dimension of dialogue with Islam in the EU since, as Camilleri writes, the way in 
which Europe handles dialogue with its Muslim population may affect the way Islam 
responds to “the challenge of modernity”.524 Emphasising the need to promote respect 
for all societies, Imam Sajid also disputed the clash theory by saying that the majority 
of wars were caused by greed, not religion. 
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IMMIGRANTS. 
Although surveys show that some of Europe‟s aging population are resistant to 
ongoing immigration,
525
 and politicians have often blamed immigrants for ethnic 
tensions,
526
 the reality is that the EU has an increasing shortage of both skilled 
workers and labourers.
527
 The EU needs immigrants to continue to grow 
economically and to support its aging workforce. Five of the guest speakers (17.5%) 
specifically mentioned the increasing value of immigrants to the EU. Quraishy 
reinforced the predictions that Europe will continue to need immigrants because of 
the „dramatic falls in the European birth rate‟. A report presented to the European 
Parliament by Gabriele Stauner (a German Christian Democrat) in November 2008, 
reinforced Quraishy‟s words by highlighting the projected increased pressure on the 
EU‟s healthcare system if Europe did not increase immigration.528 Stauner stated that 
while there are presently four workers for every person over 65, by 2030, it was 
estimated that the ratio would be two to one. Benoît van Grieken, who told the 
audience that 40% of workers in Belgium today come from other countries, 
reinforced the fact that many EU states now rely heavily on immigrants. He stressed 
the need for companies to invest in diversity management policies in order to create a 
„win-win situation‟ for both staff and business.  
 
Eurobarometer polls confirm that many people in Europe today interact with different 
cultures on a daily basis and the speakers reinforced the idea that the EU has long 
been a multicultural society in which different cultures need to learn how to live and 
work together for the future good of Europe.
529
 Commissioner Špidla emphasised that 
immigrants were more than a cheap source of labour because they also contributed to 
their host societies through their culture and lifestyle. Luca Viscenti, a Professor at 
Bocconi University in Milan, agrees, saying in an interview that Italy‟s second-
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generation immigrants are “a critical resource in which to invest”.530 Špidla also 
argued that immigrants should be valued for their diversity, not only as citizens, but 
also as consumers. The Commissioner stressed that companies, which embraced the 
realities of a multicultural workforce and consumer base, inevitably benefited 
economically as well as socially because they not only filled labour shortages thereby 
increasing their productivity but they also enlarged their customer base. 
Commissioner Orban also spoke about the richness of Europe‟s multicultural society, 
emphasising the need to promote a sense of belonging though multilingualism in 
order to improve Europe‟s social cohesion and prosperity. Commissioner Reding 
stressed that Europe‟s cultural diversity is its „biggest wealth‟ and this aspect of 
Europe should be nurtured. These speakers echoed the comments of academics like 
Bennett, Maalouf and Riftken (Chapter 3, p. 24) who argue that immigrants should be 
valued because they have the ability to straddle two or more cultures and can, if 
valued, strengthen the societies in which they live. 
 
POLITICAL WILL. 
Sixteen of the guest speakers (57%) concurred that meaningful dialogue cannot occur 
in a vacuum – it is dependent on the provision of equal opportunities, which in turn 
depend on political will. This stance reinforces academic discourse and reports from 
centres like the EUMC that state the integration of minorities relies on social and 
economic preconditions. While the speakers were talking about minorities in general, 
this is one of the major factors continually raised in relation to the integration of 
Muslims in the EU. A report, in 2006, on Islamophobia in the EU highlighted 
concerns regarding discrimination against Muslims in relation to “employment 
opportunities, education standards and social marginalisation”.531 Pettigrew also 
argues that for integration to succeed, policy makers need to be proactive in the areas 
of employment, education and housing in order to facilitate opportunities for natural 
interaction.
532
 Sandahl argued that „cultural democracy‟ relied on equal access to 
economic and education resources for minority groups. Schnapper concurs, writing 
that integration relies on the democratic process, which ultimately stems from the 
political and social will of the host society. Integration, he writes, is “foremost a 
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value…in so far as it rests on the fundamentally democratic notion that…in spite of 
divergence of their beliefs…people…can live in harmony”.533 In order to promote 
harmony, the third debate focussed specifically on the concept of „active citizenship‟ 
as a means to bridge intercultural and interreligious divides. Active citizenship 
presupposes, however, that minorities have access to equal opportunities. Imam Sajid 
called for a harmonisation of EU laws in order to produce a “single equality” and 
fight discrimination. This echoes the literature examined in chapter two, which 
discusses the fact that although Article 13 of the EC Treaty established a basis for 
addressing discrimination, these resulting protective legal frameworks remain limited 
and do not cover key areas where Muslims (and other minorities) experience 
prejudice.
534
 Additionally, these Directives are limited by the fact that they are left to 
the interpretation of member states and “positive action is discretionary rather than 
mandatory”.535 Regulations, which are either jointly passed by the EU Council and the 
European Parliament, or solely by the Commission, become legally binding once 
passed, and national governments simply implement them on par with their current 
national laws.
536
 Directives, on the other hand, are legislative acts of the EU, which 
require member states to achieve a particular aim. The way in which the member 
states achieve these aims is up to each member state and this accounts for tardiness by 
some states.  
 
On this note, Chibo Onyeji commented that although the EU had passed anti-
discrimination directives, equality had not arrived in the workplace and he urged the 
Commission to increase the powers of its anti-discrimination directives. Fred van 
Leeuwen stressed the responsibility of governments to facilitate integration through 
quality education built upon universal values and respect for human rights. Van 
Leeuwen stressed that the classroom was the place to start breeding tolerance, but this 
could not happen without a political commitment to recruit quality educators. In a 
similar vein, Bettina Peters advocated an active investment by EU institutions in 
promoting diversity in the media to prevent discriminatory press. These comments 
reinforce the writings of scholars who continue to argue for a concerted political 
response to recent conflicts, particularly those involving Europe‟s Muslims:  
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Recourse to radical forms of political Islam, particularly by young people, is 
often the expression of a lack of political representation and participation by 
those who are excluded and socially and culturally discriminated against.
537
  
 
 
EDUCATION. 
The importance of education was emphasised by seventeen speakers (60%). Ján 
Figeľ, who spoke at three of the debates constantly emphasised that education was the 
vital to the future of the EU politically, economically and socially. He remarked that 
“politics grow from culture”. Thus, if the EU wanted to build a „Europe of 
knowledge‟ (as set out in the Lisbon Treaty) it must first provide sufficient resources 
to build a strong cultural society. He reiterated that education policy must not only 
boost technological excellence but must also stimulate an emphasis on human values 
in order to build tomorrow‟s European citizens because access to education, and the 
quality of the education system, are the primary factors of cohesion, understanding 
and integration. The schoolroom is of course integral to the process of intercultural 
education, and the need to promote understanding and acceptance of cultural 
differences at an early age was strongly endorsed by the speakers, with Commissioner 
Frattini stating that children are the „best ambassadors‟. Sardar concurs, commenting 
that children are „amalgamators‟, able to mix new and old cultures, able to add 
“bangers and mash and fish and chips to sag gosht, [casserole] and parathas, [bread] 
not noticing the joins” and, in turn, immigrant children help to educate their 
parents.
538
 Nadine Larchy, said education was the „key‟ to integration because if 
children could learn about other faiths and understand difference, they would also 
learn to respect different opinions and ideas.  
 
The emphasis on the importance of education substantiates polls, which showed that 
younger, better educated people were more open and receptive to different minorities 
while those who held strong prejudices against migrants were older, more politically 
conservative and less well educated.
539
 The 2006, British Sociological Association 
study revealed that some white, middle-class parents in Britain were choosing to 
enrol their children in multi-ethnic schools in order to better equip them to interact in 
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an increasingly multicultural environment.
540
 While the authors questioned the 
altruistic nature of the parents‟ intentions, arguing that their „cosmopolitan 
multiculturalism‟ could be motivated by a desire to accrue „cultural capital‟ rather 
than promote cultural equality, the end result was that the „white‟ children were “seen 
to be developing key citizenship skills of tolerance and understanding difference that 
are increasingly vital in a society with growing class and ethnic intolerance”.541 The 
parents reported the ease with which their children could relate to those of different 
ethnicities compared to their own experience. Richard Harding, a barrister and parent 
said: 
 
Sophie…is totally different to us, all our friends are white and middle –class, 
hers are from all sorts of class and ethnic backgrounds. And to be honest I‟m 
quite uncomfortable with people from different backgrounds. I never had the 
experience at school or university…We want her [Sophie] to be a fully paid up 
citizen of the 21
st
 century and I think she is and that is all down to the school. She 
has a real social confidence and can get on with anybody.
542
 
 
In the debate, Fred van Leeuwen warned that, “separation and exclusion in education 
bring hatred and conflicts”. For Muslim youth, education is a double-edged sword 
because of madrasses, where Muslim youth are often taught by foreign imams who 
do not speak the local European language and who have no understanding of 
European customs or western society. On this note, Ramadan argues that it is 
imperative for Western Europe to encourage the development of native-born, 
European educated imams who can teach an Islam that equips young Muslims with 
the means to live in the West.
543
 
 
Chibo Onyeji challenged the audience to remember that there are two sides to the 
debate on education. He said that many well-educated immigrants often faced 
discrimination in terms of employment, resulting in professional and academic 
immigrants working as taxi drivers and cleaners. Discrimination in employment is 
substantiated by the findings of the Institut Montaigne, which reported that applicants 
with a „traditional‟ French name were five times more likely to be interviewed than 
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applicants with an Arab name even with identical CVs.
544
 This was also supported by 
Benoît van Grieken who commented that sometimes employers would refuse to 
employ workers of different origins.
545
 
 
On the positive side, Professor Gundara said Europe has a long history of dealing 
with diversity and already had a shared identity. He spoke of the need to continue to 
develop teacher‟s intercultural competencies and their abilities to transfer European 
values in order to build a cosmopolitan citizenship. According to Delanty, a 
cosmopolitan Europe is one that does not need an „other‟ to construct identity against 
because it “does not have a clear distinction between east and west or between Self 
and Other”.546 To be European in a cosmopolitan sense, he argues, is to simply 
acknowledge that today “one lives in a world that does not belong to a specific 
people”.547 One of the keys to unity in diversity is the understanding of other 
languages and, thus, Commissioner Orban described the Commission‟s new 
multilingualism strategy as an ambitious, comprehensive package to improve 
Europe‟s social cohesion and prosperity. Joris Rijibroek commented on the 
importance of cultural education for all ages through a variety of mediums, telling the 
audience about the projects underway in Amsterdam, which were set up in direct 
response to lessen the violent backlash against the Muslim community that occurred 
after the killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004.  
 
SEPARATION BETWEEN POLITICS AND RELIGION.  
The need for a separation between politics and religion was stressed by five of the 
speakers (17.5%). All four speakers in the first debate agreed that although 
intercultural dialogue is essential to help integrate migrants, it should not be confused 
with inter-religious dialogue because most minorities do not want religious 
domination. They just want equal access to housing, employment and education. 
Nadine Larchy remarked that politicians often mixed politics and religion, which 
confused the issues. Cem Őzdemir concluded the first debate by reiterating that 
integration policy should focus on the separation between politics and religion. He 
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stressed that young immigrants wanted to be able to interact with those in their host 
countries without always having to be concerned about ethnic or religious issues. As 
Klausen reports, “Muslims are always explaining who they are not and never have a 
chance to say who they are”.548 Fetzer and Soper endorse the need for a separation 
between politics and religion, because as they argue, the UK presently privileges the 
Church of England over other faiths. By not recognising the faith of Islam on par with 
the Church of England, they say, the state does not protect the “distinctive religious 
identity” of Muslims.549  
 
For Muslims, separating the secular and religious spheres means separating Islam as a 
culture from Islam as a religion, and conferring the same rights and privileges on 
Islam as other religions enjoy. Roy and Tibi argue that Islam is both a culture and a 
religion, and that confusing the two exacerbates the failure of integration in Europe. 
Rather than pushing for an ethno-cultural identity, the majority of European Muslims 
simply want recognition for Islam, in the same way other religions are recognised 
(especially Christianity), and to be allowed to practice their faith without being 
stigmatised. According to Roy, the recognition by the state of Islam as a „mere‟ 
religion, on par with other religions would prevent the politicalisation of Islam, thus 
isolating extremists and preventing them from “building a political constituency”.550 
 
IDENTITY.  
Speakers agreed that the recognition of different cultural identities is pivotal to the 
success of integration and the promotion of „unity in diversity‟. The increasing 
interaction on a daily basis of varied cultures, all with a legitimate claim to European 
soil, means that minority cultures are continuously challenging majority cultures for 
the equal recognition. Four of the guest speakers (14%) stressed the importance of 
recognising that identities are multiple, fluid and equally valid. This is reflected in 
academic discourse, which posits that identities are constructed and ever changing, 
being shaped in the crucible of experience where “identities can be adapted and 
discarded like a change of costume”.551 Jette Sandahl emphasised that the need to see, 
understand and empathise with the viewpoint of the „other‟ is a core issue for 
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contemporary societies because “different ways of life carry their own qualities”. As 
Strath writes, immigrant identities are even more complex and the immigrant can find 
themselves in „double danger‟ of either “falling in between two cultures…[or] falling 
into the abysses of modernity” forever without a „home‟.552 Commissioner Orban 
warned that a sense of belonging based on accepting cultural diverse identities can be 
a powerful antidote to extremism. Academic literature suggests that it is the 
marginalisation and exclusion of Europe‟s Muslims that leads to conflict rather than 
inherent cultural differences.
553
 Ramadan, Roy and Tibi all stress that it is imperative 
for young Muslims to feel that they belong because marginalisation pushes them 
towards an „imagined community‟, a politicized Islam, a “defensive-cultural 
phenomenon” directed against the West.554 Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United 
Hebrew Congregations of the British Commonwealth, told the European Parliament 
in November 2008 that recognition of the Europe‟s Muslims is vital to combating 
extremism:  
 
The condition for being able to talk to somebody is that they recognise 
your right to speak, that you are a partner in dialogue. Someone who 
negates my very existence, or my identity, or my right to have rights, 
cannot be a partner in dialogue. So the issue is not how do we talk to the 
extremists, the issue is how do we talk to the moderates so that we can 
isolate the extremists.
555
  
 
In this vein, Polat Ahmet commented on the importance of understanding different 
cultures in order to fully appreciate the „others‟ experience. He said that artists had 
the ability to build bridges between cultures by challenging people‟s awareness of 
diverse identities. Commissioner Figeľ stated that socio-cultural cohesion ultimately 
underpinned the political and economic success of the EU.  
 
MEDIA.  
The role of the media in the EU has often been a contentious issue, especially when 
freedom of speech is invoked as a justification for reporting on inflammatory issues. 
As a young Muslim teacher in Aubervilles remarked, “Whenever Islam is mentioned 
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on television or in newspapers, it is always about terrorist attacks”.556 Five of the 
speakers (17.5%) focussed on the importance of the media in regards to 
accommodating diverse cultures. Bettina Peters raised the difficulty of ensuring 
freedom of the press while promoting good practice and she shared examples of 
discriminatory reporting in several EU states. She argued that the media, at times, is 
guilty of fuelling conflict as evidenced by the 2006 „cartoon affair‟ in Denmark. 
Parekh notes that, the publication of the cartoons contrasted with a decision three 
years earlier by the editor of the Jyllands-Posten, who declined to publish cartoons 
about Jesus because they could be offensive to Christians.
557
  
 
Forward Maisokwadzo said the media industry should employ a multicultural staff, in 
order to reflect the multicultural dimension of the EU. Similarly, the 2004 CBMI 
report also stressed the need for newspapers and other media to employ Muslim 
journalists to ensure balanced reporting.
558
 Maisokwadzo also pointed out that the 
public has a role to play in the promotion of ethical journalism by demanding 
accurate reporting. Christa Prets agreed with the need for public responsibility, 
coupled with a greater emphasis on media education at schools so that young people 
could learn to distinguish between good and bad information especially on the 
internet. Again, the CBMI report highlights the dangers of the web, writing that 
“virtual anarchy reigns in cyberspace” because websites are not subject to the same 
laws of libel.
559
 The report details the case of the Evening Standard, which was 
reported to the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) in 2002 by Ken Livingstone, 
the Mayor of London, for allowing racist comments on its website This is London. 
The comments posted on the website were in reaction to the Bali bombings and 
included remarks like, “Hands up who would like to see…the rounding up of 
Muslims” and “Every mosque a potential terrorist HQ”.560 In order to combat this 
kind of influence Ms Prets spoke about her report on “media literacy in a digital 
world”, which was aimed at providing the necessary skills to safely use the internet.  
 
                                                 
556
 BBC News, Sara. http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/4376500.stm  
557
 Parekh, Identity, 112. 
558
 CBMI, 71. 
559
 CBMI, 70. 
560
 CBMI, 70. 
 136 
Modern communications, transnational mobility, trade and international relations 
coupled with environmental and security concerns have reduced the world to a global 
community, increasingly reliant on the dialogic process. Within the EU, the need for 
open channels of communication becomes increasingly urgent as continuing 
immigration flows contribute to cultural, political and religious plurality. The debates 
in Brussels provided an opportunity to discuss some of the challenges facing the EU 
in an increasingly multicultural world and the concerns raised by the speakers echoed 
the discourse analysed in the preceding chapters. Both strands emphasise that 
integration and intercultural dialogue is about reciprocity - about understanding the 
others‟ point of view in order to expose social and economic differences and create a 
level playing ground.  
 
Guest speakers raised many of the same concerns that academics, scholars and 
stakeholders have been raising during the past two decades:  
- the need to promote peaceful dialogue as a means to prevent conflict,  
- the EU‟s future is reliant on immigrants, 
- successful integration relies on social and economic pre-conditions and political 
leaders must act responsibly to ensure these are met, 
- the importance of education to equip future generations to live harmoniously in a 
multicultural Europe, 
- the need to accept Islam as a European religion, 
- the equality of identities,  
- the power of the media to ignite prejudice or mediate reconciliation.  
 
Ultimately, for Muslims and other minorities in Europe, intercultural dialogue is 
about action - on the street and in civic, national and supra-national institutions. The 
following chapter looks at the recommendations from the debates, situating these 
within academic discourse. It also looks at some emerging „intercultural trends‟ at the 
grassroots and the response of civil society, and the EU institutions to the Year of 
Intercultural Dialogue. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WHISPERS OF CHANGE? 
 
 
“In a world which has become a small village we may benefit from all 
cultures and gather them together in one civilisation for the good of 
all…but at the same time one must defend one‟s own identity so as to 
protect the beauty of the world”. Ahmad Badr al-din Hassoun.561 
 
 
Introduction. 
One of the main objectives of EYID was to promote intercultural dialogue as a 
medium for peaceful coexistence and to provide an opportunity for member states and 
citizens to explore the therapeutic qualities of the dialogic process. Over 524 national 
events and 406 projects raised the awareness of intercultural dialogue and mobilised 
stakeholders, policy makers and grassroots civil society organisations throughout the 
EU.
562
 Its aim was to facilitate a better understanding of Europe‟s complex multi-
cultural environment by moving beyond „mere tolerance‟ towards a celebration of 
Europe‟s diversity. Will „intercultural coffee‟ or „intercultural art‟ under the carapace 
of intercultural dialogue make any difference to those who struggle with diversity? 
Only, according to guest speakers and scholars, if it enables a public recognition of 
the value assigned to the different cultural identities that contribute to a multicultural 
society.
563
 Parekh argues, that societies value identities relative to their positions of 
importance within “the prevailing structure of power and any revaluation entails 
corresponding changes” within those power structures.564 As Bashy Quraishy argued 
in the first Brussels debate, however, only the majority power structures in societies 
have the means to orchestrate change because, “Minorities do not have the power to 
ask for a dialogue based on mutual understanding. The majority has the key to the 
front door, not the minority”.565 This is especially true in relation to Europe‟s Muslim 
population, for although there are approximately 15 million Muslims in the EU there 
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are fewer than 30 Muslim representatives in national governments across the member 
states.
566
 Thus, within the EU it is the majority power structures - supranational, 
national and local - that orchestrate the socio-economic and psychological 
environment within which immigrants are ascribed value and it is the majority 
population that then accepts or rejects these „valued immigrants‟.   
 
This was reinforced by the guest speakers at the EU debates in Brussels, who cited 
the importance of education and the need for responsible leadership to address socio-
economic disparities as the most influential factors in relation to valuing immigrants 
and for promoting successful integration. Since this thesis is concerned with the 
dialogue between Islam and contemporary Europe, this chapter looks at the concerns 
and recommendations that emerged from the EU debates and specifically situates 
these within the wider body of academic discourse that has consistently advocated 
similar solutions for the integration of Europe‟s Muslims. It also looks at the 
commitment of the EU institutions to promoting a multicultural Europe and some 
emerging grassroots trends amongst young Muslims. It then suggests areas for further 
research in a discourse that remains significant to Europe‟s future. 
 
Concerns and Recommendations. 
Socio-economic pre-conditions (reliant on political will) and education emerged from 
the EU debates as the two most important factors in relation to the successful 
integration of migrants in Europe. These two themes are especially relevant in 
relation to Europe‟s Muslim population and this chapter argues that these two 
concerns ultimately underpin all of the other themes. In 2006, a Pew Poll conducted 
in Germany, Great Britain, France and Spain reported that the major worry for 
Muslims in these four countries was unemployment rather than religious or cultural 
concerns.
567
 Employment - the ability to house, feed and clothe one‟s family - and 
access to education, enable migrants to become upwardly mobile and to fully 
participate in citizenship. The first step from intercultural challenges to 
interculturalism, according to The Rainbow Paper, is to “stop identifying conflicts in 
our interactions with “others” as foremost culturally and ethnically motivated when 
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they are often actually rooted in socio-economic and political inequalities”.568 
Academics like Klausen, Roy, Pettigrew, Schnapper and Boubekeur (quoted in 
Chapter 5, pp. 128-131), along with the EUMC (Ch. 5, p.130) and Brussels‟ speakers, 
like Quraishy and Sandahl, agree that „cultural democracy‟ relies on equal access to 
economic and educational resources for minority groups. As Bhutto writes in relation 
to life in Pakistan, “Huge economic disparities between social classes in a society 
strain national unity”.569 This is also true in the EU where high unemployment 
sparked violent clashes involving Muslim youth in the banlieues in France in 2005. 
As Wharton writes: 
 
One can also state that prevailing economic conditions command a powerful 
influence over the respective fortunes of Muslim communities in Western Europe 
and thus closely affect both the reaction of the host society towards Muslim 
communities and the corresponding response of the Muslim communities. This 
factor has been seen to be at work during times of economic recession and 
unemployment in Western Europe when the non-indigenous nature of respective 
Muslim communities and their perceived “intrusionary” status was found to have 
been emphasized and exaggerated in a negative fashion.
570
  
 
The concern for the EU in this present time of economic uncertainty is whether 
Muslim immigrants will once again find themselves marginalised as they were in the 
recession during the 1970‟s. Already media reports are signifying that the economic 
slump will exacerbate social problems amongst the “poor and those descendent from 
immigrants, especially the Muslim community”.571 In his role as manager of a 
recruitment company, Benoît van Grieken commented that sometimes employers 
would refuse to employ workers of different origins and to address this, Onyeji 
“urged the commission to speed up efforts to win approval from all EU countries for 
an exhaustive – horizontal anti-discrimination directive” that would cover 
discrimination in all its forms.
572
 Imam Sajid also called for the harmonisation of EU 
laws in order to “produce a “single equality” and fight discrimination…and bring 
about change through active citizenship”573 and Commissioner Špidla said the EU 
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needed to legislate in order to “guarantee effective enforcement mechanisms and 
dissuasive sanctions, accompanied by positive action measures”.574 Imane Karich 
endorses these comments, arguing for proactive policies to ensure that Muslims are 
not disadvantaged by their religion in the labour market and argues that the EU could 
introduce “targets for the minimum level of ethnic and religious diversity, starting 
with the public services”.575 These recommendations echo the proposals of academics 
like Choudhury
576
 and the EUMC 2006 report on Islamophobia which advises that: 
 
Member States need to develop, reinforce and evaluate policies aimed a 
delivering equality and non-discrimination for Muslim communities, 
particularly in the fields of employment, education, and access to goods and 
services.
577
 
 
Education is on a par with socio-economic pre-conditions and is also pivotal to 
integration because education not only creates opportunity but as polls in the EU 
suggest, those who are better educated also tend to be more accepting of different 
ethnicities and less given to prejudice (Pettigrew, Ch. 3, p. 77). While first generation 
immigrants are often resigned to the difficulties of settling in a foreign land they 
believe that life will be easier for their children as they become educated through the 
host societies‟ institutions. For Muslim immigrants in Europe in the 1970‟s, however: 
 
The second shock came when the children of these migrants, whom their parents 
had hoped would become well educated and well integrated in the job markets, 
were unable to achieve social promotion. Many of them ended up having no 
qualifications and therefore were either in low level jobs or unemployed. In this 
precarious situation, for some Muslims religion has become a way to regain the 
recognition which could not be obtained through professional merits.
578
  
 
It is exactly this type of marginalisation that can be remedied by ensuring equal 
access to education with teachers who are trained to deal with diversity. Hence, Mr 
van Leeuwen‟s call for more teachers able to promote tolerance and the value of 
diverse cultures in the classroom. As the guest speakers and Sardar argue, children 
are the best ambassadors and are able to more easily straddle two worlds. The role of 
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schools and educators, therefore, are crucial especially as “many migrant families 
belong to socially-disadvantaged groups where parents have little capacity to 
promote” the integration process.579 Again, Bhutto‟s words regarding education for 
young Muslim children in Pakistan are equally applicable to young Muslim children 
in Europe, “The first key is to build an educational system that allows children to rise 
to a higher social and economic status than their parents.”580 Education is also key for 
„native European‟ children who need to learn to value other cultures and understand 
that different ways of life are equally valid. In the European Parliament, the EP Vice-
President Rodi Kratsa-Tsagaropoulou stated that “Education can teach respect and the 
acceptance of pluralism and diversity in the context of religion and beliefs”.581 Thus, 
education can foster Bennett‟s „virtual insidership‟ and Maalouf‟s „reciprocity‟ and 
help to avoid Castells‟ „resistance identities‟ (Ch. 3, p.76, p. 76 & p. 67 respectively). 
Ramadan, Roy and Tibi also warned in previous chapters that it is important for 
Muslim youth to feel a sense of belonging in their host societies and this „sense‟ often 
begins in schools. 
 
For Muslim youth education is a double-edged sword because of the involvement of 
foreign imams and foreign governments. For this reason, guest speakers, academics 
and imams continue to point out the need for Europe to know what is being taught in 
Islamic schools on European soil. They stress the urgent need for locally trained 
imams, and for European mosques to be locally funded to ensure that mosques 
“remain primarily places of worship and not places of political influence for foreign 
national agendas and extremist ideologies”.582 Godard concurs and writes that the 
“Supervision of youngsters and the creation of training centres for imams, teachers on 
religion or chaplains appear to be urgent. Delays over the control of teaching 
materials used in koranic schools are dangerous. Muslim religious education has to be 
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considered as the first challenge”.583 Not only are Muslim youth taught by foreign 
imams in Europe but some second and third generation Muslim youth also return to 
their families‟ country of origin for Islamic studies. While other immigrants in 
Europe generally integrate over time through the immersion of succeeding 
generations in the local culture, a study commissioned by the European Parliament‟s 
Committee on Culture and Education, (May 2007), noted that although subsequent 
generations of Muslim are born and educated in Europe they often “study Islamic 
sciences in Muslim countries since there was no place to carry out those studies in 
Europe”. 584 The report warned that Islam in Europe is not only imported through 
foreign imams, but it is actually “carried forward by actors who were born in 
European territory” and this hampers the emergence of “an intellectual elite, capable 
of its own autonomous, original intellectual production”. 585 As Roy argues, it is 
imperative to sever these links so that Islam is no longer “managed through the help 
of foreign governments or institutions, which have no interest in delinking Muslims 
in the West with their countries”.586 The urgent need for locally trained imams is 
endorsed by moderate Dutch Muslims like Hikmat Mahawat Khan who says that 
before Muslim leaders can demand change in Europe, they need to take certain steps 
to show that they are changing. As well as recruiting locally-trained imams, Khan 
says, it is important that mosques and Islamic organisations are more open and 
outward-looking and more involved in their communities and that Islamic schools 
should be open to all.
587
  
 
These recommendations to ensure equal opportunities in education for Muslim 
children and to press for transparency in Islamic schools and mosques feeds into the 
need for a separation between church and state in order to further facilitate the 
integration of Europe‟s Muslims. An American journalist notes:  
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Three generations after West Indians began immigrating en masse to the United 
Kingdom, Caribbean-descended Britons still doubt that their children or 
grandchildren will ever be seen as fully British. Turkish guest workers are still, 
two generations later, not seen as fully German. And the unrest of the children 
and grandchildren o Algerian, West African and Moroccan immigrants in the 
French suburbs attest to France‟s failure to assimilate its immigrant population, 
despite the republic‟s official egalitarian rhetoric…As long as there is a Church 
of England, if you are Jewish or Muslim or Sikh, there is a subtle level at which 
you will simply not feel fully English.
588
 
 
Refusing to acknowledge Islam on par with Christianity as a „mere religion‟ (as Roy 
advocates) is a stumbling block for those Muslims like Klausen‟s elites (Ch. 4, p. 
102) who are seeking to politically participate in Europe‟s future. 
 
In Westminster, the European Parliament, the Bundestag, and in regional and 
municipal councils throughout Western Europe, the democratic political system 
that emerged from the European Enlightenment is starting to absorb men and 
women born in a Muslim tradition, for the first time in history. A promising 
generation of young Muslims now have opportunities to exercise democratic 
rights…Their political participation has its roots in local  organizations, where 
many of these entrepreneurs, activists, professionals, and civil servants got their 
start. Such grassroots political activity requires a separation of mosque and state, 
as Islam settles into the European milieu. This separation of the secular and 
religious domains is the prerequisite for liberating the forces of reform in the 
Muslim world.
589
  
 
As previously stated Islam in Europe is not homogenous, it is as diverse as the 
believers‟ countries of origin. Yet, as Ulrich Schwerin comments “when Europe fails 
in its task to integrate Muslim immigrants, religion gives them a common identity”.590 
An identity that all too often is portrayed in negative terms, which serves to further 
entrench the „them and us‟ mentality on both sides. To defuse this thinking Roy 
argues that Europe needs to encourage the emergence of a European Islam, which 
will help integrate European Muslims by providing a Western-compatible religious 
identity while weakening links with foreign countries at the same time.
591
 He says the 
“challenge is not to go at the roots of terrorism…The challenge is to prevent the 
radical fringe from finding a broad political base among the local Muslim 
population”.592 Accepting Islam as a religion on par with other European religions 
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would prevent the radicalisation of Islam and allow for dialogue on an equal basis. 
Boubeker writes, “Recourse to radical forms of political Islam, particularly by young 
people, is often the expression of a lack of political representation and participation 
by those who are excluded and socially and culturally discriminated against”.593  
 
Ironically, a Gallup World poll found that “London Muslims generally agree with the 
British public about what it takes for minorities to integrate into society. Majorities of 
both groups agree mastering the national language, getting a better education, finding 
a job, participating in politics, volunteering to serve the public and celebrating 
national holidays are necessary for successful integration”.594 This report shows that 
Muslims generally want to integrate but one barrier to integration, according to the 
guest speakers and academics, is the lack of recognition of the important contribution 
that Islam and Europe‟s Muslims make in terms of historically and culturally 
enriching the European story and their value as consumers and contributors to 
Europe‟s future. The Rainbow Paper endorses this, arguing that, ethical and cultural 
issues aside, it is important to value immigrants for the contribution they make to 
their national economies and to recognize their value as consumers, alongside the cost 
on non-integration of migrants and minorities in terms of social welfare, safety and 
policing costs.
595
 
 
The struggle to be recognised and valued as European citizens is further hampered by 
media reports, which all too often portray Islam in a threatening light by reporting the 
negative and omitting the positive. In terms of integration, media have a double 
responsibility. On the one hand, they have the ability to influence the concerns of 
public opinion by determining the agenda and, on the other hand, they contribute 
towards creating a perception of reality by swaying public opinion. The guest 
speakers called for discernment from the public to question and challenge news 
stories and for journalists to self-monitor their work and to promote ethical 
journalism. As Rigoni writes:  “Any policy, any action in the field of integration and 
the fight against discrimination must therefore include the media…and in particular 
ethnic media…[who] are one of the key groups of actors influencing the integration 
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of minority or marginalised people and groups, and thus of their acceptance as 
belonging to society”.596  
 
Hence, equal opportunities to employment and education; recognising Islam as a 
European religion; valuing Muslim immigrants and recognising their right to express 
their different identities; and the accurate portrayal of Muslims in the media are the 
keys to facilitating peaceful integration, according to academics and the Brussels 
speakers. These are not new ideas but to date progress in fostering a „social Europe‟ 
has been hampered by an emphasis on an „economic Europe‟. At the beginning of 
EYID Bashy Quraishy, criticised the European Commission, arguing that it should 
have allocated half of the EYID budget to Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
who “interact with the very people they want to create a dialogue with”.597 He 
cautioned:  
 
My biggest concern is that this kind of year, like last year which was the year of 
„equal opportunities‟ , becomes a symbolic gesture; talking and exchanging 
smiles and pleasant words
598
. 
 
Considering, that the EU is often criticised for its loquacious rhetoric and 
sesquipedalianism, Quraishy raised valid concerns that a majority monologue was in 
danger of reducing intercultural dialogue to a meaningless exercise. However, just as 
there is evidence of a sea-change at the grassroots level, there is also evidence of a 
renewed interest within the EU institutions and national governments in intercultural 
dialogue in order to breathe life into the EU‟s motto „unity in diversity‟.  
 
Political Action. 
Although the EU does not have any competencies to act in the field of religion and 
this dimension is seldom present at the level of Community policies, the current EU 
leadership was active in the promotion of events within the framework of EYID. The 
European Commission and the European Policy Centre jointly organised the Brussels 
debates and the European Commission organised a conference entitled „Intercultural 
Dialogue: a challenge for faith and convictions‟ (November 2008). During the year 
the European Parliament invited several distinguished personalities to address the 
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plenary on various religious perspectives, and also hosted four seminars specifically 
focussing on „Islam, Christianity and Europe‟.599 In response to calls for a stronger 
stance from the EU in relation to discrimination the European Council adopted the 
„Council Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism 
and xenophobia by means of criminal law‟ on 28 November, 2008.600 In the 
Framework Decision the Council states: 
 
(5) Racism and xenophobia constitute a threat against groups of persons which 
are the target of such behaviour. It is necessary to define a common-criminal law 
approach in the European Union to this phenomenon in order to ensure that the 
same behaviour constitutes an offence in all Member States and that effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties are provided for natural and legal persons 
having committees or being liable for such offences. 
 
The FRA welcomed this as an important step forward, coming seven years after its 
initial presentation by the European Commission in 2001, saying that it is “an 
important tool for the EU-wide condemnation of racist and xenophobic crime”.601 At 
this point in time, however, full harmonisation of laws in this area is still constrained 
by the fact that: 
 
(6) Since Member States‟ cultural and legal traditions are, to some extent, 
different, particularly in this field, full harmonisation of criminal laws is 
currently not possible. 
 
Again, although migrant integration policy remains primarily the competence of 
Member States, the EU institutions have been gradually constructing a common 
framework since the Tampere Council in 1999. In 2007, the European Parliament and 
the European Council instigated an EU fund for the integration of third-country 
nationals for the 2007-2013 period based on a proposal from the European 
Commission. The purpose of the fund was “to provide education, boost proficiency in 
the language of host countries and ensure migrant access to social security 
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systems”.602 In November 2008, Barroso assured regional and municipal authorities 
that the Council would work towards allowing them to directly access the fund, 
which had previously been administered by national authorities. Earlier in the year, 
German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said that, “achieving full integration 
and ensuring equal opportunities of migrants living in Europe is one of the most 
important challenges of EU home affairs policy”. He added that “intercultural 
dialogue is particularly important for ensuring stability and internal security, given 
the growing Muslim population in many (EU) member states”.603 
 
European national governments have not been passive either. Although no longer in 
office, Azouz Begag was appointed France‟s first Minister Delegate for the 
Promotion of Equal Opportunity in 2005, and a High Authority for the Fight Against 
Discrimination and for Equal Opportunity was created. In January 2008, in an 
unprecedented move, Nicolas Sarkozy appointed three Muslim women to his 
cabinet.
604
 The UK created several committees with a mixture of government and 
Muslim members, to improve dialogue and explore concrete measures to aid 
integration and the Dutch government launched a comprehensive program for 
empowerment and integration. France already has a system in place to check on the 
sources of foreign money used to build mosques and Italy is looking to put a system 
in place in an attempt to prevent the influence of foreign Islamic groups.
605
  
 
Ultimately “legal protection from discrimination is only one tool for addressing 
Islamophobia and anti –Muslim prejudice…Where…discrimination is the result of 
the reproduction and reinforcement of stereotypes and the perpetuation of prejudices 
about Muslims, then the solution lies in empowering Muslims to challenge and 
disrupt these discourses”.606 Empowering requires action and there is evidence of 
action not only politically by Klausen‟s elites but also in the realms of media and 
                                                 
602
 “Barroso to ease access to integration fund.” http://www.euractiv.com/en/socialeurope/barroso-ease-
access-eu-migrant-integration-fund/article-177601   
603
 Ibid.  
604
 Rachida Dati was appointed as the Justice Minister, Fadela Amara, undersecretary for urban affairs 
and Rama Yade as foreign undersecretary for human rights. Although it looks like President Sarkozy 
will remove Rachida Dati and Rama Yade from his cabinet in June 2009, encouraging them both to 
stand for the European Parliamentary elections. (UK Telegraph, 28 January, 2009). Accessed 22/03/09 
via www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/4374160/President -Nicolas-Sarkozy-to-push-
Rama-Yade-out-of-governmetn.html  
605
 Christian Fraser, BBC News, 5 January 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6235451.stm  
606
 Choudhury, “Muslims and Discrimination,” in European Islam, 106. 
 148 
film, theatre and television, and art and journalism. Muslim artists, comedians and 
journalists are challenging negative discourses by publicly celebrating their culture, 
ethnicity and unique European identities by finding innovative ways to remain 
faithful to Islam while embracing western democracy.  
 
Grassroots Action. 
Identity is based on legitimacy, and legitimacy is reinforced through visibility. 
Visibility of Europe‟s Muslims, not only in local communities but also in art 
galleries, in craft and fashion stores, in restaurants, in the media, on the radio and in 
television programmes may well result in a legitimisation of their role in the multi-
cultured patchwork that constitutes Europe. The visibility of Muslims has long been a 
stumbling block for European governments and citizens alike. The classic example 
being in relation to the hijab in France, where as Cesari writes, the government 
responded, by passing a law “charged with the protection of individual freedom – 
including the protection of individual freedom against the individual‟s will”.607 As 
reported by the 2007 Gallup World Poll, visibility is still a problem for 62% of the 
British public who said that minorities should blend in more, whilst 55% of the 
British public thought that Muslims should not wear veils.
608
  
 
One young Muslim female comedian, Shazia Mirza, challenges these stereotypes and 
prejudices in Britain through humour. She says audiences are initially shocked to see 
a Muslim woman wearing the hijab on stage but “once people warm to me…they 
forget about it”.609 Mirza says that by openly joking about suicide bombers she 
defuses their importance and can dispute fears that every Muslim is a potential 
terrorist. Another Muslim comedian is Omar Marzouk, who was born in Copenhagen 
in 1973. Marzouk initially responded to a competition to combat racism organised by 
the EU in the mid 1990s.
610
 He discovered that as a comedian he was able to 
challenge prejudices and openly challenge European fears of Islam and terrorism 
whilst presenting a different perspective in a non-threatening manner. Marzouk, who 
speaks fluent English, Danish and Arabic, is an example of one of Castells‟ elite (Ch. 
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3, p. 75) who are able to move easily between two worlds. Recently, for another EU 
sponsored competition to promote public service programming, Marzouk wrote “The 
Terrorist Cell”, a television programme that is scheduled to air on Danish Television 
next year. While poking fun at Islam and terrorism Marzouk also “chides the Danes 
for avoiding hard questions about immigration – Denmark has some of the toughest 
anti-immigration laws in Europe – and the country‟s role in the Middle East, where it 
has troops in Iraq and Afghanistan”.611  
 
Tariq Ramadan talks of a “silent revolution in Muslim communities in the West” in 
which “more and more young people and intellectuals are actively looking for a way 
to live in harmony with their faith” as they construct a European Islam at the 
grassroots.
612
 An Islam developed through engaging in an authentic dialogue between 
equals. While dressed in Western culture and rooted in Western society, it 
nevertheless remains faithful to the principles of Islam. Cesari also argues that latter 
generations of immigrants are developing de-ethnicised European-Muslim identities 
relative to their country of residence.
613
 Using humour and art to express their 
identities, is popular with a number of artists and writers, like Sardar, who is able to 
use humour to challenge prejudice and change perceptions of Muslims by presenting 
an „insiders‟ view. Sardar, born in a rural village in the Punjab, on the Pakistani-
Indian border, emigrated with his family to London where he found that “being and 
becoming a Muslim, shaping an identity, was a contested arena wherever I lived, in 
London or in a divided India „back home‟.614 On his quest to discover “how to be a 
Muslim…in the better world…[his] generation was committed to creating”615 he 
encounters “Men with rigid certainty in their eyes”616 coming at him from all 
directions. His humorous account of one Muslim‟s search to belong dispels the notion 
of Islam as homogenous and immutable, positing instead that, like identity, “the 
Muslim paradise is not a place of arrival but a way of travelling”.617 
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Gary Younge, a black British writer also uses humour to explore real issues 
concerning the question of identity:  
 
Ladies and gentlemen, we are about to land at Heathrow. Please stow away your 
tray tables, put your seats in the upright position, ensure your seatbelt is securely 
fastened and that your racial identity is put away carefully in a safe place as 
otherwise it may well pop out and cause you injury.             Gary Younge.
618
 
 
In October (2007), during Ramadan, another young Muslim artist in Germany, Melih 
Kesmen, began to print eye-catching messages on clothing in an attempt to dispel 
rising prejudice against Muslims after the publication of the Denmark Cartoons.
619
 
Kesmen decided to promote communication through curiosity by spreading peaceful 
messages through “styleislam” which involves printing pictures with words like “drop 
love not bombs”, “hijab supporter” or “go halal”. Kesmen says the motifs facilitate 
dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim, and remind Muslims that it is okay to 
inject humour into religious issues.  
  
Klausen noted in her interviews of Muslim elites that embryonic „national faith-based 
umbrella groups‟ who support integration are focussing on political participation at a 
national level.
620
 Although at present Muslims are underrepresented in the EU‟s 
national parliaments and institutions, as well as in civic society, there are indications 
that European Muslims are becoming increasingly active at a local political level. In 
local elections in The Netherlands in May 2006, “a record number of Muslims went 
to the polls and elected immigrants to various city councils, demonstrating that 
immigrants are seeking change through healthy democratic means”.621 Kepel too 
posits that the time is ripe for the “hybridization of two distinct cultures” and that a 
new generation of Muslim thinkers are emerging who will present a modern face of 
Islam.
622
 In Milan, 2Gs (second-generation Muslim immigrants) seek to bridge the 
gap between cultures through “Yalla Italia” (Let‟s Go, Italy), a monthly publication 
started in May 2007.
623
 The magazine is directed at the 700,000 2Gs in Italy who are 
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juggling Italian, European and Muslim identities, and for Italians who have little 
knowledge of a culture that virtually didn‟t exist in Italy two decades ago. As 
Ouejdane Mejri (a teacher of information technology at Milan Polytechnic) says, 
„Yalla Italia‟ shows Italians another perspective of Muslim life:  
 
Immigrants are not just people who wash ashore on a beach. We pay taxes, 
participate in society, strive to integrate. We are the future of Italy, and we want 
to be protagonists of that future.
624
 
 
 
The importance of art and the artist as mediums for crossing cultural barriers was 
emphasised by the Brussels speakers and EYID devoted considerable effort to 
promoting art, drama, music, film and photographic exhibitions throughout the EU. 
This work is continuing in the work of commercial film producers as well with a 
French film, The Class winning the prestigious Palme d‟Or at Cannes in 2008. The 
film was shot at the Francoise Dolto High School in the 20
th
 arrondissement in Paris, 
one of the city‟ most culturally mixed suburbs. The Class “addresses the current 
concern over the integration of immigrant students into a crumbling school system 
and ties into the ongoing debate over what exactly constitutes „Frenchness‟”.625 The 
real life actors in the movie reject Sarkozy‟s derogatory comments regarding 
immigrants in their neighbourhood during the 2007 riots by presenting immigrant 
communities in a more positive light.  
 
Architecture is another medium through which prejudices are being challenged. 
Previously the building of mosques in old warehouses and garages strengthened the 
perception of Islam as a „secondary religion‟ to Muslims, while also reinforcing the 
perception of “Muslim communities as a part of shadow society”.626 Joël Privot, 
architect and co-founder of Expert-is, a consultation agency specialising in the 
construction of mosques, says that, “wherever Islam has settled in history [outside 
Europe], new Islamic architecture had developed related to the local context…[but] 
this architectural contextualisation had not taken place in Europe.”627 However, this is 
changing, evidenced by a new mosque in Belgium, which dispels traditional fears of 
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Islam by combining high architectural and environmental standards, whilst creating 
spaces, which are open and welcoming for the residents of the entire neighbourhood.   
 
Conclusion.  
Thus, whispers of change are evident across the EU, in the institutions as well as in 
the streets. There are signs of a political and civil commitment to moving beyond 
„mere tolerance‟ towards a united future. Despite economic and social challenges, the 
EU continues to work towards harmonising practices in relation to integration, and in 
deterring racism and discrimination. Though political change is slow there are 
indications of „political will‟ and despite entrenched Islamophobia in some parts of 
the EU, many people accept that Muslims are an integral part of Europe and have 
much to offer culturally, and as consumers, workers and citizens.   
 
With its strengths and weaknesses, Europe is gradually taking shape in an 
increasingly complex world - but it's still looking for a vision, for its "founding 
myth". This search for an identity is at least proof that it is becoming a reality. 
Professor Pierre Hassner.
628
 
 
 
For over three decades, Europe‟s Muslims have lived largely in the shadows but in 
this, the 21
st
 century, through both positive and negative actions, they are seeking a 
more visible role. Young educated Muslims are using their artistic and comedic skills 
to challenge old stereotypes and promote dialogue. Changes to the European 
landscape both figuratively and literally signify the emergence of an embryonic 
European Muslim identity, which, given the chance, could well be compatible with a 
broader pan-European identity. The EYID provided an opportunity to focus on the 
importance of Europe‟s cultural diversity on a number of levels and endorsed the 
same concerns that academics have raised in relation to the integration of Muslim 
immigrants in recent years. Continued emphasis on the value of these immigrants and 
ethnic diversity in general can only benefit the integration process and the EU‟s 
search for a „social Europe‟. Equally importantly, if intercultural dialogue is effective 
as a paradigm for peace between Islam and contemporary Europe, its influence will 
also benefit the EU‟s relationship with its Mediterranean neighbours and the global 
West/East discourse.  
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In terms of the Euro-Muslim chronicle, it seems that one of the areas suffering from a 
lack of research is that of analysing the positive achievements of Muslims in Europe. 
Consequently, further research including interviews at the grassroots level as well as 
with elites and stakeholders, could prove insightful and provide valuable resources 
with which to balance the „integration narrative‟.  
 
Ironically, twelve thousand miles away, in a former European colony, a different yet 
similar minority/majority debate encompassing a similar timeframe has been taking 
place. If one changes the ethnicities of the minority (Maori to Muslim) and majority 
(New Zealand to the EU), a quote in a local magazine in New Zealand could be 
equally applicable to the European Union: 
 
What‟s good for Maori is good for New Zealand. Maori can‟t sit in a vacuum 
doing their own thing and expect New Zealand to embrace it. And New 
Zealand cannot go forward as a nation without taking Maori with it”. (Hon. Dr. 
Pita Sharples, Minister of Maori Affairs).
629
   
 
 
Recognising the significant historical, cultural and economical wealth that Europe‟s 
Muslims contribute to the EU, and working towards providing economic and social 
parity can only benefit Europe, for the European Union cannot go forward without its 
Muslim population. 
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